urged states not yet parties to become parties. It was adopted by

consensus.

Negative Security Assurances. Non-nuclear-weapon states have long sought guarantees from the nuclear-weapon states that, in exchange for their renunciation of nuclear arms, the nuclear-weapon states would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. These guarantees have been referred to as "negative security assurances." At the first special session on disarmament in 1978, each of the five nuclear-weapon states, in an effort to meet the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon states, issued a unilateral statement offering a negative security assur

ance.

Since 1980, an ad hoc committee within the Conference on Disarmament has addressed the question of negative security assurances. Among points at issue are the desires of some nonnuclear-weapon states that the five declared nuclear-weapon states agree to a common NSA text, which would have the status of international law. The ad hoc committee has not been able to come to agreement on this and a number of other points. The United States has indicated willingness to discuss a universal negative security assurance which would both safeguard the security requirements of each of the nuclear-weapon states and their respective allies and meet the desires of all non-nuclearweapon states.

In 1991 resolution 46/32, "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons," was adopted by a vote of 152 to 0, with 2 (U.S.) abstentions. It appealed to nuclear-weapon states to demonstrate the political will and flexibility necessary to reach agreement on a common approach to negative security assurances. The United States believed the feasibility of reaching effective international arrangements depends on the strategic interests and the inherent practicality of the matter in question, as well as on the political will of states.

Israeli Nuclear Armament. Resolution 46/39, "Israeli nuclear armament," was similar to the 1990 version in singling out Israel for refusal to renounce possession of nuclear weapons or place nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. The resolution accused Israel of collaborating with South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems and condemned Israel's refusal to renounce any possession of nuclear weapons. Despite attempts by its sponsors to tone down objectionable language, the resolution continued to lose support compared to the year

before. It was adopted in plenary by a vote of 76 to 3 (U.S.), with 75 abstentions.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. The concept of nuclearweapon-free zones (NWFZs) dates back to the 1950s. The United States supports the NWFZ concept as a non-proliferation measure when such a zone would effectively promote regional stability and global security, but opposes zones which would erode nuclear deterrence or existing security arrangements.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is the most important NWFZ agreement to date. It entered into force in 1968 and, coupled with its two protocols, provides for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. In 1991 the General Assembly adopted by consensus procedural decision 46/411 noting the report of the First Committee concerning signature and ratification of Protocol I. Protocol I is open to adherence by nonregional states which administer territory within the area of the treaty's application and provides that such states will not store or deploy nuclear weapons within those territories. The United States has ratified the Treaty and Protocol I.

Since 1961 resolutions have been introduced in the First Committee endorsing a call by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the designation of Africa as a nuclear-weaponfree zone and condemning South Africa for allegedly impeding this objective. During the 46th session in 1991, the two traditional African resolutions on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone were introduced.

Resolution 46/34 B, "Implementation of the Declaration,” referred to the 1964 OAU Declaration in which African states declared their intention not to manufacture or acquire control of atomic weapons. The 1991 text was improved over that of prior years, and took note of South Africa's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) while again calling upon all states to consider Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was adopted by consensus.

As originally tabled, resolution 46/34 A, "Nuclear capability of South Africa," was a great improvement over that of 1990, as its sponsors had dropped years of harsh rhetoric. Unfortunately, they, subsequently, accepted an amendment restoring preambular language on alleged Israeli-South African military cooperation and operative language casting suspicion on South African willingness to comply with its recent commitments under the NPT and to the IAEA. Votes were held on both paragraphs, with the preambular paragraph being adopted by a vote of 90 to 31

(U.S.), with 31 abstentions, and the operative paragraph passing by a vote of 97 to 29 (U.S.), with 27 abstentions. Despite retention of the objectionable paragraphs, the removal of much of the rhetoric enabled the United States to move away from its former opposition, and the resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 108 to 1, with 47 (U.S.) abstentions.

Australia, on behalf of the United States and others, gave an explanation of vote on what led to the reconsideration of our approach to the issue of South Africa's nuclear capability:

We are conscious of the long and troubled history that goes with this resolution. Indeed it was because of this history that all of us were prepared to overlook the hyperbole and grudging nature of some of the paragraphs to vote in favor of the resolution as it appeared in earlier versions. . . . In this regard, it is only fair to say that since joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty South Africa has acted in an exemplary fashion. It has concluded promptly a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which came into force upon signature. . . . We see it ironic therefore that the amendments now contained in [resolution 46/34 B] have been put forward by countries which themselves have not concluded their own safeguards agreements under the NPT and that they, rather than South Africa, are not complying with their treaty obligations. . . . Factors we consider extraneous to the issue have been belatedly introduced into the draft resolution, for instance, the oblique references to Israel. Regrettably, we will therefore abstain on this resolution.

