degree. If the father dies intestate, the property is usually not divided during the widow's lifetime, but it remains under the control of the eldest brother. After the widow's death, the eldest son divides the property between himself and his brothers, and the portion of the younger brothers is altogether dependent on the will of the elder.1 A consideration of the whole series of our researches into nomenclature will show that it affords no warrant for the far-reaching conclusions of Morgan, McLennan, Lubbock, and others. The nomenclature was in every respect the faithful reflection of the juridical relations which arose between the nearest kinsfolk of each tribe. Individuals who were, according to the legal point of view, on the same level with the speaker, received the same designation. The other categories of kinship were formally developed out of this standpoint. The writers in question hold that the correct understanding of nomenclatures must be found in considerations of the circumstances of marriage and descent which are concealed in the categories of nomenclature, but the assertion is altogether unproved. We must, however, admit that the correct interpretation which we now flatter ourselves to have given, diminishes the significance of nomenclatures as a contribution to the means of historical research to such an extent that it ceases to possess the interest which would entitle us to dwell further on the subject. Lubbock, in his remarks on Morgan's book, states that while he does not accept his most important conclusions, yet he cannot avoid declaring that Morgan's work is one of the most important contributions to ethnological science which has appeared for many years. With all respect for Morgan's diligence as a collector of facts, I am more disposed to agree with McLennan that his work is altogether unscientific, and that his hypotheses are a wild dream, if not the 1 Morgan, Systems, p. 424; Appendix ix., p. 425; Appendix xvi. 2 Lubbock, Orig. of Civ., p. 157. delirium of fever.1 His statements throughout are based on such vague analysis and such irrational psychology, that they can only confuse the question, unless they are altogether ignored. 1 McLennan, Studies, p. 360 CHAPTER VI. EXOGAMY AND ENDOGAMY. Conception of exogamy and endogamy-Their relation to incest-Modern ideas of incest-Immorality and incest-Various explanations of exogamy-Symbol of rape-Its bearing-Causes of rape of women -Symbol of rape and modesty-Criminal ties-Desire of trophiesClanless tribe endogamous-Exogamy and incest-Australian legend -Crime and punishment-Marriage and sexual intercourse-Marriage of royal brother and sister-Breach of privilege and marriage -King and his sister-Legal character of marriage-EndogamyArabs-Castes and classes-Karens-Kookas-Ceremonial intercourse of parents and children-in-law-Ceremonial and marriage by violence - Modesty of Bechuanas and Beni-Amirs-Reverence of Caribs--Symbol of rape. It In the preceding pages we have repeatedly had to consider exogamy, and also some of the facts of endogamy. We need only remind our readers that exogamy signifies the prohibition to contract marriages within the group, while endogamy forbids marriage outside the group. is not too daring to hope that a closer examination of these two customs may enlighten us with respect to the ideas which underlie primitive man's view of marriage, whether these ideas agree with our own, or display the same difference between barbarism and civilization as we find to exist in the relations between parents and children. The strong moral force which characterizes these prohibitions, the inexorable strictness with which they are obeyed, and the deep abhorrence with which a transgressor is regarded, are sufficient reasons for venturing to place these prohibitions on a level with those which in our own case define the limits of a lawful contract of marriage. There is little which has to do with endogamy now extant in our communities, but at any rate class-prejudices assert themselves to a degree which is almost as stringent as express prohibitions; exogamy, on the other hand, is confidently believed to actuate our ideas of incest. If this belief is correct, the ideas of incest must originally have had a different scope from those which prevail with us, for primitive men often permit the marriage of persons who are, according to our ideas, too nearly akin, while, on the other hand, persons whom we reckon to stand in very remote kinship to each other are, according to primitive ideas, unconditionally forbidden to intermarry. The different conceptions of kinship entertained by ourselves and by primitive communities compel us to infer a like difference in the ideas which actuate a possibility of entering into a contract of marriage; and this difference may detract from the interest with which we consider the conditions of kinship which regulate all the circumstances of life so rigidly that they are almost a religion. If this view is not confirmed, and the ideas of incest are shown to arise from a common source, the justice of the theory we have put forward may be called in question. We must, in the first place, consider the basis on which our moral estimate of incestuous connections is founded. In the If the idea of marriage is defined to be a bond which unites souls as well as, and even more truly than, bodies, it would immediately appear that no better conditions of marriage could be devised than that between brother and sister, father and daughter, mother and son. two latter cases, indeed, the disparity in age would as a rule be so great that there would be less probability of a perfect marriage, with spiritual interests in common. But as marriage between persons of different ages was allowed in other instances, this circumstance could not have been the reason of the prohibition. The moral aversion which we entertain in the case of marriage between near kinsfolk may, I think, be indirectly explained, for there cannot be a more valid objection to such marriages than the fact that the offspring of such marriages are so often idiotic, or at any rate in some respect deficient. Whatever may have been the origin of these prohibitions, they obtained a character of moral sanctity from the fact that they have so long been part of the moral code which is based upon religion. The moral aversion to incest must for the most part be traced to this historical source, and it is certainly in general agreement with the ideas of primitive men. But what we are now anxious to ascertain is whether incest ought to be condemned for the same reasons as theft and murder. Except for the undesirable character of such connections which we have mentioned above, it hardly seems possible to find a single valid reason for the vehement condemnation of these marriages. It must also be remembered that when incest is in question among ourselves, we always have to do with an immoral connection, since the law does not recognize a marriage between kinsfolk who are within the prohibited degrees. While such immorality is in all cases held to be blameworthy, it is naturally still more severely condemned when it occurs between persons who are ordinarily supposed to stand in a peculiar relation to each other. We cannot precisely estimate how far this circumstance influences our abhorrence of incest, but it is certainly not insignificant. The historical basis for the prohibition of marriage between near kinsfolk also involves the abhorrence of any sexual connection between them, since its legalization by marriage thereby becomes impossible. I maintain that the prohibition should be observed if it can be proved by facts that the connection of kinsfolk is injurious to their offspring, since it is morally culpable to |