fall within that proviso of section 2 of the immigration laws, which reads as follows:

"Provided, That nothing in this act shall exclude, if otherwise admissible, persons convicted of an offense purely political, not involving moral turpitude."

An extremely literal interpretation of this proviso might require the Secretary to expel political refugees who had taken or assisted in the taking of human life as an incident to their pursuit of a revolutionary cause, unless they had done so as recognized belligerents. For upon such an interpretation unlawful homicide, even though clearly political in character, might be considered as being a crime involving moral turpitude. But in the face of our historic policy, which has made this country a refuge for the oppressed of all nations, such an interpretation of the legislative intent would be unreasonable. It would, at any rate, be too doubtful an interpretation at the best to reasonably satisfy the Secretary of Labor that this refugee is not within the political proviso quoted above. The warrant is, therefore, issued and canceled.

In the A-case (A-4944576), without any discussion, the assassination of the Austrian Prime Minister was held to be a purely political offense within the meaning of the 2d proviso to section 3 of the act of February 5, 1917 (C. O. order March 13, 1943). A-stated that he had shot and killed the Minister on October 21, 1916, for political reasons, because he had totally suppressed the legal democratic institutions of the country and had illegally set aside the Parliament for 3 years, violating and destroying the constitutional rights and institutions of the Austrian citizens. He further stated that he was sentenced to death for the offense but was later pardoned by the Emperor; that subsequently the Austrian Republican Government revoked all legal consequences of the sentence; and that he was eventually elected to Parliament. There is no indication in the file that the assassination was a part of any concerted movement or uprising.

In the R case et al. (A-5326956), the Board of Immigration Appeals held that the offenses of conspiracy to tamper with the motive power of a vessel of foreign registry and damaging the motive power of a vessel of foreign registry were not purely political offenses. The aliens were Italian seamen, who on March 29, 1941, on instructions from their government had damaged a vessel of Italian registry while it was in a port in the United States. The Board rejected the theory that the offenses were political offenses, stating that it was doubtful that political aspects should be attributed to an offense committed against the laws of this country by subjects of a nation with which we were then at peace, and found that the offenses committed were not purely political offenses within the meaning of the Immigration laws.

Thus it appears from the cases cited that in order for an offense to constitute a political one, there must be concerted action for a political purpose. In all the cases cited, with the exception of the A case, there appeared to have been such concerted action. The

case was decided without any discussion as to the conclusion reached that the act performed by such person was a political offense. In the present case, the husband has testified that he "committed this act, independently, individually without being connected with anyone else." In view of such statement, it cannot be held that the offense committed by the husband was a political offense within the meaning of the 2d proviso to section 3 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917. Consequently the husband is not entitled to the benefits of such proviso. The evidence of record establishes that he admitted and was convicted of the commission before entry of a crime involving moral turpitude. The first ground of exclusion urged against the husband is therefore sustained.

In reference to the second ground of exclusion, the applicable provisions of the act of October 16, 1918, are as follows:

SECTION 1. That any alien who at any time, shall be or shall have been a member of any one of the following classes shall be excluded from admission into the United States.

(c) Aliens who believe in, advise, advocate or teach, *** (2) the duty, necessity or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers (either of specific individuals or of officers generally) of the Government of the United States or of any other organized government, because of his or their official character, **

It is fundamental that to sustain the second ground of exclusion we must find that the husband's belief in the necessity of assaulting and killing the Soviet Ambassador arose because of his official character. The phrase "because of their official character" has been employed to exclude cases where the personal character of the officer in any way motivated the assassin. In other words the office of the individual must be the sole animation (Matter of de E-, A-6808388 (April 1, 1948)).

In the instant proceeding, the husband was motivated to commit the act as much because of the personal character of his victim as his official capacity. The victim's acts as chief administrator of the Ural District in persecuting the people therein and his participation in the execution of the Czar and his family marked him in the eyes of the husband as one deserving extinction. Moreover the record discloses that the husband is not or was not opposed to all organized government and forms of law but rather his opposition was directed to the particular regime in Russia because of its persecution of his fellow countrymen. It is therefore concluded that the second ground of exclusion urged against the husband is not sustained.

The wife has stated that she did not wish to emigrate to the United States at this time, in the event that a decision is made adverse to the admission of the husband and that she wished her case and that of her child held in abeyance pending final decision in the husband's

case. In view thereof, no determination is made in respect to the admission of the wife and child at this time.

Order: It is ordered that the excluding decision of the Board of Special Inquiry be affirmed solely on the ground that the alien is inadmissible as one who has admitted and been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, to wit: Homicide.

IN THE MATTER OF H

In EXCLUSION Proceedings

A-2725294

Decided by Board August 18, 1950

Board of Special Inquiry hearing-Applicability of Administrative Procedure Act (1946).*

The Administrative Procedure Act (June 11, 1946) does not apply to Board of Special Inquiry hearings** (60 Stat. 237, 5 U. S. C. secs. 1001 et seq.).

EXCLUDED BY BOARD OF SPECIAL INQUIRY:

Act of 1924-No visa.

Act of 1917, as amended-Departed to avoid military service.

BEFORE THE BOARD

Discussion: This case is before us on appeal from an order of the Assistant Commissioner of June 14, 1950, affirming a decision of a board of special inquiry excluding the subject alien from admission to the United States on the above-stated grounds.

We have carefully reviewed the record in the case and counsel's brief on appeal. The facts and circumstances of the case are fully discussed by the Assistant Commissioner in his opinion, and we agree with the conclusion reached that the subject alien is inadmissible to this country.

Counsel's brief on appeal is directed mainly to the hearing before the board of special inquiry. It is maintained that the hearing was unfair and illegal in that the board of special inquiry was one in which that Board acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge, and jury. In

*Editor's note.-As to its inapplicability to civil fine proceedings, see unreported Matter of S. S. Bunty, F-5532, B. I. A. 6-16-50 (Sec. 20 of Immigration Act of 1924 involved).

It has been held inapplicable to a hearing provided for in 8 C. F. R. 171.5 when an adjustment of status is requested pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (said statute not requiring a hearing) in Matter of 8, A-6815891, C. O. 4–17–50 (Int. Dec. #147).

**Editor's note.-To like effect as in above Interim Decision, unreported Matter of LT, A-6815697, B. I. A. 6-12-50 and Matter of RA-7138126, 7, B. I. A. 6-16-50.

support of this position, counsel cites Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 70 S. Ct. 445, 94 L. Ed. 383 (1950). In this regard it should be pointed out that it has been held that the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to board of special inquiry hearings. (U. S. ex rel. Saclarides et al. v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. (2d) 687 (C. A. 2, 1950); U. S. ex rel. Frisch v. Miller, 181 F. (2d) 360 (C. A. 5, 1950), 18 L. W. 2466). The appeal from the decision of the Commissioner will be dismissed.

Order: It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby dismissed.