to a committee,

Mr. Stanley after paying a compliment to the eloquence of the hon. gentleman who had spoken last, said, he rose, as a country gentleman, to hint at their sentiments and to state his own. He approved of the treaty, and should have done so if the subsidy had been doubled. He approved of the war, but thought it had not been conducted with sufficient vigour. He entreated the minister to keep a watchful eye over the several departments of office under him. If ever an honourable and disinterested support was given to any minister, it had been given to the chancellor of the exchequer for the last four years. Let him show himself worthy of that support: let him show himself the son of Chatham. Peace he thought at present impossible, because we were engaged with enemies who envied us our constitution, our religion, our liberty, our property, and every thing we possessed. Mr. For said, in explanation, that although he had never applied the epithet unprecedented to the treaty, he had no objection to adopt it, unless some precedent could be adduced more in point than any he had yet heard. When the treaty of Worms was concluded, the king of Sardinia was literally balancing between the two contending parties, and the terms agreed upon were the price of his declaring for us. The other treaty was also equally dissimilar from the present: by the terms of that treaty, we gave every thing to receive nothing; and bound ourselves by stipulations, the consequences of which might prove highly injurious to our interests. The motion was agreed to.

Debate in the Commons on the Army Estimates.] Feb. 3. The House having resolved itself into a committee on the Army Estimates, [VOL. XXX.]

The Secretary at War observed, that he should state what exertions had been made in the present campaign, and what the result of the comparison of those exertions was with the exertions that had been made in former wars. Gentlemen would recollect, how little prepared this country was, at the breaking out of the war, to enter into it; for this a degree of allowance ought necessarily to be made. He should first state what this country had done in former wars. In 1756, 1760, 1761, 1762, and 1774, the number of effective forces that had been raised, did not, taking any one year, exceed 22,000 men. He should next state, the consequence of the exertions that had been made during the first year of the present campaign. The total of the infantry and cavalry during the year 1793, amounted to 37,169 men: from this he would deduct the Fencibles that had been raised in North Britain; the amount would then be 32,000 men. Thus it turned out, that 10,000 more had been raised in the course of the last, than in any former year. He then moved, "that a number of land forces, including 3882 invalids, amounting to 60,244 effective men, be employed for the year 1794.”

Mr. Hussey said, he was almost ashamed to look at this augmentation of our military force, because he was afraid we should never be gainers by it. He had declared himself, on a former night, an advocate for the augmentation of our navy, because he knew that they would be of more real use to this country than an augmentation such as this, ten times over. He wished the minister had stated some inducement to the House for what was now asked; for he confessed that he could not make up in his mind what we could gain by this augmentation of our military force. We should only plunge ourselves deeper and deeper into calamity.

Major Maitland said, it was his intention to vote for the resolution, but upon very different views from those who approved what had been done during the campaign. He was ready to admit, that more troops had been raised during the present war than on former occasions; but if levy money to a greater amount was expended upon the present than any former occasion, there certainly was an end of that superior merit in raising them which was claimed. Would the hon. secretary state the effects produced by [4 Q]

the effects of the expeditions of the British forces, as far as related to Europe. He must now proceed to take a short view of them in the West Indies. Tobago was taken, an acquisition of but trifling consequence. But the expedition at Martinique had completely failed, in consequence of being improperly planned at home, and the fault was not the fault of the general, the officers, the men, but of the ministers. He acknowledged the necessity of great supplies, but while he did so, it was his duty to get, if possible, some security, that not a shilling of the money of the people of this country should be misapplied in future: 100,000l. had been already employed, for the purpose of erecting barracks in different parts of this island; a measure not unnecessary only, but clearly unconstitutional.

Mr. Jenkinson said, thatupon all that had fallen from the hon. gentleman, he had but two observations to make. They were 1st, whether the campaign had or had not been successful: 2dly, whether blame was or was not to be imputed to the several officers engaged in it; or, if not, whether misconduct was or was not to be attributed to his majesty's ministers. It could not be for a moment doubted, that if there was success, it was a proof of merit in administration. If the exertions that had been made during the present campaign were fairly considered, they would reflect considerable merit on ministers. The secretary at war had incontestibly shown, that 10,000 men more had been levied during the first year of the present campaign, than in the course of any one year in any former war. With respect to the operations of the campaign, there was not the least doubt but that they had been in an eminent degree successful. These operations were planned by government, and consequently great praise was due to administration. It remained then to be shown where blame was to be imputed. The first instance the hon. gentleman had adduced was, the failure at Dunkirk; but in mentioning this, the hon. gentleman admitted, that Dunkirk was a considerable object for this country. The hon. gentleman seemed to apply his greatest objection to the division of the army; but did the hon. gentleman recollect, that it was impossible that Mons and Brussels could have been secured from the attacks of the French till Quesnoi and Maubeuge had been reduced? Did the hon. gentleman forget that, under these circumstances, if the at

