the acquisition of two or more contract-carrier rights by a single carrier. See Marion Trucking Co., Inc.-Purchase-Martz, 37 M. C. C. 305, Marion Trucking Co., Inc.-Purchase-Black and Crouse, 38 M. C. C. 415, Pomprowitz-Purchase-Walsh, 38 M. C. C. 595, Dieckbrader-Purchase-Zimmerman Trucking Service, Inc., 40 M. C. C. 48, and Fischbach-Purchase-Reid Bros. Exp., Inc., 40 M. C. C. 841. The discussion in the last-cited case is pertinent here. There the vendee was authorized, in part, to operate as a contract carrier of specified commodities between Clarksville, Tenn., and Akron, Ohio, and the vendor was authorized inter alia, to operate in the same manner between Akron and various eastern seaboard points. Although recognizing that certain shippers were using vendee to transport a substantial volume of their traffic from Clarksville to Akron, from which point the same traffic was reshipped over vendor's facilities to eastern destinations, the division clearly indicated that the proposed' unification would not permit a through single-line service when it said: Although vendee, as indicated, would be permitted to serve the same shippers in a somewhat more extensive destination territory from the common origin point of Akron, the proposed unification of the two operating rights under single ownership would not permit him to perform a through single-line service authorized by the separate operating rights. For example, approval of the proposed purchase would not authorize vendee to transport shipments of rubber products from an origin point in Tennessee to Boston, or some other destination point in New England, by combining his present authority with that which would be acquired from vendor by the purchase. Approval of the purchase would not broaden under single ownership the separate authorities now held by vendee and vendor. Compare Clare M. Marshall, Inc.-Purchase-Cunningham, 36 M. C. C. 507 and Marion Trucking Co. Inc.-Purchase-Martz, 37 M. C. C. 305.

From the above it is clear that division 4 did not intend to permit vendee in the future to perform a through service under any combination of the separate operating rights irrespective of the contracts used or the method of determining or assessing the charges. The quoted statement clearly seems to remove all doubt as to what that division meant in the above-cited cases, when it said that after the unification vendee would not be permitted to perform "through service greater in scope than has been possible under separate ownership." As stated before, petitioner claims that the position thus taken has the effect of eliminating part of service previously available to the shipper and hence would be an unwarranted restriction on the rights heretofore held by the carriers separately. With this we cannot agree. Prior to the acquisition there were two separate carrier services. With the intervention of the shipper or its agent at a common point, it was possible for both of them to serve such shipper successively in respect of the same shipment, but technically there was no through service per

formed nor available and none was lost by reason of the acquisition. Any lessening in the usefulness of the two operating rights or services to the shipper was due to the fact that after the acquisition the separate rights came into the possession of a single carrier, and there was one less carrier in the field with whom it or its agent could deal. While this may be a factor to be considered in determining whether the acquisition should be authorized it does not follow that operating rights are thereby restricted. There is nothing to prevent vendee from using the separate operating rights in the manner for which they were originally intended when initially granted. The basic concepts under which contract-carrier operating rights have been granted by this Commission are entirely inconsistent with the suggestion that contract carriers should be permitted to "tack" separate grants of authority for the purpose of rendering through service. Through service by a contract carrier over a combination of separate authorities whether under separate contracts or a single contract is a new and different service from that contemplated in the initial issuance of the separate authorities. It is one which is not described in the permit as required by section 209 (a), and one which should be permitted only after it is specifically found to be consistent with the public interest and national transportation policy.

In instances where the vendee in an application under section 5 desires to provide a through motor contract carrier service in lieu of the separate services of vendor and vendee, and believes that such a through service can be shown to be consistent with the public interest and the national transportation policy as required by section 209 of the act, he may include in his application under section 5, a request that the desired authority be granted. In the case of an application under section 212, an application under 209 may be filed concurrently.

In our opinion the specific issues raised by the petition are adequately answered by the foregoing and there is no need for the general investigation requested. Accordingly the petition will be denied. An appropriate order will be entered.

COMMISSIONER ALLDREDGE did not participate in the disposition of this proceeding.

49 M. C. C.

No. MC-870351

MOTOR RAIL COMPANY COMMON CARRIER
APPLICATION

Decided January 4, 1949

Upon reconsideration, finding in prior report, 31 M. C. C. 353, corrected to authorize operation by applicant as a common carrier by motor vehicle, in interstate or foreign commerce, of general commodities, serving Norristown, Pa., as an off-route point in connection with applicant's regular-route operations between New York, N. Y., and Wilmington, Del.

Appearances as shown in prior report, also Homer S. Carpenter for applicant.

REPORT AND ORDER OF THE COMMISSION ON RECONSIDERATION

DIVISION 5, COMMISSIONERS LEE, ROGERS, AND PATTERSON

BY DIVISION 5:

In its prior report herein, the Commission, division 5, found, among other things not now important, that Motor Rail Company of Jersey City, N. J., was entitled to a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing continuance of operation as a common carrier by motor vehicle, of general commodities, between New York, N. Y., and Wilmington, Del., through Jersey City, N. J., and Philadelphia, Pa., serving all intermediate points and certain off-route points.

