35 Comments on the Swedish Proposal Replying to the Secretary-General's inquiry on the Swedish resolution, Acting Secretary of State Ball reaffirmed American opposition to the "development of national nuclear weapons capability by any additional nation." He added, however, that the Western defense system included both conventional and nuclear weapons and that the latter were "a necessary deterrent to a potential aggressor who is armed with such weapons and openly threatens the free world." The United States believed that general and complete disarmament under effective international control was the only sure way to remove nuclear weapons. Although it could not speak for other states, it did not think that nations would be willing to surrender vital elements of their security until they were sure that their security was "adequately guaranteed by effective disarmament and peacekeeping measures. Finally, the Swedish resolution had been passed before the ENDC was established, and the United States believed that the ENDC was the appropriate forum for discussing it.86 36 The British said that restrictions on deployment of nuclear weapons could be accepted only as part of a general and complete disarmament program which "would adequately safeguard the security of the States concerned." They also expressed support of the Irish resolution and a test-ban agreement.37 The French commented that the Swedish proposal contained no verification provisions and reaffirmed their desire for nuclear disarmament as "an essential part of general disarmament." 38 The Canadians declared that they had not manufactured or acquired nuclear weapons but reserved their right to adopt such security measures "as might be considered necessary in the light of international developments." At the same time, they favored a safeguarded nonproliferation agreement binding both nuclear and nonnuclear powers.39 Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that it was important for the nonnuclear countries to conclude a nonacquisition agreement along the lines proposed by Sweden. The Soviet Union was ready to join the three other nuclear powers in an undertaking "not to deliver nuclear weapons or information concerning their manufacture to other countries." Mr. Gromyko warned that further proliferation, whether through acquisition by new states or by making nuclear weapons available "to one or another military bloc as a whole," would make it more difficult to achieve nuclear disarmament and solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. Finally, he expressed support for the Rapacki plan and other proposals for nuclear-free zones.40 Foreign Minister Undén informed the Secretary-General that Sweden was willing to join a nuclear-free zone comprising the nonnuclear states of Central and Northern Europe if this zone could be 37 Ibid., p. 82. 38 Ibid., pp. 166–167. 30 Disarmament Commission Official Records: Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, p. 59. 40 Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, pp. 83–86. set up by the end of 1963. Sweden believed that the nuclear powers should undertake not to furnish nuclear weapons to countries in the zone and, "possibly after an appropriate transitional period," not to stockpile nuclear weapons in the zone or to equip their own forces in the area with nuclear weapons. Sweden also suggested that the nuclear powers might undertake not to make a nuclear attack on any of the countries in the zone. The zonal proposal was contingent on a test-ban agreement.41 The Indians declared that they had no intention of manufacturing nuclear weapons and were willing to enter into a nonacquisition agreement. They also favored a test ban and action to confine nuclear weapons to the territory of the nuclear powers.2 The Nigerians were willing to participate in nonproliferation undertakings under four conditions: (1) The undertakings should apply to all independent states, including those that did not belong to the United Nations; Chinese Communist participation was especially important. (2) The undertakings were intended to induce the United States and the Soviet Union to disarm. (3) There should be a specific ban on the sale of nuclear warheads. (4) The technical skill for manufacturing nuclear weapons should be restricted.43 41 Ibid., pp. 38-42. 43 Disarmament Commission Official Records: Supplement for January 1961 to December 1962, pp. 70–71. 13 Ibid., pp. 80-81. ENDC Negotiations (1964) In a message of January 21, 1964, to the ENDC, President Johnson reaffirmed the previous American proposal for a cutoff of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and introduced a new proposal for a freeze on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. He also urged the following steps to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which did not already possess them: (A) That nuclear weapons not be transferred into the national control of states which do not now control them, and that all transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes take place under effective international safeguards; (B) That the major nuclear powers accept in an increasing number of their peaceful nuclear activities the same inspection they recommend for other states; and (C) On the banning of all nuclear weapons tests under effective verification and control.1 On February 6, ACDA Director William C. Foster told the ENDC that the United States would have private discussions with the Soviet Union in an effort to reach agreement on a declaration based on the Irish resolution. Such a declaration, covering both nondissemination and nonacquisition, would be subject to accession by nuclear and nonnuclear states. "As an immediate step and to facilitate progress in these discussions," he said, "the United States, for its part, does not intend to take any actions inconsistent with the terms of the Irish resolution. That is the declared policy of the United States." 