tack upon Dunkirk had been delayed, a particular season of the year would have arrived, that would, considering the situation of the place, have rendered any attempt to reduce it abortive? In the failure that succeeded, unless the hon. gentleman could show that the officers who had been appointed, had remonstrated, or had demanded a force that was not granted to them, he made out nothing. No blame could possibly attach upon the duke of York. He was convinced that all was done that possibly could be done. But was it to be supposed that no expedition was to fail in the course of the war? Considering the great superiority of force on the part of the French, it was not to be wondered at that our troops had been compelled to yield. The army had been divided for the purpose of attaining two grand objects, the reduction of Quesnoi, and Dunkirk. In the one we had been successful; in the other we had failed. With respect to the circumstance of the ordnance stores not being forwarded in due time, it was well understood that if the stores had been sent too near the place before the army had approached, they would have been seized. No disgrace could possibly arise from the failure of the expedition against Dunkirk, when it was recollected what a superior force had been brought against the covering army. What was the event of that defeat Why, in order to produce it, the French drew their forces from the army of the Rhine and the Mozelle. The successful operations that followed in that quarter were owing to that circumstance.-The hon. gentleman found great fault with the expedition to the West Indies; but before he had made up his mind upon the subject, it would have been well if he had paid a little attention to dates. The forces that had been sent out were not for the purpose of conquering, but of taking possession of the French West India islands. At the period that the troops were sent out, the royal party had possession of the islands, but in the interval that had elapsed between their setting out and their arrival at the place of destination, a revolution took place, and the democratic party had gained the ascendancy. When the forces arrived, this was a circumstance that required prudence and discretion; the general at first debarked part of the forces; but, as soon as it was found that no success was likely to ensue, but that, on the contrary, a great number

of the men must, were the object to be pursued, inevitably have perished, he reembarked them. This was the effect of mere accident, and consequently no blame could be imputed to administration. He admitted that Toulon was certainly an object: but at the same time it was not to be considered so great an acquisition as to induce us to sacrifice the opportunity of getting possession of the French West India islands. At that period, the inhabitants of Lyons were adverse to the National Convention of France. If the Lyonese could have held out, Toulon would have been secure. But that was not the case, the Lyonese were overcome, and consequently a considerable force was brought against Toulon. As to the expedition of the earl of Moira, he was prepared to defend it; for notwithstanding what had been said against it, that expedition was wise in the plan of it, and the reason, why it had not been tried, and probably why it would not have been successful, was, that the royalists did not endeavour to gain possession of sea ports, previous to which it would have been impossible for us to send a sufficient force to that country, to give reason to expect success. The royalists alone were to blame; the fault did not attach to the earl of Moira or his army. Taking the whole campaign in one view, our success by sea and land had been as great as at any former period.

Mr. Drake supported the resolution, although he would, at the same time, recommend the increasing our navy. We should oppose all our force to the depraved enthusiasm of the French, and fulfil those duties to our country, which we had so magnanimously undertaken to perform. If we had not now in our hands a valuable consideration, we had a valuable speculation. He considered this as a just, necessary, and moral war, and promised to give it a disinterested, patriotic, and zealous support.

Mr. Pitt said, he was happy to find that there was no direct opposition to the motion; and as all the collateral topics of debate were announced as matter of future and more formal discussion, he should touch but very briefly on them at that time. To the hon. gentleman who had called upon him so pointedly, he must answer, that he could not enter into any detail of the intended operations on the continent; but that, looking at the general character and description of the war, looking at the internal state of France, upon a change in