In discussing the evidence in support of the claimed "grandfather" rights to serve off-route points, division 5 said:

All of the points in New Jersey to or from which shipments are shown to have been moved in radial off-route service from New York City and Jersey City are in Essex, Hudson, and Union Counties, and that portion of Middlesex County north of the Raritan River plus Perth Amboy. In New York the only point to which off-route service is shown outside New York City is Yonkers; and, at Philadelphia, off-route service is shown only to Camden, N. J., and to Norristown, Pa. No other irregular-route or radial off-route operations are shown at any point on the regular route between New York and Wilmington. [Italics supplied.]

However, in the findings in the mimeographed report, service was inadvertently authorized to and from "Norristown, N. J.," a nonex

1No. MC-87035, McLain Motor Line, Inc., Common Carrier Application, are the number and title assigned to the application after the acquisition by McLain Motor Line, Inc., approved in No. MC-FC-23005.

istent point so far as we can determine, instead of Norristown, Pa. This obvious error was aggravated further when the printing clerk in an apparent attempt to correct it in the bound volume changed "Norristown, N. J.," to "Morristown, N. J.," which is a comparatively substantial city some 25 miles from New York City. In the interim, a certificate was issued to Motor Rail Company which conforms to our mimeographed report and authorizing off-route service to and from "Norristown, N. J."

McLain Motor Line, Inc., successor in interest to Motor Rail Company, now calls our attention to the discrepancy between the findings in the "printed" report and in the certificate issued and requests that a corrected certificate be issued authorizing off-route service to and from Morristown, N. J.

Clearly no grant of authority to service Morristown, N. J., was ever made. Instead it was intended to authorize off-route service to and from Norristown, Pa. No evidence was submitted to support a grant of "grandfather" authority to serve Morristown, N. J. The certificate authorizing service at Norristown, N. J., was inadvertently and mistakenly issued. In such circumstances we are empowered to order the certificate corrected. Compare Smith Bros. Revocation of C'ertificate, 22 M. C. C. 524, 26 M. C. C. 219, 33 M. C. C. 465, and 42 M. C. C. 211. We are hereby reopening the proceeding for this purpose.

On reconsideration, we find that finding 1 (a) in the prior report, 31 M. C. C. 353, should be, and it is hereby, amended and corrected by substituting "Norristown, Pa.," in lieu of "Norristown, N. J.,” and it is so ordered. The printing of the report will serve to correct also the report at 31 M. C. C. 353.

Upon compliance by McLain Motor Line, Inc., with the provisions of sections 215 and 217 of the act, and with our rules and regulations thereunder, an appropriate certificate, with the correction noted above, will be issued.

49 M. C. C.

No. MC-C-4821

PERFORMANCE OF MOTOR COMMON CARRIER SERVICE BY RISS & COMPANY, INC.

Decided January 31, 1949

Opinion expressed that the plan of operation proposed by Riss & Company, Inc., will meet the requirements set forth in the prior report and order herein, 48 M. C. C. 327, and that if the proposed plan of operation is put into effect, Riss & Company, Inc., will then be operating as a common carrier by motor vehicle as defined in section 203 (a) (14) of the Interstate Commerce Act. Nos. MC-C-484 and MC-200 (Sub-No. 46) reopened for further hearing.

Appearances as shown in prior report and also:

A. Alvis Layne, Jr., for respondent in Nos. MC-C-482 and MC-C484 and for applicant in No. MC-200 (Sub-No. 46).

James J. Doherty, John R. Norris, R. J. McBride, and Albert B. Rosenbaum for certain interveners.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION

DIVISION 5, COMMISSIONERS LEE, ROGERS, AND PATTERSON BY DIVISION 5:

In the prior report herein, 48 M. C. C. 327, decided June 10, 1948, we found (1) in No. MC-C-482, that respondent, Riss & Company, Inc., of North Kansas City, Mo., under its so-called provider plan, was not operating as a common carrier by motor vehicle as defined in section 203 (a) (14) of the Interstate Commerce Act, (2) in No. MC-C-484, that Riss, in view of its operations under the provider plan, had willfully failed to render reasonably adequate service to the public as a common carrier by motor vehicle as authorized and required by its certificates in Nos. MC-200 and MC-200, subnumbers 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 30, 32, and 33, and (3) on further hearing in No. MC200 (Sub-No. 46)-formerly No. MC-30077-that the findings of the prior report in that proceeding, 44 M. C. C. 802, except to the extent reopened by the Commission on December 3, 1945, for reconsideration, should be affirmed.

This report also embraces No. MC-C-484, Riss & Company, Inc., Revocation of Certificates, and No. MC-200 (Sub-No. 46), Riss & Company, Inc., Common Carrier Application (formerly No. MC-30077, Monark Motor Freight System, Inc.)