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destruction of traditional Ukrainian culture and village life,
the primitive level of existence in the collectives can only
be compared, writes Tykhiy, to the feudal estates of the past.
Obviously, in such a state of affairs any consideration of eco-
nomic and technological cooperation between the USSR and the
United States and Europe must take into account the oppressive
characteristics of the Soviet economic system in Ukraine and
its connection with the lack of basic human freedoms in the
USSR. There must be a genuine linkage between trade and human
rights in any dealings with the USSR.

BASKET III. Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

REUNION OF FAMILIES. Ukrainian citizens of Ukraine cannot leave Ukraine of their own free will. Government regulations and restrictions inhibit travel abroad. Thousands of families who wish to leave Ukraine or who wish to join their families in the West cannot do so, either because they are not permitted or because they are afraid to apply for exit visas for fear of repression and persecution. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group in its Memorandum No. 18 accuses the Soviet government for discriminating against Ukrainians in its emigration policies. The document charges that Soviet Jews and Russian dissidents are allowed to emigrate to the West in much greater number than Ukrainians or other non-Russian dissidents. The latter are often imprisoned for their attempts to leave the USSR. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group theorizes that few Ukrainians are allowed to emigrate because Moscow does not want them to undermine the myth that the USSR has solved its nationality problem, a myth that the Soviet government has assiduously and successfully propagated for the last half century. The emigration of substantial number of Ukrainians would acquaint the West with the Ukrainian problem, and that is something that Moscow is determined to prevent. The authors of the document state that peace in Europe cannot be attained by deception and the secret actions of individual state rulers. A lasting peace can only be built on the just treatment of individuals, including the individual's right to freely emigrate from his country.

MOVEMENT OF IDEAS. The free flow of peoples and ideas is impeded by the very nature of the Soviet system in Ukraine. The borders are sealed by barbed wire, fortifications, armed guards, and machine gun stations. Mail is censored, all publications are censored, foreign publications are not allowed into the country unless they pass a rigid state censorship; authors are not free to publish their works in Ukraine. Even artistic productions are carefully scrutinized for their "nationalistic" content. Any foreign Ukrainian-language publications printed outside Ukraine are not allowed into the country. The free flow of information and ideas circulates instead, by means of "samvydav," clandestine or "underground" bulletins, appeals, journals, and reports for which a person, if caught by the KGB, may get a minimum of three years in a Soviet

labor camp.

As an example, circulating in "samvydav" at present is a letter by Pope John Paul II to Ukrainian Cardinal Yosyf Slipiy in which the Pope indirectly appeals to Moscow to recognize the right of Ukrainian Catholics to freedom of religious worship. The publication of this letter or even its possession is disallowed by the Soviet government; indeed, the KGB has tried hard to stop any circulation of the letter, fearing that it will further intensify Ukrainian human and national rights activity.

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE. Although cultural and educational exchanges between the USSR and Europe have been many, Ukrainians have benefitted little. Most of these exchanges involve only Russians and Russian cultural presentations. Moreover, as in the case of Ukrainian-language publications outside of Ukraine, Ukrainian cultural exhibits and performers of traditional Ukrainian arts situated outside of Ukraine are not permitted in Ukraine by Soviet authorities. Ukrainian scientists or artists are, for the most part, carefully screened before they are allowed to journey outside Ukraine and even then they are accompanied by KGB agents and prevented from free interaction with their colleagues abroad. Under such conditions it is futile to speak of any meaningful or beneficial cultural or educational exchange between Ukraine and other European nations.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In its second Memorandum of January 1978, the Kiev Helsinki Group states that it is in "no small measure" the responsibility of Western leaders that perpetuates the imperialist conception and policies of Russia concerning Ukraine. The USSR is an empire, and the West cannot ignore this fact. The aspirations for freedom of 50-million people will not vanish to accommodate the short-sighted perceptions of political leaders in the free world. "We have always resisted," state the members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group. "We are resisting today; we will resist tomorrow."

