Opinion of the Court. account with said corporation for $ -, as shown by said statements of said accounts in evidence in this case, then said draft became the property of said corporation, and it was an indebtedness due by said Warten to it; and if the jury further believe from the evidence that said indebtedness was transferred from the account of said Warten with said corporation to the account of said Warten with said firm on or about the 11th day of January, 1890, for the purpose of evading the law of the State of Alabama, which prohibits foreign corporations from doing business in the State of Alabama without known place of business and authorized agent therein, the jury would be authorized to find that said indebtedness was the property of and due to said corporation, and not said firm, when said alleged transfer of the stock of goods in dispute in this suit to said firm by said Warten was made, and should they so find, in that event their verdict should be for the plaintiffs." They were rightly refused. There was no proof of any kind even tending to show the simulation of the note. It was certainly, under the undisputed proof, due by Warten; it was drawn to the order of the Memphis firm, who were, as endorsers, necessary parties to its negotiation. That firm had an obvious right, with the consent of the company by whom the paper had been discounted, to use it as a debt due them, and thus protect their endorsement. Nor was the sending of a note to Tennessee for discount, and its discounting in that State by the Memphis company, carrying on business in Alabama by the Memphis company. The second section of the fourteenth article of the constitution of Alabama, and the act of the legislature of 1886-7, pp. 102, 104, relied on by the plaintiff in error, have been held by the courts of Alabama not to have been intended to (as of course they could not) interfere with matters of commerce between the States, and to have no application to transactions such as that here under consideration. Ware v. Hamilton Shoe Co., 92 Alabama, 145; Cook v. Rome Brick Co., 98 Alabama, 409. Sixth. Error as to the bearing on the rights of the parties, of the letter written by the Memphis firm, and the settlement had by the latter with Warten after the writing of the letter. Opinion of the Court. Much stress is placed by counsel on this proposition. The contention is that the Louisville firm having been induced to give an extension on the faith of the letter written them by the Memphis firm, the latter could not receive payment by sale, from the debtor, which created a preference, without operating a fraud upon the Louisville firm. To support this contention authorities are cited holding that when creditors have jointly agreed, each upon the faith of the other's promises, to extend the indebtedness of their co-debtor for a fixed and definite period, a party to such an agreement who secures an advantage to himself out of the mutual debtor's property, during such extended period, may be compelled to account for the property received and permit the other creditors to share pro rata with him. But the fallacy is not in the legal proposition, but in its application to the facts here considered and consists in treating the Memphis firm as consenting to and being bound by the terms of the extension granted to Warten by the firm in Louisville. There was no evidence even tending to so prove. The only connection of the Memphis firm with the settlement, even if all the disputed questions of fact were determined in favor of the firm at Louisville, was the letter from the Memphis firm, presented by Warten when the extension was made. But the letter could not give rise to the obligations contended for, since the extension granted by the Louisville firm was in conflict with the obvious intent of the letter. It stated that Warten, "through we believe no fault of his own, but owing to disastrous failure of crops in his own section, finds himself forced to ask for extension," and expressed a willingness to grant the extension provided the Louisville firm would do likewise. The extension referred to must necessarily have meant an extension to the next crop year, otherwise the letter was meaningless. The disaster calling for the extension was the crop failure, and the substantial results of the crop being realized by the end of December, it was self-evident that the extension proposed, and which the Memphis firm was willing to give, in conjunction with the Louisville firm, was one which would carry the debtor to another crop. This becomes more manifest when it is Opinion of the Court. considered that the extension was only to be asked of three creditors, the Louisville firm, the Memphis firm, and one other, leaving the other debts unextended. But the extension granted by the Louisville firm did not accede to this proposal, since it embraced short time acceptances for three thousand dollars, which they could only hope to be paid out of the avails of the disastrous failure of the crop which had by the terms of the letter given rise to the necessity for the extension. Doubtless it was this view of the relation of the parties which caused the court to instruct the jury that if the Louisville firm took short time paper from Warten in the hope of obtaining an advantage over the Memphis firm, they would have no right to complain because the Memphis firm overtook them in the race of diligence. Whether, however, this instruction was given because the court took this view of the letter and the legal effect of its unaccepted proposal, is immaterial. The entire charge is not in the record. The court may have expressed itself in this matter to the jury, in connection with observations possibly advanced in argument by counsel for plaintiffs in error upon their claim that the Memphis firm in the letter in question had sought to gain an advantage. And if such were the case, it was not error for the court to call the attention of the jury to the opposing view of the transaction. These conclusions dispose of all the errors assigned which relate to the instructions given by the court, and leave only the exceptions taken to rulings admitting or rejecting testimony. They are twelve in number. We have examined them all, and content ourselves with saying that we find them either not well taken or of such a character on account of their immateriality as to create no reversible error. Affirmed. Opinion of the Court. 160 170 si61 103 160 170 L-ed 382 $161 103 160 170 L-ed 382 f183 120. NEW ORLEANS FLOUR INSPECTORS v. GLOVER. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR No. 88. Argued November 22 and submitted December 2, 1895. - Decided December 9, 1895, Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651, affirmed to the point that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without any fault of the defendant, an event occurs which renders it impossible for the appellate court, if it should decide the case in favor of the plaintiff, to grant him any effectual relief, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal. THE case is sufficiently stated in the short opinion of the court. Mr. J. R. Beckwith argued for appellant on the 22d day of November, 1895. At the close of his argument the court adjourned until the 2d day of December following. Mr. William Wirt Howe on that day presented himself to argue for appellees, but the court declined to hear further argument in the case. THE CHIEF JUSTICE: The decree below enjoined appellants from enforcing against appellees act No. 71 of the extra session of the general assembly of Louisiana of 1870, (Session Laws La. Ex. Sess. 1870, 156). This act was repealed June28, 1892, (No. 23 of 1892, Acts La. 1892, 34,) and the appeal is dismissed on the authority of Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 651.. Appeal dismissed. Syllabus. DOUGHERTY v. NEVADA BANK. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. No. 98. Argued and submitted December 6, 1895. - Decided December 9, 1895. Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18, affirmed and applied to this case. THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff in error to foreclose a municipal tax or street assessment lien. In a brief filed for defendant in error it was stated that the judgment here sought to be reversed involved the validity of precisely similar extensions to those sought to be reversed in Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18, and under the same statute. This statement was not denied or challenged by the counsel for the plaintiff in error. Mr. J. C. Bates for plaintiff in error submitted on his brief. Mr. John Garber, Mr. John H. Boalt, and Mr. Thomas B. MR. JUSTICE FIELD: The writ of error is dismissed on the authority of Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18. Writ dismissed. TOWNSEND v. VANDERWERKER. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 73. Argued November 20, 1895. Decided December 16, 1895. 160b 171 L-ed 383 173 59 160b 171 L-ed 383 f89f 107 160b 171 L-ed 383 f1031818 160b 171 L-ed 3831 f181 90 160 A court of equity in the District of Columbia may take jurisdiction of a bill brought against the administrator and heirs of an intestate, alleging 10f 276 a verbal agreement between the intestate and the plaintiff by which the plaintiff was to contribute one half of the cost of a tract of land and of a dwelling-house to be erected thereon, and the intestate, after entering on the property, was to convey to him a half interest therein, 171 Case 2 40 L-ed 383 184 3109 114 f 827 |