8 U. S. C. 5) and there would have been no need for them to become naturalized as United States citizens in order to acquire United States citizenship. Consequently, it must be deemed that the parents had not acquired Spanish nationality on or before April 11, 1899. Thus, whether or not petitioner acquired Spanish nationality on or before April 11, 1899, is not free from doubt. Accordingly, the question of whether petitioner acquired United States nationality, pursuant to the acts of April 12, 1900, and March 2, 1917, is not free from doubt. 8 C. F. R. 373.10 provides in part that "where doubt of citizenship exists, the case shall be treated by the Service as though the applicant were an alien." Since petitioner has not established that she was a Spanish national at the time of the acquisition of Puerto Rico by the United States, she is unable to establish that she acquired United States citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the act of April 12, 1900, and March 2, 1917, or any other act. The evidence of record establishes that petitioner was born in Puerto Rico of alien parents and she is, therefore, eligible to file a declaration of citizenship pursuant to the provisions of section 322 of the Nationality Act of 1940. The case, however, is not as yet ready for presentation to the court, inasmuch as no recommendation has been made by the field office in regard to petitioner's attachment to the principles of the Constitution and favorable disposition to the good order and happiness of the United States. The facts, findings, and conclusions contained in the memorandum of the District Director are hereby adopted. It is ordered, That a copy of this memorandum be forwarded to the field office so that appropriate action may be taken in accordance with the foregoing. IN THE MATTER OF S In BREACH OF BOND Proceedings A-6738868 Decided by Central Office March 10, 1950 Bond-Delivery bond, upon release in expulsion proceedings-When breached— Where demand for delivery made on surety after alien's departure from United States-Administrative discretion. Where an alien was released from the custody of the immigration authorities on the posting of a delivery bond, conditioned upon the alien's surrender to the immigration authorities when demanded in connection with deportation proceedings, the delivery bond may be considered breached when the alien was not surrendered upon demand of the surety even though such demand was made after the alien had departed from the country; and where the circumstances are such as do not justify favorable administrative discretion, such bond will be declared breached. BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE Discussion: On May 16, 1949, a warrant was issued for the arrest of the alien on the charges that at the time of entry during March 1948 he was not in possession of an immigration visa; that he did not present an unexpired passport; that he admitted committing a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry, to wit: Forgery; and that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude prior to entry, to wit: Forgery. On June 7, 1949, he was released from custody by the Miami office of this Service when a delivery bond in the sum of $1,000 was posted in his behalf. On June 20, 1949, his presence in Canada was verified when he presented himself at the Toronto, Ontario, Canada, office of this Service. On August 5, 1949, demand was made on the surety that the alien be delivered into the custody of the Miami office within 10 days after receipt of notification for a hearing. The surety advised that as the alien was in Canada it was not possible to comply with the demand. By not surrendering the alien, the conditions of the bond were violated. In transmitting the case to the Central Office for determination as to whether the bond should be declared breached, the office of the District Director at Miami, Fla., states: "Since proper demand was not made on surety until after alien had departed for Canada, it would appear that the bond should be canceled (Matter of L- de SA-, C. O. File A-7621680, August 17, 1949; Matter of J R-S de SA, C. O. File A-9554762, August 17, 1949)." Although the delivery bonds were canceled in the cases cited by the Field Office, that action was purely in exercise of administrative discretion. From a legal standpoint, the conditions of those bonds were violated when the aliens were not surrendered in accordance with demands, and they might have properly been declared breached. Opinion of General Counsel in Matter of V G—, A-2890631, August 3, 1948. However, the instant case is not one in which the exercise of favorable administrative discretion is merited. The record shows that on August 8, 1947, the alien had previously been made the subject of deportation proceedings, was released under a $1,000 delivery bond on August 25, 1947, and shortly thereafter departed to Canada. The bond exacted was canceled. This, then, is the second time that by leaving the country, the alien has managed to avoid a final determination in a deportation proceedings instituted against him. In addition, he has a criminal record which renders the matter more