The formation and continued existence of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group as well as the many other courageous human and national rights activists in Ukraine are of special significance to any discussion of European political interests and humanitarian considerations. First, Ukraine is a populous nation whose existence and future development can hardly be ignored in the context of European political forces. The fact that there is any opposition in Ukraine at all, let alone in its current widespread form, testifies to the intensity and ineradicability of the Ukrainian component in Eastern European affairs. Second, violations of national and human rights are far more frequent and notorious in Ukraine than in any other national republic of the USSR. Precisely because, as Ukrainian dissidents assert, the rights movement in Ukraine strikes at the very heart of the Soviet global apparatus of ideology and disinformation, Moscow sees in this movement its most bitter enery. Many Russian and Jewish dissidents have confirmed the fact that

Ukraine has been the hardest hit in Moscow's periodic crackdowns against dissidents. According to documents in "samvydav," Ukrainians constitute almost 40-percent of the political prisoner population of the Ural-Mordovian camp system, although Ukrainians constitute only 19-percent of the total population of the USSR. Third, Europe, the United States, and the rest of the free world bear a heavy responsibility in at least partially mitigating the lawlessness and terror unleashed against Ukrainian rights activists, for such violations of rights are rarely reported in the American and European press. Having access to few sources outside Moscow and traditionally uninformed about the colonial nature of the Soviet Russian empire, foreign correspondents fail to inform the world about the critical situation in Ukraine. This lack of publicity in the Western news and information media further undermines the morale of and intensifies the difficult circumstances under which Ukrainian rights activists continue their struggle. It is morally imperative, therefore, that the situation in Ukraine be fully explored and publicized at the CSCE Conference, a conference which by its very nature should address the Ukrainian problem.

We recommend that the United States take the following broad actions at the coming Madrid meeting:

1.

2.

3.

In response to the many requests of the Ukrainian
Helsinki Group, the United States should bring up the
matter of Ukrainian representation to the CSCE Conference
and any future conferences in connection with the
Helsinki Accords.

The United States should bring up the violation or
national rights in Ukraine and in the other non-
Russian republics of the USSR and should give serious
consideration to the whole question of self-determination
and the future of a secure and independent community of
European nations, free of Russian control.

The United States delegation should highlight the flagrant
violation of rights in Ukraine; it should see to it that
these reported violations cover all the many examples
in the various national republics and not just a few
select and well publicized ones. The meeting must
bring to world attention the cases of men such as Lev
Lukyanenko, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Shukhevych, and Oles
Berdnyk.

4. Finally, the United States must link all attempts at
trade between Europe, the US and the Soviet Union to
an implementation of provisions of the Helsinki Accords.
The reevaluation and turnabout of Western policy in
this regard following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
are glaring inconsistencies inasmuch as the gross violations
of human rights and of the Helsinki provisions existed before
the invasion yet elicited no comparable response by Western
leaders. The defense of human and national rights of
Ukraine and other nations in Eastern Europe must be put into
future perspective and become a consistent and outstanding
part of American and European policy in regard to the USSR.

THE POLISH MINORITY by Jan Nowak

Submitted by the Polish American Congress,
Commission on Poles in the Soviet Union

Poles in the Soviet Union constitute the second largest Polish ethnic group outside Poland. -- the first being in the United States. The international structure of the Soviet Union consists of 131 nationalities apart from Russia. Poles belong to 23 major ethnic groups numbering more than one million.

According to official Soviet statistics from 1939, 626,905 Poles lived within pre-war borders of the Soviet Union. Polish population was concentrated mainly in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. After incorporation into the U.S.S. R. of the eastern part of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, about 5,400,000 Poles found themselves within new borders of the Soviet Union. About 850,000 of those who were deported eastward perished through either violent or natural death. Around 2,150,000 were repatriated to Poland. The balance left around 2,000,000 Poles, aside from the 626,000 pre-war Polish inhabitants of the Soviet Union. The first post-war Soviet census in 1959 shows, however, only 1,380,000 Poles. Unaccounted for are 1,256,000 Poles.

