it had been prevented by the wise exertions of the king's ministers and of the republic of Holland; but from what he had since seen in general Dumourier's printed correspondence, it was evident, that, if the French army had succeeded in passing the Moerdyck, their general would have employed with effect the riches, resources, and local advantages of the United Provinces, and would have mocked every effort to drive him again out of Holland. He laid much stress on this point, because he thought that much must depend on maintaining the continental war with the utmost vigour and effect; that there was no other mode of effectually crushing the unprovoked hostilities which France had begun, and was driving against us: that there were possible cases of insular policy, in which our interests might differ from those of the continent; but he would venture to assert that the day which should see the Austrian Netherlands and the United Provinces completely possessed by France, would not long precede the general confusion of Europe, and ultimately the downfall of Great Britain. He might, perhaps, be asked whether he would continue the war, so long as the confusions of France should continue? He would answer, that the war had not, on the part of England, been a war either of ambition or expediency, but of strict necessity; and that he would continue it, not so long as the confusions of France should continue, but so long as those confusions should profess and struggle to extend themselves over every other country. Our situation called for the union of whatever was wise and respectable in parliament; for the union of all the power, faculties, and exertion of the nation. He felt strong hopes that the event would be decidedly favourable to our prosperity and security. He saw France destroying herself by exertions, which he trusted would end in her ruin, before she could effectuate the ruin which she malignantly sought to carry to other nations; he saw her beggared by the dereliction of her manufactures, commerce, and agriculture; torn by civil dissensions, depopulated by maintaining fourteen armies, by famine, by emigration, by a general depravity of manners, and above all, by that permanent massacre which had prevailed from the 2nd of September 1792, and which was called in France "a continued exercise of a revolutionary power." Nor was it possible that she

could long maintain her expense, without taxes, or the power of imposing taxes. It appeared by the late reports of the Convention, that her expenses in one month were equal to the war expenses of England in a year. On our part, the prospect was the reverse. The interior of the kingdom was opulent and prosperous; new markets were opening for our merchants and manufacturers in the Mediterranean and in the West Indies; and our income was such, as to have produced in the last year a larger sum than was stated by Mr. Pitt in 1791 as the probable peace revenue. Lastly, there was some encouragement in the consci ousness of a just and righteous cause. On the whole, he trusted, that, by the blessing of God, Great Britain would add to the best and brightest pages of her history, the glory of protecting the independence of Europe, and of preserving the whole system of civil and religious society and the existing and future ages of mankind, from the miseries with which the French pestilence has menaced them. His lordship concluded by seconding the motion for the address.

The Earl of Guilford said: It is impos sible that any noble lord can refuse to congratulate his majesty upon the bravery of his army and navy; it is impossible that any person can withhold his congra. tulations upon the success of his majes ty's arms by sea and land; and it is equally impossible that any loyal subject should wish to keep back that aid which may be necessary to obtain every just and honourable object that his majesty may be in pursuit of; but when it is proposed to support his majesty in the prosecution of the war, it becomes the dignity and wis dom of this House to consider the object and end of it. When it was first proposed to prosecute the war with vigour, the avowed object of it was the protection of our allies and the security of these kingdoms: but sorry am I to hear, that that object is now changed, and that nothing less is professed this day than the restoration of monarchy, as it was established under the old government. It is of little consequence in whose person it is to be established, and vain are the efforts, if they are made only to substitute Calonne for Robespierre or Danton. When lord Hood negociated with the Toulonese, and when they were induced to receive him into their port, it was under the express stipulation of supporting the con

stitution of 1789; but of the constitution | of 1789, which has been properly styled a "stupendous fabric of human wisdom and virtue,"* and against which our allies on the continent have declared war, we this day hear not a word. If lord Hood was not authorized to propose the terms which he offered, his public declaration to the people of France is a scandalous reflection upon the government of this country. Does the address propose that we should prosecute the war for the protection of our allies? Has Holland once entered into the minds of his majesty's ministers, or the noble lords who with so much eloquence supported the address? It is but too obvious from the language which they have used, that the objects which they have in view are widely different from those by which they lured the public into this unfortunate war. Let us, however, for a moment suppose that the end which they wish to obtain is the protection of Holland and of Great Britain against the incursions of the French republicans, could not this have been as effectually obtained, by negociation as by warfare? When that had failed, it would have been time enough to commence hostilities; and there are few, I believe, who are not now convinced that the safety of Holland would have been better secured by the conciliating voice of our ambassador at Paris, than by the thunder of cannon. It may be said, that the moment I allude to was not the most favourable, that the French were at that time so elated with their astonishing successes, that they would have listened to no terms which the dignity of Great Britain, and her good faith to her allies, could have permitted her to offer. The history of that period, and the language and efforts of her ministers, ambassadors, and generals, afford a complete refutation of such an assertion. But let us even here again concede to those who are of this opinion. We know of another period, the circumstances of which can give no support to such an argument: were they not sufficiently humbled in the course of last summer, by a retreat as speedy and disastrous as their march was rapid and victorious-When their army had been half destroyed, and the remains of it had been almost totally disorganized when they had been driven from Brabant, and had been unsuccessful from

See Vol. 29 p. 249.

