betrays no mental angularities; he does not even indulge in theological dreaming. Nor does he write under the conviction that unless he has some new doctrine to propound he will never be considered great or clever. Regarding Philosophy and Science as the children of Religion, he is desirous that the three should live together in love. But concord will not be preserved by Religion's renouncing her legitimate authority and surrendering all to Philosophy and Science. Let the parent and the children do their proper work and move in their proper sphere; the children recognising the rights of the parent, and the parent recognising the rights of the children; and then they will dwell harmoniously together in the same household. Each will be helpful to the other, and the success of one will be the joy of all. Mr. Wace appears in these Lectures as a defender of Scriptural theology. With what he has aptly and justly called 'the minimizing theology' he has no sympathy. That theology is illogical and inconsistent. It makes certain concessions to unbelief upon a principle which, if followed to its logical issue, would necessitate the abandonment of every theological truth. For this reason the Lecturer says: "That it would be vain to attempt any compromise with the scientific spirit by minimizing the articles of our faith. As long as we retain any of them, however elementary, as more than speculations, we go beyond scientific grounds and rest upon assurances which transcend the capacity of mere reason. We rise above nature, beyond the realm of sight and sense and observation, and we act on the conviction of things not seen.'

The aim and object of this minimizing theology is to throw into the background everything in our faith. which is mysterious and perplexing, and to insist only upon the moral

teaching of Christianity. But if everything in our creed that is incapable of sensible verification has to be eliminated, what shall we have left? The application of such a principle would take away every article of belief. If we retain our faith in God, we have at once decided that sensible verification shall not be the arbiter in matters of belief. Hence the minimizing theology is logically bound either to abandon the principle on which it is based, or to follow that principle to its final issue, which is blank atheism.

With great force and beauty Mr. Wace shows that those articles of the Christian faith that are the most mysterious are the very articles that are most adapted to the requirements of the human heart:

'Now it is precisely in the most mysterious doctrines of our creed, in those which make the strongest demands on faith, and are the most remote from any possibility of possibility of scientific verification, that Christian souls find their support and refuge under these burdens of the flesh and these torments of the spirit. The message that "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life"-this is a message, simple as are its terms, which transcends all philosophy, all reason, all experience-nay, all capacity of comprehension; and yet it is in reliance on this message, and on other assurances of the same kind, that Christians are delivered from all despair, and are enabled, under whatever distresses, to cling to their belief in the love of their Father in heaven. When the Christian Minister can assure a suffering soul on the bed of death, in misery or in pain, that whatever its agonies, the Son of God in human form endured far worse for its sake, as a pledge of the love of the Father, and in fulfilment of that love, he applies a remedy which is equal to any need. The message of the Cross, interpreted by the doctrine of the Incarnation, is thus in moments of real trial, the support of the most elementary principle of faith. In fact, the minimizing theology, now in question, depends for its plausibility upon a simple evasion of the real problems of philosophy, and of the practical difficulties of life. The full and

explicit faith of the creed recognises those difficulties, and looks them in the face. It owns that they are insuperable upon any grounds of mere natural reason, and it offers supernatural realities and supernatural assurances to overcome them.'

Having, in his introductory Lecture, vindicated the claims of faith, our author proceeds to the consideration of the main principles upon which the structure of the Christian creed is built. The first of these principles, both in the order of time and importance, is the existence and personality of God. This doctrine is of supreme importance both speculatively and practically. It concerns all men and every part of man's nature. The issues involved in it are vital to morality and science as well as to religion. If Christian theism be true, the idea of God should have a dominating influence upon our intellectual, emotional and practical life. With that supreme idea in our mind, it will be impossible to regard either the material universe or ourselves or the duties and obligations of morality in the same light as we should had we no thought of God. All these things appear to us in fresh and more exalted aspects when the light of God shines upon them. What, then, are the foundations upon which an idea so influential rests?

We regret to say that this subject is not treated so thoroughly and exhaustively by Mr. Wace as, in our opinion, its importance deserves. He silently passes by all the great theistic arguments with one exception. He does not even say why he confines himself to the argument derived from man's moral nature. Were it not for a single sentence, we should have classed him among those who affirm that the only valid arguments for the existence of God are of a moral and not an intellectual kind. Mr. Wace evidently thinks that the moral argument possesses more weight

than any other with the unsophisticated masses of mankind; and with characteristic ability he argues that our belief in God is rooted in the necessities of our moral nature, and is imperatively demanded by the conscience. Conscience creates within us a feeling of responsibility, of which we cannot rid ourselves. There is interwoven into the very texture of our moral nature the conviction that there is a God above and around us, to Whom we are responsible for what we do and say; and, therefore, if there is no God, human nature is deceptive in its very constitution, and even its most irrepressible instincts are not to be trusted.