3 The Soviet Union also favored a nonproliferation agreement. It had supported the Irish resolution, and nonproliferation was the sixth item in its nine-point memorandum of January 28, 1964. But it insisted that a nonproliferation agreement should be broad enough to prevent establishment of the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) which the United States and some of its allies were discussing.4 Soviet opposition to the MLF centered on the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). A Soviet note to the United States (July 11) charged that FRG "military and political circles" regarded the MLF as only a beginning and sought a dominant role in the project. For its part, the Soviet Union still advocated measures to prevent nuclear dissemination and supported proposals for nuclearfree zones. In the Soviet view, those who favored both the MLF and nonproliferation were trying to reconcile the irreconcilable.5 The United States replied that the MLF was entirely defensive. It reaffirmed opposition to "the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities" and maintained that the MLF was "specifically designed to be consistent with this position." It pointed out that the MLF could be used only by decision of its governing body and that safeguards would prevent accidental or unauthorized use. The United States was still ready to conclude an agreement in conformity with the Irish resolution. If the USSR sincerely believed that the MLF was a stepping stone to transferring nuclear weapons to a "specific nonnuclear power," such an agreement would give it additional assurance. The United States was "ready at all times to discuss this urgent issue, but with the clear understanding that such discussions cannot be used to frustrate security arrangements for the defense of the United States and its allies." It regretted the "unrealistic and unrestrained charges" the USSR had made against the FRG." A similar exchange of views on the MLF took place in the ENDC, where Mr. Foster said that no single participant would be able to fire the missiles, since "firing of missiles in wartime would be by decision of the United States and an agreed number of other participants." Reiterating U.S. support for the Irish resolution, Mr. Foster stated: In keeping with that call, the United States has been seeking, and will continue to seek, an international agreement under which the nuclear Powers would commit themselves not to transfer nuclear weapons into national control of States not now possessing them, as well as not to assist such States in manufacturing nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would facilitate a parallel undertaking by non-nuclear Powers not to manufacture such weapons and to refrain from acquiring control over such weapons and from seeking or receiving assistance in manufacturing them.' Speaking at Seattle on September 16, President Johnson declared that the "work against nuclear spread must go on." He also made it clear that he had sole control of the use of American nuclear weapons and that he would retain it. And he described the measures that had been taken to prevent their unauthorized use: ... Complex codes and electronic devices prevent any unauthorized action. Every step along the way from decision to destruction is governed by the twoman rule. Two or more men must act independently and must decide the order has been given. They must independently take action. An elaborate system of checks and counterchecks, procedural and mechanical, guard against any unauthorized nuclear bursts. In addition, since 1961 we have placed permissiveaction links on several of our weapons. These are electromechanical locks which must be opened by secret combination before action at all is possible, and we are extending this system. 6 * Ibid., pp. 381-382. 7 'Ibid., pp. 252–253. Ibid., pp. 429–433. Nonaligned Developments African Summit Conference At the Cairo summit conference of the Organization of African Unity (July 17-21, 1964), the OAU leaders adopted a resolution on the denuclearization of Africa. In this resolution, they declared their readiness to conclude a nonacquisition treaty and called on all peaceloving nations to adhere to the proposed treaty.1 Second Nonaligned Summit Conference The Cairo declaration of the second nonaligned summit conference (October 10, 1964) also showed a growing interest among nonaligned states in preventing further nuclear dissemination. The declaration urged all states to "conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons." For their own part, they declared "readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons." They also endorsed denuclearized zones, called on all states to adhere to the limited test ban treaty, and urged extension of the treaty to cover underground tests.2 |