Western Flanders to the Rhine-when several of their provinces had been invaded, and their most important fortresses had been subdued, is there a noble lord who does not believe that they would have been eager to listen to such terms of peace as became the dignity and justice of this country to offer?-Much has been said of the signal advantages we have gained over them, and the certain prospect we have of a speedy peace, by vigorously exerting the strength and applying the resources of this country in the prosecution of the war. Our advantages, I much fear, will be greatly counterba lanced by the expenses we have incurred, and the losses sustained by our traders and manufacturers. If we also compare the conquests made by the allies with the present position of the French armies, it is much to be feared, that the former have not much to boast of. May it not reasonably be inquired, whether we have not already obtained the end which we proposed; and after the obtaining of which, his majesty's ministers repeatedly and solemnly declared they would pursue every measure that should tend to procure a speedy, safe, and honourable peace? Our allies, the Dutch, are in perfect security. The French have been driven from their territories, and confined within limits, beyond which we ought not to attempt to pass. The noble lords admit, that they have made the most stupendous efforts, and such as have astonished all Europe; but this, rising in a mass, say they, cannot be repeated. It is a violent convul sion which must exhaust the nation, or, at least, so far weaken it, as to bring it to a low pitch of humiliation. The same causes, my lords, will produce the same effects. The pressure of an invading enemy only bends the bow to give the arrow a greater force. Their extensive territories we are all acquainted with; their vast numbers, and great internal resources, are unquestioned; and whatever may be their dissensions and massacres, we find them capable of bringing into the field, troops that have successfully opposed the best disciplined armies in Europe. What reason have you to believe, that those troops which they will oppose to us in the next campaign, will be less disciplined, or worse appointed than those we have already had to contend with? History teaches us that experience makes the soldier, and practice often leads to victory. There is another argument ad

duced to encourage us in the prosecution of the war, arising from the destruction of the ships and naval stores at Toulon. The noble mover says, that this alone will compensate us for all our losses and expenses incurred during the war; and whatever may be their future form of government, they will not for many years, perhaps an age to come, be able to disturb the tranquillity of this country. To estimate our gain by the losses of the French is not the most accurate method of calculation. I cannot see how the reducing of France to poverty will enrich Great Britain. Was it for the purpose of making a partition of France amongst the allies, that we so benevolently interfered? Was it then, for the purpose of destroying her wonted consequence, that we so humanely interposed our fleets and armies in behalf of Louis 17th.? Is it to reduce her for the future to the lowest degree in the scale of nations, whatever may be her form of government, that we are to prosecute this disastrous war? Our allies may, perhaps, owe us some obligations if this be the case; but no Frenchmen of any description, royalists or republicans, can thank us after having discovered this cloven foot. The arguments suggested in favour of the continuance of the war may in general be reduced to two heads: the policy of it, and the necessity of it. The policy of it, if there be any, must be founded upon some present gain, or future advantage that we are to reap from it. Circumstanced as the two countries are, our interest would be promoted by its prosperity, rather than ruin. A neighbouring nation, desolated and impoverished, can hold out no advantage to this country, whose prosperity depends upon the flourishing state of her trade and commerce. If you dry up the resources of France, you destroy your own markets. If you desolate her, she will have no commodities to exchange with you, or money to purchase what you have to sell. But be the policy what it may, if it be not founded in justice and in honour, it should be spurned by a nation hitherto famed for those distinguished virtues. The arguments adduced to prove the necessity of continuing our warlike operations against France, may be reduced to three heads. It is said, that we must go on; first, because it is necessary to oppose the progress of the French arms; secondly, it is necessary thereby to prevent the propagation of French prinprinciples: thirdly, we must persevere,