In two decades, between the census of 1959 and 1979, the Polish ethnic group had dropped by 16.7% (from 1,380,000 in 1959 to 1,151,000 in 1979). In the same time, total population of the Soviet Union increased by 24.2% (from 209,000,000 in 1959 to 262,000,000 in 1979). The population of Poland increased in post-war years by an extraordinary 54% (from 22,700,000 in 1945 to 35,000,000 in 1979).

Out of 23 major ethnic groups, only Jews and Poles show considerable decreases in numbers. The drop in the Jewish population corresponds more or less to the number of emigrants. Since repatriation of Poles was stopped in 1959, a sharp downward trend of the Polish minority can be explained only by enforced assimilation.

Forms of pressure in enforcing change of nationality vary in different parts of the Soviet Union. 84% of Poles are concentrated in four Western republics: the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Lithuania and Latvia. Discrimination and intimidation of Poles has been particularly ruthless in Byelorussia and that part of the Ukraine which was within pre-war Soviet borders. Refusal by authorities to register the nationality of a newly-born child as Polish represents the simplest way of enforcing change of nationality. If parents have the courage to resist officials, the nationality column of the register is left blank until the child reaches 18 years of age and can decide his nationality for himself. Similar pressure to declare nationality other than Polish has been applied to school children and military conscripts. Authorities also refuse to register children under Polish names. Thus, for instance, if a child is given the Polish name, Jan, it is registered as the Russian name, Ivan. Teresa Kowalska was registered as Tereza Iwanowicz.

In this respect Poles are treated in a different way than Jews. While Jewish people are not allowed to hide their race, religion and ancestry, and cannot give their nationality as Russian, Ukrainian or anything other than Jewish, Poles are under pressure to renounce their ethnic identity.

Discrimination in jobs, profession and education represents another form of pressure to renounce Polish nationality. The access of Poles to higher education is either denied or made very difficult. In Byelorussia, in every thousand people 86 Russians and only 12 Poles have higher education. In Lithuania, out of every thousand inhabitants, 53 Russians, 33 Lithuanians and only 9 Poles have university degrees. According to general reports from the Soviet Union, secret instructions were issued establishing a limit on the number of Poles who could be admitted to universities.

Similar discrimination has been applied in employment policies. An affidavit by a young Pole from Lwow (Western Ukraine) who had left the Soviet Union in the mid '70's and lives presently in the West, attested to the fact that while he always considered himself Polish, his passport showed that he had Ukrainian nationality. As a Pole, he would have had no chance to work at his profession as a press photographer.

An overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens of Polish extraction work on collective farms, in mines, and in industry as unqualified manual workers. In the United States there are more than 3,000 professors in universities who have Polish backgrounds. Many of them are prominent scholars.

There are thousands of Polish names among American athletes. In the Soviet Union Poles could not pursue careers as scholars, doctors, writers, artists or athletes. Olympic star Olga Korbut comes from a well-known old family of Polish landowners in the district of Grodno, where her grandparents lived before the war. She gives her nationality as Byelorussian.

The Polish journalist from Poland, Alicja Grabowska visited Uzbekistan in 1967. She discovered that at least 150 Polish families, who were deported during the last war from Eastern Poland, live in Taszkient and Samarkanda. Nobody dared to speak to her in Polish in the presence of witnesses from fear of harassment. Poles in Uzbekistan were afraid to maintain any contacts with their families in Poland or to receive from them Polish publications.

Since it is an act of courage and sacrifice to admit Polish ethnic allegiance in the Soviet Union, the number of Poles is probably much higher than shown by official statistics. But there is no doubt that the number is rapidly shrinking. Linguistic assimilation is making particularly rapid progress. In 1959, 45.2% of Poles in the Soviet Union used their Polish language; in 1979 only 29.1%. So far, only general data are available from the population census of 1979. From the previous census of 1970, we learn that in the capital of Byelorussia, Minsk, out of 10,500 persons registered as Poles, less than 1,000 spoke Polish. Byelorussia has the largest concentration of Poles. Out of 382,600 in 1970, 290,500 did not speak Polish. There were in 1970, 8000 Poles

in Kiev but only 1,600 spoke Polish.

In the district of Zytomierz in the

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