Modern scepticism professes to have found an explanation of this conviction of responsibility in the theory of evolution. The conviction, it is said, has been formulated during the course of ages out of the materials supplied by the experience and observation of mankind. In reply to those who would seek an explanation of our sense of responsibility, and of our moral ideas, in the theory of evolution, Mr. Wace affirms that the theory can hardly account for the existence in the earliest moral consciousness of humanity of an instinct with which visible experience was often painfully in conflict-even more flagrantly in conflict than at the present day. If the Scriptures be regarded simply as very ancient records, they bear witness to the intensity with which in the very dawn of history this conviction was grasped; and similarly on the monuments of ancient Egyptian civilization, it is exhibited as exercising a predominant influence in the most remote antiquity. The natural cause which at those periods could account for such a belief, and which in all ages has rendered an appeal to it so potent a moral instrument, has yet to be stated.'

No rational account of this sense of responsibility can be given apart from the idea of God. We cannot, in any other than a poetical sense, be said to be responsible to that which is impersonal. If by the word God is meant simply a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness,' as asserted by Matthew Arnold; or 'collective humanity,' as held by Frederick Harrison; or moral idealism, as propounded by the latest philosophical school in Holland, then our conviction of responsibility is wholly inexplicable. One of the profoundest facts of our nature can be traced to no adequate cause. There can be responsibility only where there is personality. Impersonal things cannot be said to owe any duties to each other: it would be an abuse of language to say that they stand in mutually responsible relationships. To speak of a person as being responsible to that which is impersonal is, if possible, still more absurd.

It is the fashion with a certain modern school to speak of the law of righteousness as that to which we are responsible and by which we shall be judged. But our author does not fail to show how futile is this endeavour to substitute the law of righteousness for a personal God. His argument proceeds upon the following lines: Human actions vary very much in their form, complexity and moral quality. To estimate the precise amount of merit or demerit connected with them, it is essential that we should know all about the previous training and history of him who performs them, and the circumstances that surround him at the time that he performs them. Apart from this knowledge we can pass no true judgment upon the acts of any person. But how can an impersonal law acquire this knowledge? By what process can it ascertain the exact

moral quality of actions, so as to pass upon them a judgment that shall

neither be excessive in blame nor extravagant in praise! Injustice must always result when personal merits or demerits are subjected to the action of impersonal agencies, powers or laws. According to the old principle, that like is only known by like, so like can only be judged by like; and none but a personal being, endued with our morality and intelligence, can be conceived as entering fully into the infinite variations of mind and heart and brain, on which the conduct of every human being depends.' Professor Wace has earned the gratitude of all Christians by the vigorous way in which, both in his Bampton and in his Boyle Lectures, he has defended the doctrine of the Divine personality against all attempts to make God an impersonal law or force or cause. He has looked the profoundest facts of our moral nature fully in the face; he has submitted them to a rigid scrutiny, and has then built upon them a conclusive argument in favour of Christian Theism. Step by step he has worked his way to the conclusion that if the highest impulses of life are not to be balked, if the deepest dictates of morality are not illusive, some Being there must be, Who is at all events so far personal as to be able to deal justly with persons.'

At this point Mr. Wace enters a very emphatic protest against much of the philosophical argumentation of the day, which seeks to undermine our faith in God. He characterizes it as intolerable and revolting to good sense. It is based simply upon facts established by physical science, and completely ignores the facts of consciousness. But what right has any person to set aside the facts of our moral and spiritual experience? Those facts are of infinitely greater interest to mankind than are the facts of science, and any

argumentation which refuses to recognise them ought not to have any influence upon our beliefs. Modern scientists are rendered incapable of giving a fair and impartial judgment upon the great principles of Christian Faith, by the attitude they assume towards the momentous truths of moral and spiritual consciousness. If it is the business of science to deal with facts, and to ascertain the laws by which they are ruled, then let science direct her attention to those facts of experience which have had such a potent influence upon men in every age. If she can give an explanation of those facts more simple, natural and forceful than the explanation which is given by the idea of God, we will follow her guidance. so long as she treats those facts with indifference, she must be an unsafe and unworthy guide. Mr. Wace's protest may not have very great restraining influence upon scientistic presumptuousness; still, the protest is called for.