Resolution 46/30 on "Establishment of a nuclear-weaponfree zone in the region of the Middle East" urged "all parties directly concerned to consider seriously" taking steps necessary to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone.

It also requested the Secretary General to consult with the states of the region and other concerned states to explore ways and means of establishing the zone. The resolution was adopted by consensus.

The traditional resolution, "Establishment of a nuclearweapon-free zone in South Asia" (Resolution 46/31), dates back to 1974. The text in 1991 was similar to those of previous years, and was adopted in plenary by a vote of 121 (U.S.) to 3, with 26 abstentions. The United States offered a brief explanation of vote regarding nuclear-free zones and this resolution:

First, we trust that all states in the region will take particular note of operative paragraph two, which urges them to refrain from actions contrary to the objectives of this resolution. Second, our delegation also wishes to note that the reference in preambular paragraph three to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world does not constitute a blanket endorsement by the United States of such zones on a universal basis.

Other Disarmament Issues

Disarmament and Development. The question of a relationship between disarmament and development was first considered in depth in 1978, and has been the subject of General Assembly resolutions in recent years. In 1986 the United States announced it did not accept the premise that there is a causal relationship between disarmament in the developed world and development in the developing world. The United States has not participated in General Assembly consideration of this issue since then, stating it did not consider itself bound by Assembly resolutions relating to it.

In 1991 resolution 46/36 C, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development," was adopted without a vote. The United States made a statement before its adoption, explaining it would not

...

participate in whatever action the First Committee takes on (this resolution). The United States believes that disarmament and development are two distinct issues that cannot be considered as organically linked.

Institutional Issues. A number of First Committee actions in 1991 involved the adoption of reports of other bodies or the Secretary General. "Report of the Conference on Disarmament," resolution 46/38 C, continued to be controversial. Although the Geneva CD reached consensus on the final report it submitted to the General Assembly (via the First Committee), members of the CD took advantage of the resolution adopting that report to insert issues on which the CD did not agree. The resolution was adopted in plenary 131 to 8 (U.S.), with 23 abstentions. By contrast, resolution 46/38 A on the report of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), which also provided instructions for its continued operation, was adopted by consensus.

Resolution 46/37 F, adopted by a vote of 160 to 1 (U.S.), with 1 abstention, encouraged the activity of the three UN Regional Centers for Peace and Disarmament. In an unfortunate step backwards, its language again contained financial implications for the United Nations-a request that the regional disarmament center in Kathmandu be funded through the regular UN budget. The vote on the paragraph requesting that funding was 137 to 2 (U.S.), with 22 abstentions. The United States explained its position:

We voted "no" on [this resolution] because it provided for funding of administrative costs from the UN regular budget.... The U.S. view is that the centers should continue to be funded from voluntary contributions, as provided for at the time the centers were established.

Subsequently, a Japanese philanthropic foundation provided the necessary funds to the center in Kathmandu.

A resolution little changed from previous years on the "UN disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services program," resolution 46/37 E, was adopted by consensus.

Indian Ocean Zone of Peace. General Assembly resolution 2832 (1971) contained a Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a "zone of peace" (IOZP) and called for the great powers to remove naval forces and facilities from the Indian Ocean. The United States has consistently opposed this call as incompatible with international law guaranteeing, inter alia, freedom of navigation and the right of collective self-defense.

Subsequent annual resolutions endorsed the 1971 declaration and established an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to consider its implementation. Due to the failure of the Ad Hoc Committee to make any progress toward finding a basis for the establishment of the Zone satisfactory to both regional states and nonregional maritime users of the Indian Ocean, most Western participants, including the United States, withdrew from the Ad Hoc Committee in 1990. In 1991, resolution 46/49, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace," was adopted by 127 to 4 (U.S.), with 30 abstentions.

South Atlantic Zone of Peace. Resolution 46/19 was somewhat improved over versions adopted in previous years, but not enough to change the U.S. vote opposing it, for reasons stated in an explanation of vote:

In the first instance, the United States does not support attempts to institute an internationally recognized zone of peace by General Assembly resolution. We believe that such zones of peace can only be established through multilateral negotiations among the relevant parties.

Our second concern refers to freedom of navigation. While the United States appreciates the positive references the sponsors have made to address our concerns on this matter, we note that they are only in the preambular portion of the resolution. However, given the territorial claims of some states in the region, we believe that this resolution insufficiently protects the right of innocent passage through territorial waters as established by customary international law and the law of the sea negotiations.

The resolution was adopted by the plenary, without having been referred to the First Committee, by a vote of 141 to 1 (U.S.), with 0 abstentions.

International Arms Transfers. Three resolutions relating to the international transfer of arms and related technology were adopted in 1991, reflecting the growing interest in this issue.