Opinion of the Court. most obvious conception of justice and good conscience. It proceeds upon the theory that a mere intruder and trespasser cannot make his wrongdoing successful by asserting a flaw in the title of the one against whom the wrong has been by him committed. In Christy v. Scott, 14 How. 282, 292, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Curtis, said: "A mere intruder cannot enter on a person actually seized, and eject him, and then question his title, or set up an outstanding title in another. The maxim that the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title, and not on the weakness of the defendant's, is applicable to all actions for the recovery of property. But if the plaintiff had actual prior possession of the land, this is strong enough to enable him to recover it from a mere trespasser, who entered without any title. He may do so by a writ of entry, where that remedy is still practised, Jackson v. Boston & Worcester Railroad, 1 Cush. 575, or by an ejectment, Allen v. Rivington, 2 Saund. 111; Doe v. Read, 8 East. 356; Doe v. Dyeball, 1 Moody & M. 346; Jackson v. Hazen, 2 Johns. 438; Whitney v. Wright, 15 Wend. 171, or he may maintain trespass, Catteris v. Cowper, 4 Taunt. 548; Graham v. Peat, 1 East. 246." So also, in Burt v. Panjaud, 99 U. S. 180, 182, it was said, Mr. Justice Miller expressing the opinion of the court, that in ejectment, or trespass quare clausum fregit, actual possession of the land by the plaintiff, or his receipt of rent therefor prior to his eviction, is prima facie evidence of title, on which he can recover against a mere trespasser. The same principle was enforced in Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261, 262, and application of it to various conditions of fact is shown in Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 513; Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 287; Glacier Mining Co. v. Willis, 127 U. S. 471, 481. There remains only to consider the errors which are asserted to have arisen from rulings of the trial court, admitting or rejecting testimony. (a) The objections to the admissibility of the copies of Dyer's notice of location become wholly immaterial, in view of the findings on the subject of the actual location made by Dyer. The sixth finding establishes that there was not at the Opinion of the Court. time the copies were left for record any mining district recorder, and that the rules and regulations of what had been known as the "Carbonate mining district," in which said claim was situated, had long prior to Dyer's location fallen into disuse, and were not then, and for a long time prior thereto had not been, in force and effect. In such event there was no statutory requirement that notices should be recorded. Rev. Stat. § 2324; North Noonday Mining Co. v. Orient Mining Co., 1 Fed. Rep. 522, 533. Moreover, the acts of Dyer, enumerated in the fourth finding, constituted a sufficient location by him of the two claims, as against subsequent locators, irrespective of the posting of notices. Rev. Stat. § 2324 merely required that the locations shall be distinctly marked on the ground, so that their boundaries can be readily traced. Book v. Justice Mining Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 106, 109, 112, et seq., and authorities cited, page 113. (b) The testimony of McLaughlin, tending to show knowledge by Haws of Dyer's location, that he recognized it, also becomes immaterial, in view of the findings establishing the nature and extent of such location. The same reason is applicable to the objection made to the testimony of Doneher. (c) It is contended that the District Court erred in permitting two witnesses to testify as to the conversation had with Haws relative to his intention to take possession of the mines operated by the plaintiff. This evidence tended to support certain allegations contained in the second cause of action set out in the complaint, and appears material to such allegations; and was doubtless accepted as evidence in support of the fact, stated at the close of the eleventh finding of the trial judge, "that while at work for the plaintiff in the year 1888, said Haws formed a secret intention of taking possession of the mines and mining claims of plaintiff." There was no attack upon the sufficiency of the proof to sustain this finding; moreover, the testimony of Haws as contained in the record admits that he formed the intention to take possession under the suggestion that he considered that he had the right to make a relocation. (d) Lastly, it is contended that the District Court erred in Syllabus. permitting the plaintiff to prove that it had expended between seven and eight thousand dollars in working the mines, from the time it took possession until it was ousted therefrom by the defendant Haws. This testimony was offered to show good faith in working the property by the plaintiff company. We think it was competent, in view of the requirements of Rev. Stat. sec. 2324, "that on each claim located after May 10, 1872, and until a patent has been issued therefor, no less than one hundred dollars' worth of labor shall be performed or improvements made during each year." Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE GRAY was not present at the argument and took no part in the decision of this case. MARKHAM v. UNITED STATES. ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE No. 544. Submitted November 18, 1895. - Decided December 16, 1895. An indictment for perjury in a deposition made before a special examiner of the pension bureau which charges the oath to have been wilfully and corruptly taken before a named special examiner of the Pension Bureau of the United States, then and there a competent officer, and having lawful authority to administer said oath, is sufficient to inform the accused of the official character and authority of the officer before whom the oath was taken. In such an indictment it is not necessary to set forth all the details or facts involved in the issue as to the materiality of the statement, and as to the authority of the Commissioner of Pensions to institute the inquiry in which the deposition of the accused was taken. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 1025 that “no indictment found and presented by a grand jury in any district or circuit or other court of the United States shall be deemed insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant," is not to be interpreted as dispensing with the requirement in § 5396 that an indictment for perjury must set forth the substance of the offence charged. 160 319 L-ed 441 106 f 885 Statement of the Case. An indictment for perjury that does not set forth the substance of the offence will not authorize judgment upon verdict of guilty. Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185, affirmed. THE plaintiff in error was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky, for the crime of perjury as defined in section 5392 of the Revised Statutes. The defendant pleaded not guilty. The first and second counts related to certain statements by the accused, alleged to have been wilfully, falsely, and feloniously made, in a deposition, given, under oath, before G. C. Loomis, a special examiner of the Pension Bureau of the United States, such statements being material to an inquiry pending before the Commissioner of Pensions in reference to a claim of the accused for a pension from the United States. The third count set out another statement of the accused in the same deposition, and charged that he did not believe it to be true. The defendant was found guilty upon the fourth count of the indictment, which was as follows: "And the grand jurors aforesaid, upon their oaths aforesaid, do further present that at Bowling Green, in the district aforesaid, on the seventh day of October, in the year of our Lord eighteen hundred and ninety-two, the matter of the hereinaftermentioned deposition became and was material to an inquiry then pending before and within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Pensions of the United States, at Washington, in the District of Columbia; whereupon said William H. Markham did then, at said Bowling Green, wilfully and corruptly take a solemn oath before G. C. Loomis, then and there a special examiner of the Pension Bureau of the United States, and then and there a competent officer and having lawful authority to administer said oath, that a certain written deposition then and there by said Markham subscribed was then and there true, and in giving said deposition said Markham was asked by said Loomis a question in substance and effect as follows, to wit, 'Have you received any injury to forefinger of right hand since the war or since your discharge from the army?' (by which said question said Statement of the Case. Loomis referred and said Markham well understood said Loomis to refer to the right hand of said Markham,) and in answer to said question said Markham then and there made and subscribed an answer and statement in substance and effect as follows, to wit, No, sir; I never have ;' which said statement that said Markham never had received any injury to the forefinger of his right hand since his, said Markham's, discharge from the army was then and there material to said inquiry, and was then and there not true. Whereas in truth and in fact the said Markham had then and theretofore received an injury to the forefinger of his, said Markham's, right hand, as he, the said Markham, then and there very well knew. And so the jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid say that said Markham did commit wilful and corrupt perjury in the manner and form as in this count aforesaid, against," etc. There was no demurrer to the indictment, nor any motion to quash either of the counts. The defendant moved for an arrest of judgment upon the following grounds: 1st. That the count upon which he was found guilty charged no offence under the statute. 2d. That its averments did not inform the court that any offence had been committed, nor show that Loomis, the examiner, was authorized to administer the oath alleged. 3d. That the averments did not set forth the proceeding or cause in which the defendant was charged to have given his deposition or made oath to the statement alleged to be false, in such manner as to show that the deposition and the alleged false statement were material to any inquiry or matter before the Commissioner of Pensions, nor to what said inquiry related, nor show that Loomis, special examiner, had any lawful authority to swear or require the defendant to swear to the deposition or statement averred to be false, nor for what purpose, nor upon what cause, or investigation of what claim, or of any claim pending before any Department of the Government or in any court. 4th. That it did not aver facts sufficient to show the materiality of the oath or statement alleged to have been made. 5th. That the words charged to have been sworn to by defendant were not averred to have been sworn VOL. CLX-21 |