But

Having vindicated the first principle of Faith-belief in God-Professor Wace proceeds to consider whether or not God has given to the world any positive revelation of Himself. It is here that he finds himself in direct conflict with the 'minimizing theology.' In nothing is that theology more energetic than in its efforts to show that we possess no positive revelation from God. It admits the existence of God, or it could be no theology; but it maintains that all our knowledge of God must be gained from the light of nature and the works of creation and providence. Its avowed intention is to explain away that which is miraculous, supernatural and mysterious, and to reduce Christianity within the limits of what is simple, intelligible and dependent solely upon the dictates of enlightened natural morality.' With this object

the author of the book entitled Supernatural Religion says: 'It is singular how little there is in the supposed revelation of alleged information, however incredible, regarding that which is beyond the limits of human thought.' Professor Wace, in replying to this singular statement, does not think it necessary to enumerate all the particulars concerning which the Bible gives us supremely important information which could not be arrived at by any process of reasoning. He mentions only two: that Jesus Christ will be the personal Judge of every soul of man; and that God can forgive sin. These are truths in which we are all profoundly interested. But unless they had been supernaturally revealed to us, we must have been utterly ignorant of them. Sin we might have felt and deplored, and might have yearned to be delivered from it; but from no natural source could we have derived the hope of pardon. Professor Wace's remarks on this subject are very earnest and weighty. It is with great reluctance that we refrain from quoting them. They emphasize a truth which Methodists are especially bound to proclaim and defend.

Professor Wace, however, scarcely does full justice to himself and the momentous subject he is discussing in the remaining portion of this Lecture. There is sometimes a lack of method and clearness in his plan. Occasionally we feel at a loss to know the exact point to which he is conducting us; and when the point is reached, it seems as though the route has not been sufficiently direct, but that we have been led into some of the byways of thought, which, however interesting, might very well have been avoided. Further, we feel a certain meagreness in his treatment of the question whether Cod has given us a positive Revelation. He devotes, we think, far too much

time to the consideration of the side issues of the question, and too little to the question itself. The only argument he brings forward to prove that God has given us a positive Revelation is that derived from the testimony of the Apostles, especially St. Paul. He endeavours to show that the testimony completely fulfils the requirement of Hume, namely, that to prove a miracle 'the testimony be of such a kind that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavours to establish.' To us it seems that he has done little more than indicate the line of argument which leads to that conclusion.

In the Lecture on Our Lord's Demand for Faith, we have Professor Wace at his best. He justly observes that in the teaching of Christ 'faith assumes at last its full proportions, and finally claims its position as the cardinal virtue of man's nature.' The demands of Christ for faith were unique. He professed to belong to an order of being altogether different from other men. He declared that in Himself the kingdom of God was come, and that He was the Centre and Ruler of that kingdom, 'the Light of the world,' the true Vine from which all spiritual vitality and fruit-bearing power is derived.

Here Professor Wace again finds himself in conflict with the minimizing theology. Various efforts have recently been made to eliminate all theological teaching from the words

of Christ, and to make that teaching purely ethical. With much vigour and animation the Lecturer exposes the futility of these efforts to denude Christ's teaching of its theological elements. He asks: 'Is there no theology involved in teaching love to God? No theology in the belief that God is, and that He is the "Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him," and that in spite of all the difficulties, perplexities and cruelties of the world, He is worthy of the whole love and trust of our hearts! Why, this is the very theological problem which has racked the heart and brain of man from the dawn of religious thought to the present moment. "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."

The sentimental and irrational clamour which has recently been raised against dogmas and creeds appeals in vain to the teaching of Christ for support. And Professor Wace is never more successful than when he seeks to prove that all attempts to divest Christ's teaching of its theological complexion, and to reduce it simply to a 'sublime morality,' are useless and futile.

This volume cannot fail to be of great service to any one who is wishful to understand and to be able to vindicate the great principles which lie at the foundation of the Christian Faith.

posthumous note, in explanation of the observation, is published in the recently collected works of the great physicist. He fully appreciated from the first the fact that the rapidity of the deviation is equal to the earth's velocity, multiplied into the sine of