which more than upon any other circumstance must the possibility of a safe and honourable peace depend, he could say that a mere naval war would prove inefficacious, because it would not bring that immediate pressure upon the enemy, which was necessary to accelerate the prospect of peace. France was persisting in the commission of suicide on her own commerce. She was not only careless of her colonies, but it seemed to be her system to destroy them and her commerce. Let gentlemen but recollect what were the causes which led to the war. They were, first, the encroachments made by the French, on the territories of other powers, to restrain which had, in all former times, been held to be the policy of Great Britain. The French had overrun the Austrian Netherlands, and threatened Holland with an invasion. If we suffered them to add port to port and commerce to commerce; if we suffered them to possess themselves not only of all the ports and means of naval and commercial force which Holland afforded, but also the intermediate ports of the Netherlands, however safe we might think ourselves from immediate attacks, what prospect could we look to of future security? To save Holland from an invasion, and to recover the Austrian Netherlands, the only barrier for Holland against the force of France, were true British objects; objects in which Britain was as deeply and as immediately interested, as the emperor himself. But to obtain these objects, he would appeal to the judgment and the candour of every reasonable man, if it was not necessary to undertake a continental war. The first campaign of the war, whatever judgment might be formed of it, or whatever epithets might be applied to it, he should contend, had been eminently successful, although not without some important reverses. The argument to be deduced from this would militate directly against the conclusions of the hon. gentleman; for all those reverses had been owing to the inadequacy of the force brought into the field against a people, who did not carry on war by levying and equipping armies like other powers, but who might rather be considered as an armed nation. If any argument was to be built upon this, and he was aware of the use some gentlemen might make of it, it would not serve their purpose, because it would be found too much for those who would urge it against the continuance of war; for either it was

impossible we could succeed in bringing | any force adequate to our object, and then all must be despair, a sentiment which he believed not many would be brought to harbour; or else, if they could not bring the country to this conclusion, they only proved the necessity of making still more vigorous exertions. Would the interests of this country have been better consulted -would the protection of Holland and the recovery of the Netherlands have been more effectually promoted, if we had not had 30,000 men in Flanders? Our hopes then were, that we should be able to make greater exertions in the second campaign than we had done in the first; and that having made some progress already, our future progress would be greater, more rapid and decisive, because we should start with superior force, and from better ground. The ground from which we were to start was better, because the French were driven from all their former conquests on the Rhine; and although they had again been unfortunately able to over-run part of that country, they had been prevented from seizing on Mentz, the key of Germany in that quarter. They were driven out of the Austrian Netherlands, and instead of having to begin the campaign with some of the strong places of Holland taken, and others on the point of falling, we should begin it with several of the strong fortresses of the French fron tiers in the hands of the allies. He did not claim for himself the exemption stated by his hon. friend (Mr. Jenkinson), that when generals did not remonstrate that the force given them for any object was inadequate, they and not ministers, were responsible for miscarriage. He thought it would be more correct to say, that in such case, generals would become jointly responsible with ministers. What degree of blame might attach to a general, and what to ministers, on this supposition, it would be rarely fit to discuss, unless the miscarriage had been of such magnitude, as to render the inconvenience of avoiding inquiry, as great as the danger to be apprehended from discussion; and, in time of war, how great that danger was, he needed not remind the committee. But when gentlemen said, that the expedition against Dunkirk was undertaken contrary to the opinion of the illustrious prince who commanded it, or that the force employed in it was in his opinion inadequate, he must tell them that their information was diametrically the reverse of the fact. The acquisi

tion of Dunkirk, at a time when the object was to make as great and as general an impression as possible upon the enemy's frontier, every gentleman would allow was important. It was not, however so important as to supersede other operations, and divert the force at the disposal of ministers from other purposes, which they might think of still higher importance. He was ready to avow that, as one of his majesty's ministers, he had advised the expedition against Dunkirk, believing not only that the place could not resist the force that was sent against it, but also that the French could not, by any probable exertion, collect a force sufficient to relieve it. That he was deceived in his hopes, was but too true-whether he was to be blamed for advice from which he would not now shrink, it would be for the House to consider, if they should think fit to go into the inquiry, of which notice had been given. When the motion for inquiry came to be debated, he should contend that there was no ground laid for inquiry, and that, even if there were, the danger to be apprehended far out-weighed any advantage that could possibly be expected from it. If he were conscious of an error, he should not be ashamed to own it, as, on so complicated a subject as the direction of a war, who would have the presumption to say that he should never err? but so far was he now, that he had had the aid of experience to inform his judgment, from being conscious of any error in the advice he had given, that under the same circumstances, he should give the same advice again. To the very respectable nobleman at the head of the ordnance, he owed it to declare, that no exertion that could be made in his department had been omitted. The French gun-boats, of which so much had been said, had in point of fact, contributed nothing to the failure of the enterprise. The true cause of the retreat was, that the covering army was attacked by such superior forces as even the able conduct of the officer who commanded it could not resist. Both the time and the manner of that retreat were highly honourable to the prince by whom it was directed. In the ardour of youth and courage, to relinquish a favourite object, and to mark the precise time when to relinquish it became necessary, was, in his consideration, the highest merit.-Respecting the conduct of the war in other parts, all he desired to say was, what more ministers could have done with the force they had