RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACE PROCESS AND EVENTS IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any relationship between your decision to move on the peace process now and the situation on the West Bank and Gaza?

Ambassador MURPHY. I would prefer to say that the situation on the West Bank and Gaza has created this sense of opportunity. It has demonstrated very vividly that the status quo as we have said, is not a viable option. The events in the West Bank and Gaza have driven that point home very forcefully.

Mr. HAMILTON. Would it be correct to say that the peace initiative we are now seeing would not have occurred had it not been for the violence in the West Bank and Gaza in the last few weeks?

Ambassador MURPHY. When you put the question that way you are in effect asking me to say that we are driven only by violence and that we would come up with ideas to present a workable proposal or construct a program only to reward violence. That is not the way we are approaching it, but I cannot disassociate in time and place the events on the West Bank and Gaza.

Mr. HAMILTON. There obviously is some linkage between those events.

Ambassador MURPHY. There is some, yes.

SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE IN U.S. PEACE PROPOSALS

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the things that has struck me, in the conversations we had with Secretary Shultz before he went to the Middle East-and I think he said it publicly-is his statement that he wanted to skip over a lot of the procedural problems and try to get to the substance of the matter. Yet if you look at the Secretary's letter, for example, and your statement today and all of the public statements, it seems to me you are still focusing on procedure and not substance.

Would you care to comment on that? Is it because you do not want the substantive aspects of your proposal to be public at this time? If that is the reason I personally would understand that. I would like to hear you comment on this apparent discrepancy.

Ambassador MURPHY. I agree that as you look at the proposal, the letter which was handed over in confidence and took at least 36 hours to be published, as I recall. But the fact is the essence of the proposal is out there, has been published in the American media as well as in the region and in Europe. You do see a great stress on procedure. You see a great stress on acceleration on the calendar, moving ahead on the negotiations.

The closest that you come to a substantive statement in that proposal is that negotiations will be based on Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts. That has been repeated a couple of times in the proposal.

The issues of substance, as we went further in our discussions, were not that novel. There were, after all, several years of discussions after the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed on issues of what we call transitional arrangements for the occupied territories. How the Palestinians would achieve greater political, economic control of their own decision-making, how the military occupa

tion would be ended. Out there in the category of issues that we have called final status are the issues of territory, of sovereignty. Mr. HAMILTON. What I want to understand is this integral package that you talk about includes fairly specific suggestions with regard to substance?

Ambassador MURPHY. Most of the effort has been focused on the organization of the negotiations. I can say this, Mr. Chairman, that the only document that has been presented is the one that has been published. We have presented a calendar, a time frame, a concept of how to tie the different stages of negotiations together, but this is the only, and it comes down to a single page, the only document that has changed hands between the United States government and those other governments.

Mr. HAMILTON. Has there been discussion between the United States and the parties involved on the substance of an interim arrangement and also, on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza?

Ambassador MURPHY. No, not really on final status. We have said that our positions on final status issues would come as no surprise to any party. They were as stated by the President in September, 1982 in the Reagan Initiative.

Mr. HAMILTON. You have chosen not to made those substantive proposals public I presume.

Ambassador MURPHY. We have not many any formal substantive proposals on final status issues.

Mr. HAMILTON. And interim proposals?

Ambassador MURPHY. To a certain degree we have, but they have been informal discussions.

STATUS OF EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Smith of New Jersey.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, you note on page eight of your testimony with regard to the arms embargo with regards to Iran, you raised it in your discussions in Moscow recently. Secretary of State George Shultz has also raised it, as have many of our representatives at the UN.

What is the status of that effort? You indicated you hoped we would have had that in the Security Council in February, and obviously we have not. Do you have high hopes that the Soviets will accede to our requests? What is their main obstacle to supporting the arms embargo?

Ambassador MURPHY. The Soviets have said they do not in principle oppose a second resolution, but they have not agreed to the timing of it. They have continued to state that the consideration of Security Council Resolution 598 has not been fully explored, fully exhausted.

We do not agree. We think Iran has led the Security Council on a merry dance for these last seven or eight months. But we do hope to persuade the Soviets that the time has come for that resolution to be passed and for an international effort to be joined on squeezing down the arms sources reaching Iran.

We have been accused of trying for a quick media success, a quick political success, "look, the United States has pulled a rabbit

out of the hat." We have been at great pains to say that if you look at our own program, Operation Staunch, it has scarcely been an outstanding success. We claim 50 percent success rate, 60 percent of all of the countries that we have talked to and contracts that we have been able to cut off.

But if we could add to that a Soviet and a Chinese effort with their friends and their allies, we think we could have a much stronger pressure on Iran, and it is going to be slow in coming.

The fact is, the bulk of the campaign season is past for this winter. There has not been a major campaign launched for that. We say some credit is due to the efforts on arms control. The weapons are more expensive, harder to get, spare parts harder to get, and this has had its influence on the battlefield.

It would be nice if we could get the Soviets and the Chinese formally on board and engaged actively in, say, restricting supplies.

CHINESE VIEW OF AN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. What was the Chinese Foreign Minister's view of this? Was he more open this time during his visit?

Ambassador MURPHY. He said they would support it if a majority of the Council did. We could try to go outside of the five permanent members and organize positive votes, but that would really defeat the point of the whole effort. It is not a propaganda gesture we are trying to make. We would like to get the active involvement of the Soviets, the Chinese. For that purpose we have gritted our teeth and said we will keep working. We think the time has long passed for this resolution.

