Opinion of the Court. the sums advanced by them, respectively. He, however, took a conveyance of the entire estate to himself, and they both moved upon the place, he managing the land, and she attending to the household duties. The deed was recorded, and he borrowed money, mortgaged the land to secure the loan, and appeared to the world as the owner for a period of over ten years, during which time the sister took no steps to have her equitable rights enforced or asserted. It was held that her possession, under such circumstances, was not such as would charge a subsequent purchaser from her brother with notice of her equitable rights. Here, too, the record title was strictly consistent with the possession. In Rankin v. Coar, 46 N. J. Eq. 566, 572, a widow, who occupied part of a house in which she was entitled to dower, while her son, the sole heir at law, occupied the rest of the house, released her dower therein to her son by deed duly recorded. It was held that her continued occupation thereafter would not give notice to one who took a mortgage from the son, of a title in her to a part of the house occupied by her, acquired by an unrecorded deed to her from her son contemporaneous with her release of dower. "Possession," said the court, "to give notice or to make inquiry a duty, must be open, notorious, and unequivocal. There must be such an occupation of the premises as a man of ordinary prudence, treating for the acquisition of some interest therein, would observe, and, observing would perceive to be inconsistent with the right of him with whom he was treating, and so be led to inquiry." So in Atwood v. Bearss, 47 Mich. 72, the title to property upon the record appeared to be in the wife. Her husband's previous occupation had been under her ownership, and in right of the marital relation, and nothing had transpired to suggest that she had made the property over to him. She had, however, given him a deed, which was not put upon record. It was held that his continuance in possession was no notice of this deed, since it was obviously consistent with the previous title in herself. Indeed, there can be no doubt whatever of the proposition Opinion of the Court. that, where the land is occupied by two persons, as for instance, by husband and wife, and there is a recorded title in one of them, such joint occupation is not notice of an unrecorded title in the other. In such case, the purchaser finding title in one, would be thrown off his guard with respect to the title of the other. The rule is universal that if the possession be consistent with the record title, it is no notice of an unrecorded title. But, where the land is used for the purpose of a home, and is jointly occupied by husband and wife, neither of whom has title by record, we think that in view of the frequency with which homestead property is taken in the name of the wife, the proposed purchaser is bound to make some inquiry as to their title. The case of Phelan v. Brady, 119 N. Y. 587, is an instance of this. In this case a suit was brought to foreclose a mortgage upon certain premises, given by one Murphy, who held an apparently perfect record title to the property. It appeared, however, that before the execution of the mortgage, Murphy had conveyed the premises to one Margaret Brady, who was in possession, and with her husband occupied two rooms in the building on the premises. She also kept a liquor store in a part thereof. The other rooms she leased to various tenants, claiming to be the owner and collecting the rents. Her deed was not recorded until after the giving of the mortgage. It was held that her actual possession under her deed, although unrecorded and its existence unknown to plaintiff, was sufficient notice to him of her rights to defeat any claim under the mortgage. This case goes much farther than is necessary to justify the court in holding that Mrs. Tallmadge's possession was notice in the case under consideration, as the actual occupation of the wife was only of two rooms in a tenement house containing forty-three apartments. If there be any force at all in the general rule that the possession of another than the grantor, puts the purchaser upon inquiry as to the nature of such possession, it applies with peculiar cogency to a case like the present, where the slightest inquiry, either of the husband or wife, would have revealed the actual facts. Instead of making such inquiry, Kirby turns Syllabus. his back upon every source of information, does not even enter the house, makes no examination as to whether the property was in litigation, and buys it of collateral heirs of Miller, subject to his widow's dower if he had had the title, to an unpaid mortgage, and to the chances of the property being required for the payment of Miller's debts. It is clear that a purchase made under such circumstances does not clothe the vendee with the rights of a bona fide purchaser without notice. We see no reason for impeaching the original purchase of the land by Mrs. Tallmadge. Her account of the transaction is supported by the testimony of all the witnesses, as well as by the receipts and other documentary evidence. Her failure to cause the deed to be recorded is not an unusual piece of carelessness, nor is it an infrequent cause of litigation. Under the circumstances of the case, it raises no presumption of fraud. What motives she may have had for taking the title to the property in the