of maintaining a competitive equality in obtaining employment or other essentials of living with the majority (or even a large number of persons engaged in similar occupations).

It may have been necessary for respondent to join the Communist Party to retain the particular employment in which he was then engaged, but opportunities for employment and availability of essentials of living, difficult as they may have been to secure under the conditions existing in 1935 were as accessible to the respondent as a nonmember of the Communist Party as to the millions of employable and nonemployable Americans who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. In fact, we may take notice that in general competition with nonparty members his membership in the Communist Party of the United States would have hindered, not aided his efforts in obtaining the essentials outlined above. We also note that while a janitor, respondent continued in his regular employment as a peddler and odd job man, occupations in which he had engaged for about 5 years prior to his joining the Communist Party. We concluded that whatever compulsion, if any, may have induced respondent to join, it did not make the joining an involuntary one under Public Law 14, (See Matter of S, A-1258853, B. I. A. 1951 (Int. Dec. 313), 4, I. & N. Dec. 314).

Since in arriving at a conclusion that the respondent was a voluntary member of the Communist Party of the United States, we have used the facts most favorable to him; we need not dwell upon the effect of his membership in the International Workers' Order for a period of about 6 months prior to his joining the Communist Party; and his signing of Communist Party nominating petitions between 1935 and 1937 and one on March 4, 1940. Nor, need we pass judgment as to the affect upon his credibility arising out of his failure to disclose an arrest resulting in a 10-day jail sentence and a court martial resulting in a 2-year sentence, until after direct questioning concerning both events.

We shall now deal with counsel's contention concerning discretionary relief. The alien is deportable who has been found after entry to have been a member of the Communist Party of the United States (8 U. S. C. 137 (c)). Such a person is not eligible for discretionary relief (8 U. S. C. 155 (c) (d)). It is apparently counsel's contention that the prohibition contained in 8 U. S. C. 155 (c) (d) does not apply to former members of the proscribed organizations mentioned in the act. Counsel cites no authority for his position. We have carefully examined his contention and conclude no reason is shown why the statute should not be construed to mean what it appears to say and what we have previously held it to say, Matter of S— (supra).

Counsel's objection that the respondent is subject to physical persecution if deported to Czechoslovakia, is premature. The order of deportation provides for respondent's deportation pursuant to law. The law provides that no alien shall be deported to any country in which the Attorney General shall find that such alien would be subjected to physical persecution (sec. 20 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended). Considerations concerning persecution must therefore necessarily enter into any decision made as to the country of deportation by the authorized officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who will designate at whose expense and to which country the respondent shall be deported (8 C. F. R. 152.3).

Counsel's contention that the charge under which respondent has been found deportable constitutes the application of an ex post facto law must be dismissed on the basis of the decision in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580 (1952).

The appeal will therefore be dismissed.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.

IN THE MATTER OF P

In DEPORTATION Proceedings

T-1143540

Decided by Board July 9, 1952

(1) Pursuant to 8 C. F. R. 151.5 (e) (effective May 24, 1952), exceptions to the hearing officer's order must be to specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as to deportability to confer appeal jurisdiction on the Board of Immigration Appeals.

(2) Pursuant to the same regulations, there is no appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals from a hearing officer's denial as a matter of administrative discretion of an application for voluntary departure if the alien has not been in the United States for a period of five years, or more, at the time the warrant of arrest was served on the alien.

CHARGE:

Warrant: Act of 1924-No immigration visa.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from an order of the hearing officer dated May 27, 1952, directing the respondent's deportation on the charge stated in the warrant of arrest.

The respondent is a 39-year-old-married male, a native and citizen of Greece, who last entered the United States at Philadelphia, Pa., on July 8, 1948, as a seaman. The hearing officer found him to be deportable as above mentioned. Counsel in his appeal from the decision of the hearing officer stated that he excepted to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law as to deportability, as well as to the finding that the respondent had failed to establish statutory eligibility for voluntary departure.

Section 151.5 (e) of Title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations, effective on publication May 24, 1952, provides, insofar as it is pertinent to the instant case, that the hearing officer's order shall be final except (1) when the alien or his counsel or representative takes exception to any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law as to deportability, or *** (3) when the alien or his counsel or representative takes exception to a finding that the alien has failed to establish statutory eligibility for voluntary departure, or (4) when the alien

or his counsel or representative takes exception to a denial of an application for voluntary departure, with or without the additional privilege of preexamination, in a case in which the alien had been in the United States for a period of 5 years or more at the time the warrant of arrest in deportation proceedings was served on him. * * * Although counsel appeals from a purported finding by the hearing officer that the respondent had failed to establish statutory eligibility for voluntary departure, reference to the opinion of the hearing officer indicates that he found that the respondent had established statutory eligibility for this relief. Accordingly, there is no basis for an appeal on that ground. Furthermore, the notice of appeal does not take any exception to any specific finding of fact or conclusion of law as to deportability and, therefore, there is no basis for consideration of an appeal on that ground. In considering the case we have also noted that the respondent has not been in the United States for a period of 5 years or more. The decision of the hearing officer is therefore final and there is no jurisdiction in this Board to consider an appeal, no basis for any appeal having been shown.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal from the decision of the hearing officer be and the same is hereby dismissed.

IN THE MATTER OF S― B

In EXCLUSION Proceedings

A-5496423

Decided by Board July 21, 1952

Crimes involving moral turpitude, Federal-Desertion in violation of the 58th Article of War.

(1) Desertion from armed forces of United States in time of war in violation of the 58th Article of War is not an offense involving moral turpitude.

EXCLUDED:

Act of 1924-Ineligible to citizenship.

Act of 1917-Conviction of crime involving moral turpitude, to wit:
Desertion from the armed forces during war.

Act of 1917-Admission of crime involving moral turpitude, to wit:
Desertion from armed forces in time of war.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from an order of a board of special inquiry excluding the appellant on the grounds above mentioned.

The appellant is a 36-year-old married male, a native and citizen of Mexico, who has sought admission into the United States as a temporary visitor for the purpose of visiting his citizen wife and other relatives. On or about October 26, 1949, before a general courtmartial, he was convicted of a violation of the 58th Article of War in that on or about May 20, 1943, at Fort Sam Houston, Tex., he deserted the service of the United States and remained absent in desertion until he surrendered himself to military authorities at Matamoros, Mexico, on or about August 15, 1949. He was sentenced to be dishonorably discharged, to forfeit pay and allowances, and to be confined at hard labor for 5 years. On review, the period of confinement was reduced to 1 year. He admits the commission of the offense.

As the appellant is seeking to enter the United States only as a temporary visitor and is not an immigrant, he is not excludable under section 13 (c) of the Immigration Act of 1924.

With regard to whether the offense of which he has been convicted is a crime involving moral turpitude, the Acting Assistant Commis