Developments in Europe, February 1988: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, February 9, 1988U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988 - 147 pagini |
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Termeni și expresii frecvente
agreed agricultural Alliance allies ANSWER areas arms control balance of payments Bank base BEREUTER billion borrowing chemical weapons CONGRESS THE LIBRARY continue conventional forces conventional imbalance countries CSCE current account debt service decision defense deployed deployments deterrence discussions domestic dual-track decision economic elimination emigration ethnic Albanians Europe European exports external debt financing foreign funds GILMAN global going Gorbachev growth HAMILTON human rights important improvement increase industry INF missiles INF Treaty inflation interest rates investment issues Kosovo LIBRARY OF CONGRE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS meeting ment military Minister Moscow NATO NATO's negotiations nuclear weapons percent political Portugal Portugal's Portuguese position President proposal public sector question reduce RIDGWAY Romania Secretary shorter range missiles Soviet Union Spain stability strategic subcommittee substantial talks tion trade Turkey Turkey's Turkish U.S. and Soviet U.S. Dollars U.S.-Soviet United verification warheads Warsaw Pact Yugoslav Yugoslavia
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Pagina 1 - HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, Washington, DC. The subcommittee met at 2:30 pm, in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Pagina 59 - The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.
Pagina 65 - The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring. 7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile...
Pagina 50 - There can be no other basis for US -Soviet arms control. • Because the Soviets had deployed more, the treaty also establishes the principle of asymmetrical reductions. The Soviets will eliminate deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as those eliminated by the United States. • It keeps third-country systems and programs of cooperation with our allies completely out — essential precedents for future negotiations.
Pagina 50 - But let me stress that this agreement has the most stringent and comprehensive scheme of verification in the history of arms control. We worked out our verification regime thoroughly in Washington, with full interagency participation. We also consulted closely with our basing country allies, whose territory will be directly involved. It took time, but it was well worth it. When the Soviets were finally willing to discuss verification, we were ready. They did so on the basis of thoroughly considered...
Pagina 1 - Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, who has been a participant in each of the four United States-Soviet summit meetings since 1985.
Pagina 51 - Union will be tempted to exploit ambiguities or to take actions that may seem to fall in a nebulous "grey area." The structure of the reductions will give us a basis to assess Soviet compliance early on. After the treaty has been in force for 30 days, we have the right to conduct onsite inspections to check the the data the Soviets have provided us. From 90 days after entry into force, if the Soviets have any deployed shorter range missile outside a declared elimination facility, that will be a violation....
Pagina 10 - We must proceed with the Montebello program, so that our nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence. This Treaty does not resolve the conventional imbalance in Europe. That was not its objective. The security criterion which we established was that, in improving the nuclear balance, the Treaty...
Pagina 94 - ... for anti-regime dissidents, may return to traditional levels. Bahrain has the potential to reverse its economic decline and has shown by past performance and current intention that that continues to be a high priority for the government and people.
Pagina 67 - CFE negotiations, as outlined in its mandate, were to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces, and to eliminate the capability to launch a surprise attack and initiate large-scale offensive action.