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Opinion of the Court.

proof of insanity makes an equipoise, the presumption of sanity is neutralized—it is overturned, it ceases to weigh, and the jury are in reasonable doubt. How, then, can a presumption, which has been neutralized by countervailing proof, be resorted to to turn the scale? The absurdity to which this doctrine leads will be more obvious by supposing that the jury should return a special verdict. It would be as follows: 'We find the defendant guilty of the killing charged, but the proof leaves our minds in doubt whether he was of such soundness of memory and discretion as to have done the killing wilfully, deliberately, maliciously, and premeditatedly.' Upon such a verdict no judge could pronounce the judgment of death upon the defendant." So, in Plake v. State, 121 Indiana, 433, 435, Judge Elliott, speaking for the Supreme Court of Indiana, said: "If the evidence is of such a character as to create a reasonable doubt whether the accused was of unsound mind at the time the crime was committed, he is entitled to a verdict of acquittal. Polk v. State, 19 Indiana, 170; Bradley v. State, 31 Indiana, 492; McDougal v. State, 88 Indiana, 24.” To the same effect are many other American cases cited in argument. The principle is accurately stated by Mr. Justice Cox of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia as follows: "The crime, then, involves three elements, viz., the killing, malice, and a responsible mind in the murderer. But after all the evidence is in, if the jury, while bearing in mind both these presumptions that I have mentioned-i.e. that the defendant is innocent until he is proved guilty, and that he is and was sane, unless evidence to the contrary appearsand considering the whole evidence in the case, still entertain what is called a reasonable doubt, on any ground, (either as to the killing or the responsible condition of mind,) whether he is guilty of the crime of murder, as it has been explained and defined, then the rule is that the defendant is entitled to the benefit of that doubt and to an acquittal." Guiteau's case, 10 Fed. Rep. 161, 163.

It seems to us that undue stress is placed in some of the cases upon the fact that, in prosecutions for murder the defence of insanity is frequently resorted to and is sustained by the

Opinion of the Court.

evidence of ingenious experts whose theories are difficult to be met and overcome. Thus, it is said, crimes of the most atrocious character often go unpunished, and the public safety is thereby endangered. But the possibility of such results. must always attend any system devised to ascertain and punish crime, and ought not to induce the courts to depart from principles fundamental in criminal law, and the recognition and enforcement of which are demanded by every consideration of humanity and justice. No man should be deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their consciences, to say that the evidence before them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact neces-¡ sary to constitute the crime charged.

For the reason stated, and without alluding to other matters in respect to which error is assigned, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to grant a new trial, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

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160 493
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ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE 176 73
DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON.

No. 75. Submitted November 19, 1895. - Decided December 28, 1895.

82f 241

160 493

L-ed 508

901 522

160 493

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Circuit Courts of the United States have jurisdiction of actions in which f102f 4
the United States are plaintiffs, without regard to the value of the matter
in dispute.

THE case is stated in the opinion.

493

40 L-ed 508

184

696

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MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

Opinion of the Court.

This action was brought by the United States against the defendants in error in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington, Northern Division, to recover the sum of $1470 as damages alleged to have been sustained by the government in consequence of the unlawful conversion by the defendants of timber made from fir trees on certain unoccupied lands of the United States.

One of the defendants demurred upon the ground that, as the matter in dispute did not exceed the sum or value of $2000, the court was without jurisdiction.

The demurrer was sustained and the cause was dismissed, the Circuit Court holding upon the authority of United States v. Huffmaster, 38 Fed. Rep. 81, 83, that the acts of Congress defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States deprive those courts of jurisdiction in civil suits where the amount involved was less than $2000, exclusive of interest and costs, even in cases in which the United States were plaintiffs or petitioners.

In accordance with the fifth section of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, the court below certified the above question of jurisdiction as the only question to be determined upon the present writ of error.

By the judiciary act of 1789 it was provided that "the Circuit Courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State." 1 Stat. 78, c. 20, 11.

The Revised Statutes, which went into effect in 1873, specified the suits and proceedings of which the Circuit Courts of the United States should have original jurisdiction, and, among them, were many in which the government would ordinarily be the plaintiff, namely, suits in equity where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum or value of $500, and the United States were petitioners; suits at common law

Opinion of the Court.

where the United States, or any officer thereof suing under the authority of an act of Congress, were plaintiffs; suits at law or in equity arising under an act providing for revenue from imports or tonnage, except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and seizures on land or on waters not within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and except suits for penalties and forfeitures; suits arising under a law providing internal revenue, and of all causes arising under the postal laws; suits and proceedings for the enforcement of penalties provided by laws regulating the carriage of passengers in merchant vessels; proceedings for the condemnation of property taken as a prize, in pursuance of section 5308, Title, Insurrection; suits arising under the laws relating to the slave trade; and suits by the assignee of a debenture for drawback of duties, issued under a law for the collection of duties against the person to whom such debenture was originally granted, or against any indorser thereof, to recover the amount of such debenture. § 629.

In reference to the jurisdiction of the District Courts of the United States, as defined by the Revised Statutes, it is only necessary to say that as to actions or suits in which ordinarily the United States would be petitioners or plaintiffs, such jurisdiction was not made to depend upon the amount in dispute. § 563.

The first section of the act of March 3, 1875, determining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States, and regulating the removal of causes from state courts, provided that "the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of $500, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State

Opinion of the Court.

and foreign States, citizens, or subjects; and shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein." 18 Stat. 470, c. 137, § 1.

The first section of the judiciary act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, c. 373, corrected by the act of August 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, c. 866, amends the first section of the act of 1875, and provides that "the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of two thousand dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, or in which controversy the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid, or a controversy between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, or a controversy between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects, in which the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value aforesaid, and shall have exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States, except as otherwise provided by law, and concurrent jurisdiction with the District Courts of the crimes and offences cognizable by them."

It cannot be doubted that the judiciary act of 1789 made the value of the matter in dispute jurisdictional, even in suits of a civil nature brought by the United States in the Circuit Courts of the United States. But under the Revised Statutes the amount in dispute was not made jurisdictional in civil actions or proceedings instituted by the United States, except that in suits in equity the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, must have exceeded the sum of $500; and no restriction as

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