until such a government can be established that will induce us to treat, under the fairest prospect of obtaining a lasting and honourable peace. I mean not to deny, that the progress of the French arms was at one time very alarming. It threatened the annihilation of the Dutch, our most valuable allies; and if it had not been timely checked, it might have endangered the salvation of this country. The state of things is however quite reversed; the French are separated from them by a sufficient distance: and some regard ought to be paid to their public declarations, "That they do not mean to interfere in the internal government of any country, nor will they make war upon any nation that is not the aggressor." But have ministers calculated the force and the resources by which they are to accomplish this important end? Much reliance, no doubt, must be placed upon the assistance of our allies; but our hopes cannot be much brightened by the prospect of assistance from those whom we are obliged to subsidize for their own preservation. It is notorious to all Europe, that the resources of Austria are exhausted. The Emperor can no longer levy fresh imposts upon his subjects, and he is left to the precarious support of private benevolences. As to the king of Prussia, his distresses are no secret in Europe. It is well known that he either cannot, or will not contribute any material assistance to another campaign. From whom he expects assistance I know not; but I know the parliament of great Britain will hesitate before they tax their own husbandmen and manufacturers, to ease the burthens of the peasantry of Brandenburgh. But it is urged, that we must at any rate prevent the importation of French principles, that are destructive of the peace of every civilized government. The doctrine is not more exploded, that you cannot make converts by the sword, than that you cannot prevent the dissemination of political, or any other principles, by the aid of arms. But what more apt means than those used by the allies could have been devised to spread the false philosophy of the French, which is justly reprobated by every wise and good man? If you wish to crush the Jacobins of this country; if you desire to render abortive the machinations of a British convention; if, you would impress upon the minds of his majesty's subjects, a sense of the inestimable blessings resulting from our ex

of all the treaties which existed between this country and foreign powers-a measure which it would be dishonourable for this country to pursue, and which must ultimately end in our ruin and disgrace.

cellent constitution, prove to them that they have a government that will secure to them their liberty and property, together with all the advantages of peace and prosperity. It is in vain that you tell them the British Constitution is the wisest and best that was ever framed; you must make them feel that they actually enjoy under it those advantages which it is calculated to afford them. Lastly, It is said that you have no persons to treat with who have the power or inclination to secure to you a lasting peace. If I were asked who those are with whom we ought to open a negociation, I would answer, those men (be they whom they may) who have the direction of the arms and of the force of the country. If you offer them terms which are safe, they will close with you, and the treaty which it is their interest to conclude, the same interest will bind them to observe. No difficulty ought to arise from the form of the government with which I propose you should negociate peace. We are at peace with governments that bear a strong resemblance to that now existing in France. We have treated with those of the same description, and we are actually in alliance with Dantzick. I shall, therefore, submit the following amendment to the address; "That this House do thank his majesty for the gracious declarations which he has been pleased to make of the views and principles by which he is guided, in the prosecution of the present war; but they hope his majesty will seize the earliest opportunity to conclude a peace, by which the permanent safety of his subjects, and the independence and security of Europe may be provided for; and that they humbly hope no difficulty may prevent the attainment of so desirable an object from the form of government which may be established in France."

The Duke of Portland said, he felt it incumbent upon him to give something more than a silent vote upon the present occasion. He had, at the commencement of the war, acknowledged his opinion of the justice and necessity of it; and he was now more convinced of both. He thought it the duty of every man to concur in strengthening the hands of government, as a vigorous prosecution of the war appeared to him the only means of saving the country, and bringing the war to an honourable and favourable issue. He did not know to what the amendment could tend, unless it went to recommend a breach [VOL. XXX.]

Earl Spencer said, that he meant to vote for the address, for the same reason as the noble duke, being persuaded of the justice and necessity of the war, and that the preservation of every thing that was valuable in civil society depended on it. He was extremely sorry to be obliged to sacrifice old friendships, and to abandon political connexions with those with whom he had long been in the habit of acting ; but such a sacrifice, painful as it was, must be made, when conscience and the most deliberate reflection convinced him that at so momentous a crisis every other consideration ought to give way to the welfare of his country. He acknowledged that he felt particular pain in separating himself from a gentleman, whose amiable qualities in private life had long since entitled him to his warmest regard, and whose eloquence and ability in parliament he contemplated on the present occasion with admiration, mixed with emotions of affliction, because the gentleman to whom he alluded had appeared to him to have governed himself since the revolution in France by principles closely connected with those which had given birth to conduct and practices in that country so disgusting to humanity, and so full of horror. Great therefore as the sacrifice was, he felt it his duty to make it, and could not help uniting, with every other well-wisher of his country, to strengthen the hands of his majesty's ministers in support of the sentiments that day delivered from the throne. He would therefore support the Address, and joined in the just tribute of praise to his majesty's ministers for the merit and ability of their conduct during the last campaign. They had achieved that which in the reign of queen Anne was generally considered as a master piece of policy; indeed, they had even effected a greater combination of powers to oppose the progress of the French carnage and devastation than formed the grand alliance of that era; they had also in a great measure stopped the mischief of the dissemination of French principles and doctrines, so subversive of all peace and tranquillity, the effects of which had abolished religion and humanity in France. He reprobated the idea of making peace with those who denied the [3 Z]