Argument for Defendant in Error.

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torney General v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Massachusetts, 148.

The statute itself describes the tax as an excise tax. The declared purpose of the act is to be accepted as true, unless incompatible with its meaning and effect. Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. 475, 477; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 145.

The taxes have been defined by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in this case as well as in other cases, as excise taxes and not taxes on property. Pratt v. Street Commissioners, 139 Massachusetts, 559; Commonwealth v. Barnstable Savings Bank, 126 Massachusetts, 526; In re Suffolk Bank, 151 Massachusetts, 103, 106; AttorneyGeneral v. Massachusetts Pipe Line Co., 179 Massachusetts, 15, 19; Greenfield Bank v. Commonwealth, 211 Massachusetts, 207; Farr Alpaca Co. v. Commonwealth, 212 Massachusetts, 156, 162.

The construction and interpretation given by the Massachusetts court to the provision of law under which the taxes in question were imposed are conclusive upon this court, if in actual operation and effect the statute is consistent with that construction and interpretation. Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 572; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27, 30; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650; Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632.

The required payment is strictly of an excise tax, and not of a tax upon property. The fact that it is estimated. upon the par value of the capital stock, with a maximum limit of $2,000 as the highest tax that can be imposed upon the largest corporation, does not make it a tax upon property. Attorney-General v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Massachusetts, 148; Commonwealth v. Lancaster Savings Bank, 123 Massachusetts, 493; Pratt v. Street Commissioners, 139 Massachusetts, 559, 562; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Hamilton Co. v. Massachu

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Argument for Defendant in Error.

setts, 6 Wall. 632; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 608; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.

Since the tax is in its nature an excise tax, authorized by the state constitution, the legislature has wide discretion as to the method to be prescribed for computing the amount of the tax. Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 231; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Provident Institution v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 627.

A license tax may be exacted as a condition of the corporation keeping an office within the State for the use of its officers. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181. See also Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 217; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.

The Massachusetts statute as applied to the plaintiffs in error does not conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States.

A State may tax a foreign corporation for the privilege of a domicile for local business if the effect is not to regulate interstate commerce.

A State has power to exclude or condition the entrance of foreign corporations within its limits. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Security Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246; Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 28, and cases cited; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 655; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; Cooper Manfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 343.

The argument of the defendant in error gives full effect to the limitation which forbids imposing upon corporations engaged in interstate commerce conditions so directly affecting the interstate commerce as to amount to a restriction of that commerce or to a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Commonwealth v. Petranich, 183 Massachusetts,

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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217, 219; Attorney-General v. Electric Battery Co., 188 Massachusetts, 239; Pickard v. Pullman Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Cooper Manfg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727; Leloup v. Mobile, 127 U. S. 640; Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; Post. Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 56; International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Baltic Mining Co. v. Commonwealth, 207 Massachusetts, 381; S. S. White Dental Co. v. Commonwealth, 212 Massachusetts, 35.

If the tax denominated as an excise is not in reality a tax upon interstate commerce or a tax upon property, the mode of its measure, however arbitrary and capricious, is wholly immaterial in this court. Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, 231.

Whether the excise regulates interstate commerce is a practical question to be determined by analyzing its effect in operation. Galveston &c. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 227; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1; Pullman Co. v. Kansas, Id. 56; Ludwig v. West. Un. Tel. Co., Id. 146; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Andrews, Id. 165; Atchison, Topeka &c. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280.

The exaction in question, considered with reference to the whole taxation system of Massachusetts and as construed by the courts and as applied to the facts in these cases, does not as a practical matter regulate interstate commerce in which either plaintiff in error is engaged.

The Baltic Company is not directly engaged in interstate commerce in Massachusetts, and its place of business therein is not maintained or used for the purposes of interstate commerce.

The White Company was engaged both in interstate and intrastate business in Massachusetts and maintained its place of business therein for the purposes of both inter

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Argument for Defendant in Error.

state and intrastate business. Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650.

The only thing conditioned in either of the cases at bar was the privilege of maintaining an office in Massachusetts for the purposes of purely local or intrastate business.

It is for the Commonwealth to say whether it will grant or withhold from the plaintiffs in error the privilege of maintaining those places of business in the Commonwealth, and to fix the conditions upon which it would grant that privilege. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 7. A tax by a State for such a privilege under similar circumstances does not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce. Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 60; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Knight, 192 U. S. 21; Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 736. See, also, Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420; Allen v. Pullman Co., 191 U. S. 171; Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650; The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 565; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; Detroit &c. Ry. Co. v. Int. Comm. Comm., 167 U. S. 633; Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412; Kelley v. Rhoades, 188 U. S. 1; Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82.

A tax is not a regulation of interstate commerce merely because it is assessed upon and paid by a corporation which is engaged in interstate commerce. Postal Tel. Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. 688.

It is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution. State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206.

The excise stands the test of the principles declared in Western Un. Tel. Co. v. Kansas and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, and is constitutional under the commerce clause. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.

The decisions of the Massachusetts court do not deny to ordinary business corporations engaged to some extent in interstate commerce the protection of the commerce clause of the Constitution. Attorney General v. Electric Storage Battery Co., 188 Massachusetts, 239. Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, and the other drummer and canvasser cases distinguished.

The exaction, if true to its history, its nature, its name and its purpose as an excise, did not tax property outside the Commonwealth of Massachusetts or in any manner without due process of law.

An excise under the constitution of Massachusetts is no different in this respect from an excise under the Constitution of the United States containing a similar provision. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 152.

The right to select the measure and objects of taxation devolves upon the legislature and not upon the courts. McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 58.

The statute does not deny the plaintiffs in error the equal protection of the laws. It applies alike to all corporations in the same situation. Southern Railway Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400, distinguished.

The classification is reasonable. Bell's Gap R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 572; Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, 228.

The statute does not discriminate against the plaintiffs in error.

MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases present the question of the constitutional validity of an act of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (St. 1909, c. 490, Part III, § 54 et seq.), undertaking to impose a tax on foreign corporations within the Commonwealth. While the cases are not in all respects parallel