Furthermore, we would be obliged to shorten the tours of duty of Europe-based military personnel to 1 year, which would create conditions of personnel turnover that we know are deleterious to a peacetime Army. The main point, however, is that you cannot expect our professional officers and soldiers to long endure such a singular sacrifice of this nature in peacetime. The very people we need would simply opt for another career. With respect to the readiness of U.S. Army, Europe, I would like to offer the following comments. We are judged by two criteria. The first prescribed by NATO essentially addresses our ability to evacuate our peacetime facilities within [deleted] hours and to be in our emergency defense positions within [deleted] hours, ready to fight. U.S. Army, Europe, has continuously been among the best of the NATO forces when measured against these standards. We are also rated by Department of the Army criteria which are considerably more stringent and require the attainment of a number of goals in the fields of personnel, training and logistics. In this regard, we have made continuous improvements in the past 6 months. For example, in May none of our major combat units met all their established goals, whereas by the end of November, five out of eight met their goals in all areas. The primary factor preventing 100-percent attainment is completion of several areas of scheduled individual and unit training. In short, the state of our readiness is improved, and as of this point in time I can state that our forces are combat ready. With the winding down of the Vietnam war, U.S. Army, Europe, has been accorded a high priority in both manpower and equipment. At the end of last month our operating strength was [deleted] of that authorized. This chart will show you the strength trend. (The material is classified and in retained in committee files.) Due to the early-release program required to achieve a legislated 50,000 man-year reduction, we are faced with a temporary decline. In addition to normal losses, we will be obliged to send home some 4,000 soldiers this month, 24,600 in January, and about 7,000 per month thereafter until completion of the early-out program in June. However, the Department of the Army will provide a replacement flow [deleted]. However, it would be misleading to imply that this turbulence will not have an impact on our operational readiness. We are bound to encounter critical shortages. The Army budget for training this fiscal year has shown a heartening improvement. For the first time in years we will be able to hold fullscale divisional field exercises. We have no major complaints about equipment either. General Burchinal has informed you on our principal improvements in this regard. Now I should like to put on my NATO hat for a moment and say a few words about the German and Canadian ground forces. Besides the [deleted] divisions committed to CENTAG, the Bundeswehr also performs the lion's share of CENTAG's rear-area protection. This is carried out by the German Territorial Southern Command, whose headquarters is just down the street from us and with whom we work closely. We also have stationed in this area a [deleted]. An essential question concerns the employment of nuclear weapons. This decision would be made only at the highest political level, and speculation here would not add greatly to what you already know about this subject. I can only advise you that we have the means to wage tactical nuclear war and are fully prepared to do so when so ordered. The weapons are ready and our crews are trained to use them. Within the 7th Army we have the Pershing, the Sergeant, the Honest John, and 8-inch and 155 artillery with which to deliver nuclear warheads. In addition we have the [deleted] and the Nike-Hercules. [Deleted.] While continued modernization is always required, I am generally satisfied with the general capability of nuclear weapons available to us except for the need to replace Honest John and Sergeant with Lance. The knowledge on the part of both our allies and our adversaries that we have these weapons, can use them, and have the will to do so, constitutes a vital portion of the deterrent. Now a word about our line of communications. As you know, we had a well-established supply route through France until it was removed at French request in 1967. Our immediate task was to reposition our former French stocks in locations in Germany west of the Rhine. This was done, although the scarcity of real estate in this area made for considerable congestion, and hence vulnerability. We have reduced our stockage and accomplished some dispersal, but our present task in the logistic area is to reestablish a new contingency LOC [deleted]. However, we are still awaiting congressional allocation with which to stock and man limited depots with some equipment on a standby basis. One subject which I know is of critical concern to your committee and to the Congress as a whole, the cost of our Defense Establishment in Europe. U.S. Army, Europe, will cost the American people $1,720,600,000 in this fiscal year as shown here. The NATO infrastructure item goes for our share of common costs and is simply included in the USAREUR budget as a matter of bookkeeping convenience. The amount I have given you covers everything except the initial cost of our heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery. It does include spare parts and maintenance for these items. We must be cautious, it seems to me, in discussing savings that would result from troop drawdowns in Europe. If the U.S. 41-division force structure were removed to the United States, but maintained in readiness for commitment in NATO, it is difficult to see where any savings would accrue. In fact, every indication available to me suggests that it would be more expensive since we are afforded here facilities and real estate provided by Germany and adequate facilities for these forces are not presently available in the United States. Were we, on the other hand, to disband these forces, then, of course, we would save money; but whether we withdraw them to the United States or disband them, we would at the same time undercut our position as a power in Europe and deprive the Alliance of its sub stance. I can only repeat what you have already heard from representatives of the State and Defense Departments; namely, that our expenditure, which is less than $2 billion a year to man [deleted] the front with a 413-division force, represents a reasonably equitable U.S. share of the common defense. No presentation, Mr. Chairman, would be complete without reporting to you on the disciplinary problems within the 7th Army which seem to have drawn an inordinate amount of press attention, some of it admittedly justified. We have a drug-abuse problem in U.S. Army, Europe, just as society as a whole is faced with this problem. Our surveys indicate that drug abuse is essentially confined to the young soldier, particularly those in the 18-24 age group. Sixty percent of this group have used drugs at least once. Of those using drugs, 65 percent started before entering the Army. In U.S. Army, Europe, hashish is the primary drug abused. The extent of our hard-drugs use is relatively small. In this regard we have conducted urine testing of more than 20,000 soldiers to detect the use of amphetamines, opiates and barbiturates. Results to date show that only 1.05 percent of those tested were positive for those drugs. However, the use of opiates, though still quite limited, appears to be increasing. This is a matter of great concern. A number of positive efforts are underway to prevent and control drug abuse, and we appear to be making progress in certain areas in combating the problem. Nevertheless, we recognize the difficulties involved and we intend to continue aggressively to seek ways to ameliorate this serious problem. Although it is too soon to draw firm conclusions, we do see some lessening of the tensions between the races here in 7th Army. We have noted fewer on-post disturbances, unauthorized meetings and demonstrations. Off-post meetings sponsored by leftist radical organizations outside of the military continue at about the same frequency and low level of attendance by U.S. Army, Europe, personnel. The number of known organized racial groups has decreased. Of the 19 groups which have been identified, only 7 are known to be active recently. At least one of these is endeavoring to expand its influence. Its activities have extended to closer involvement with established leftist radical groups. There has been a decrease in the number of locally published underground newspapers. Only 4 remain, of the approximately 21 which have been noted during the past 2 years. However, these are of high quality and are commercially printed. A number of outside publications continue to appear in U.S. Army, Europe, such as Babylon, Bond and Challenge. A recent increase has been noted in the appearance of dissident literature such as "On Organizing Urban Guerrilla Units," and "Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla." These publications are highly militant and advocate revolution. This command is aware of the problems related to race relations and to dissident activity and will continue to strive to give equal and fair treatment to all soldiers, regardless of race, color, or creed. RATE 300 250 200 150 100 50 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Slide 8 Over the past 4 months we have seen a heartening trend in our crime rate. Crimes of violence in November were half those of July. Note that for 18 months, commencing in January 1970, we had been experiencing a steady increase in the rate of crimes of violence in this command, the green line being the 1970 line. We peaked out in July; and as you see, we have been on a very satisfactory downward trend since that time. We were doing very well in October; but we had three long weekends in October, and in the third week the lid sort of came off and we had an upward spurt. |