name of Mr. Miller is entirely immaterial to the present controversy, although it appears from her testimony that she was possessed of money in her own right, and took this method of investing it. The decree of the court below is, therefore, ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA. 160 389 175 175 160 389 No. 128. Submitted December 18, 1895. - Decided January 6, 1896. L-ed 467 177 236 389 The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in no way undertakes to control the power of a State to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted, or legal obligations be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice, and affords fair opportunity to be heard, before the issues are decided. Whether the court of last resort of a State has properly construed its own constitution and laws in determining that a summary process under those laws was applicable to the matter which it adjudged, is purely the decision of a question of state law, binding upon this court. 160 Statement of the Case. This court has no power to review a decision of a state court that the averments of an answer in a pending case set forth no defence to the plaintiff's claim. It is no denial of a right protected by the Constitution of the United States to refuse a jury trial in a civil cause pending in a state court, even though it be clearly erroneous to construe the laws of the State as justifying the refusal. IN 1880, the Central Iowa Railway Company, which had become the owner, through foreclosure proceedings, of the railroad of the Central Railway Company of Iowa, leased to the Burlington, Cedar Rapids and Northern Company about eleven miles of said road, which lay between Manly Junction and Northwood, the northern terminus of the Central company's road. The Burlington company took exclusive possession of the leased premises. In 1881 the citizens of North wood made application to the state railroad commissioners for an order requiring the Central Iowa Railway Company to operate such leased portion of its road, and after due notice a hearing was had before the commissioners, and, in 1883, the order prayed for was granted. As the company failed to obey, an action was brought, pursuant to chapter 133, Iowa laws of 1884, to compel compliance with the order of the commissioners. The state district court rendered a decree against the railroad company, and on appeal, after a hearing and overruling of a motion for rehearing, the Supreme Court of the State, in October, 1887, entered a decree, ordering, adjudging, and decreeing that the Central Iowa Railway Company operate such leased portion of its line, and enjoining the Burlington company from interference therewith. The opinion of the Supreme Court is reported in 71 Iowa, 410. During the pendency of this litigation, however, foreclosure proceedings were instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Iowa, against the Central Iowa Railway Company, and, while the cause was pending in the Supreme Court of Iowa, on the appeal of the company a receiver of its property was appointed. A decree of foreclosure was entered, and, in September, 1887, the road was sold. Subsequently, the purchaser assigned his purchase to Statement of the Case. the Iowa Railway Company, a corporation of Iowa, which company thereafter made conveyance to plaintiff in error herein, an Illinois corporation, and the receiver surrendered possession to it on May 30, 1889. In August, 1889, the Attorney General of the State of Iowa filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the State, in the name of the State as plaintiff, against the Iowa Central Railway Company, alleging the entry of the decree of October, 1887, above referred to; that thereafter the Iowa Railway Company had become the successor, assignee, and grantee of the Central Iowa Railway Company, and was operating and running its line contrary to the terms and provisions of the decree and in violation thereof. A mandatory injunction was prayed to compel the defendant to obey the command and order contained in said decree. A copy of said petition with notice of an intention to apply for an order to show cause why the order and decree referred to should not be obeyed, was served upon the railway company. That company filed its answer and amendments thereto, which, in substance, set forth that it was not a party to the suit in which the decree was rendered; that the Central Iowa Railway Company at the time of the entering of the decree was dead to all intents and purposes, by reason of the fact that a receiver had theretofore been appointed and the road of the company sold under foreclosure; that defendant was not the successor, assignee, or grantee of said Central Iowa Railway Company and had not been adjudged so to be; that no demand had been made upon it to perform the decree, and that a mandatory writ ought not to be issued until it had an opportunity of testing in a regular manner the right of the State to require the performance of the decree in question. The defendant also filed a demand for a jury trial. Thereupon a motion was made on behalf of the State to enter the order prayed for in the petition, upon the ground that the defendant in its answer had not shown cause why such order should not be made, and for the further reason that from the record and pleadings in the proceeding it appeared that the plaintiff was entitled to such order. Plaintiff's motion for |