aggravated. The bond will, therefore, be declared breached. Recommendation: It is recommended that the outstanding delivery bond be declared breached and that appropriate steps be taken looking toward the collection of the liquidated damages thereunder. So ordered. IN THE MATTER OF SHCC (AND CHILDREN) In DEPORTATION Proceedings A-5507418, A-7037168, A-7037141, and A-7037142 Decided by Central Office March 14, 1950 Decided by Board May 11, 1950 Government (foreign) Official's Family-Alien's deportability for failure to maintain status under section 3 (1) of the act of 1924 and regulations now in effect-Section 14 and section 15 of the act of 1924, as amended. (1) Statutory authority for imposing conditions of admission with respect to foreign government officials and their families (aliens), who enter the United States under the provisions of section 3 (1) of the Immigration Act of 1924; is found in the amendment of July 1, 1940, to section 15 of the Immigration Act of 1924; and a regulation "executing" this statutory authority as of May 27, 1944 is to be found in 8 C. F. R. 110.29, as amended May 27, 1944. (2) The respondents, who were admitted in 1939 under section 3 (1) of the act of 1924, no longer had such official status in 1946 (when the government official husband/father returned to China), and are deemed to be deportable under sections 14 and 15 of the Immigration Act of 1924, as amended, because of failure to maintain status under section 3 (1) of the act of 1924 and regulations now in effect. CHARGE: Warrant Act of 1924-Remained longer-Members of family of government official. BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE Discussion: These records relate to a 46-year-old married female, her 22-year-old single male child, 18-year-old single male child, and her 14-year-old daughter, all natives and citizens of China, of the Chinese race, whose only entry into the United States occurred at the port of New York, N. Y., on February 3, 1939, at which time they were admitted as members of the family of a government official. Their entries have been verified. The government official husband/ father returned to China in 1946. The respondents have continued to reside in the United States. In the belief that they were subject to deportation, the respondents voluntarily submitted themselves to deportation proceedings in accordance with the provisions of 8 C. F. R. 150.10, requesting that their deportation be suspended in accordance with the provisions of section 19 (c) (2) (b) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended. They are eligible for the relief requested only if they are subject to deportation. The only possible ground of deportability is that set forth in the caption hereof. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, it is the view of this Service that the respondents are not subject to deportation at the present time. Prior to July 1, 1940, foreign government officials and members of their families were admissible to the United States without the imposition of conditions with respect to duration of stay and maintenance of status. This, for the reason that section 15 of the act of May 26, 1924, prior to its amendment by the act of July 1, 1940, contained no statutory authority for the promulgation of regulations imposing conditions of admission with respect to government officials and their families. Accordingly, if the respondents were required to maintain their status in order to avoid deportation such requirement, if it exists, must be found in legislation enacted or regulations promulgated subsequent to their entry. The act of July 1, 1940, amended section 15 of the 1924 act by including government officials and their families within the statutory authority for whom terms of admission could be imposed in accordance with regulations to be prescribed, and adding a proviso to that section. This amendment was considered by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of D—— P———, A—4074327 (formerly 56043/ 906) in its orders on January 14, 1941, and July 31, 1941, and again considered and discussed on January 27, 1941, by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of G, A-1256369 (formerly 55974/884). In those cases the view was advanced that the proviso was indicative of the congressional intent to make the provisions of section 15, as amended, applicable to aliens who were admitted to the United States under clause (1) of section 3 prior to July 1, 1940, the effective date of the amendment. This Service does not question the soundness of that conclusion. It does question, however, the effect of such conclusion on the deportability of aliens in the absence of any regulation imposing conditions of admission at time of entry or imposing conditions subsequent to entry, the breach of which would be a ground of deportability under the immigration laws. Attention is directed to the fact that notwithstanding the amendment of July 1, 1940, it was not until May 16, 1944, that a regulation was duly promulgated (8 C. F. R. 110.29 (a)) amending the regulation in existence since December 21, 1933 (General Order No. 207), so as to require that the admission of a govern |