DO EVENTS IN THE TERRITORIES STRENGHTEN THE PLO?

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, do you share the view that events in the occupied territories have strengthened the PLO? And is the 13-year-old United States policy of not negotiating with or recognizing the PLO under review within the administration?

Ambassador MURPHY. That is a question I cannot give a yes or no answer to, Congressman. I do not think anyone is particularly strengthened by the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza. Our view is if this continues and there is going to be a victor, the victor will not be the PLO. The victor will not be the state of Israel or the government of Jordan or any of the others. It will be a victory for fundamentalism and a victory for those elements that would like to see more Irans and more Lebanons in the region.

Our policy of negotiating, discussing with the PLO is not under review.

POSSIBLE BIASES OF THE NEWS MEDIA

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. One final question. There have been a number of criticisms concerning the news coverage of events in the occupied areas, and there are many who have suggested that the coverage has been biased and that the very presence of cameras on a day to day basis have precipitated some of the violence. That protestors are playing to the world stage, and since a majority of Americans and really a majority of people in Western democracies receive most of their information from television, it has been a way

to try to drive a wedge between a traditional solidarity with the nation of Israel and with the Arab countries, particularly those in the occupied areas.

What is your view of the handling of the news media, particularly the networks? Do you think they have been fair? Do you think they have been biased? I'd appreciate your answer.

Ambassador MURPHY. Violence is news. Bad news is always news. I do not think it would be fair to accuse the media of creating the violence or of enhancing the violence.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I'm not suggesting that. But however unwittingly, do they become part of the drama?

Ambassador MURPHY. They do. Inevitably they become part of it, surely. But the situation out there is difficult. The situation is violent. They have captured some of the incidents on camera. The camera never gives you the whole story.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Lantos?

QUESTION ON THE ROLE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's nice to see you, Mr. Secretary.

I would like to have you give us a historical perspective of the events which are now unfolding. After all, it seems to me that if we focus on the moment and on the most recent proposals of the State Department without a firm grasp of the historical background, we are like a cork bobbing on a stormy sea without a compass, buffeted by every gust of wind and movement of water.

What I would like to ask you to do, Mr. Secretary, and I realize that these are very complex issues, in sort of capsule form, give me your view of the genesis of the four wars in that area, '48, '56, '67, and '73. Because this is part of the historical memory of the players in this drama.

Tell me, if you would, why you or the State Department apparently now feel that the Soviet Union has the same interest in the region that we do, namely a negotiated peaceful, stable settlement of the outstanding issues. Because that clearly is not our view of Soviet goals and objectives in many other parts of the world.

Tell us, if you would, the rationale for this extraordinary international forum, namely the five permanent members of the United Nations.

Tell us why, for instance, the lack of diplomatic relations between China and Israel, and the Soviet Union and Israel, would not disqualify these two countries from participating as a tribunal in this entire matter. Would it not make sense to, as a minimum condition for their participation, have them establish diplomatic relations with all of the countries involved in the region?

Finally, to sort of clear another bit of the historical record, I wonder if you would enlighten the subcommittee on what in fact happened to Secretary Shultz's proposal prior to the Washington Summit between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Reagan? My understanding is that Secretary Shultz proposed a convening of a meeting involving the top leadership from Jordan and Israel simultaneously with the Gorbachev-Reagan Summit here in Washington last De

cember. The Prime Minister of Israel agreed to this Shultz proposal, but King Hussein turned it down.

Is this an accurate impression that some of us have? And if so, would you care to speculate as to why King Hussein chose not to participate in what would have been a very forthcoming response to his repeated request to provide an international forum for the commencement of the negotiations?

My final question, Mr. Secretary, relates to the nature of the international forum, the role of the United Nations, and the degree of permanence that this forum has.

Initially it seems to me that Secretary Shultz spoke of an international forum which would have been quasi-ceremonial in nature. It would have commenced the discussions but then would have dissolved itself and the parties on a bilateral basis would have proceeded with their discussions.

What I see now is a permanent international tribunal made up of the five permanent members of the United Nations, two of which do not even have diplomatic relations with the state of Israel, and my understanding is that we are prepared to table a proposal both for the interim settlement and the long term settlement.

If in fact the Secretary's proposal as it is now before us is what you call an integral whole, and in your opening testimony you said parts of it cannot be modified or removed or changed or altered, another term for integral whole would be an ultimatum. If nothing can be changed, not the components, not the modalities, not the timing then you are dealing with a sort of a take it or leave it proposition.

Is that the intent or is there in fact far more give than appears on the surface?

Ambassador MURPHY. This ought to eat up the rest of the week's hearings to answer, Congressman.

Mr. LANTOS. You may summarize your responses.

Ambassador MURPHY. A capsule description is always inaccurate, if you summarize the wars. 1948 the war for Israeli independence. 1956, over Suez.

INITIATION OF MIDDLE EAST WARS

Mr. LANTOS. Who initiated the hostilities in the 1948 war?

Ambassador MURPHY. The Arab armies moved in to counter the declaration of independence of the state of Israel, the foundation of the state of Israel.

Mr. LANTOS. So the first war was initiated by the Arab armies? Ambassador MURPHY. Yes.

Mr. LANTOs. How about 1956?

Ambassador MURPHY. 1956, the Suez conflict, Suez war with the landing of the British and French over the canal dispute and the actions of Nassar having nationalized the canal. It was a political action to which Europe responded in terms of London and Paris, was the act of nationalization.

1967, a war that has been written up very extensively. As to who actually initiated it, were those incessant threats from Cairo, from