right such as burdening interstate commerce. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Kentucky, 394.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF:
1. Amendments by one branch of legislature.
A paragraph in a statute which is plain and unambiguous, must be ac-
cepted as it reads even though inserted as an amendment by one
branch of the legislature. Luria v. United States, 9.
2. Codes; duality of procedure not favored.
The court will if possible avoid construing a code of procedure as es-
tablishing a dual instead of a single procedure in the prosecution
of crimes committed within the same territorial jurisdiction.
Summers v. United States, 92.
3. Implications; validity of that which is contrary to.
That which is contrary to the plain implication of a statute is unlaw-
ful, for what is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that
which is expressed. Luria v. United States, 9.
4. Legality and justice favored in.
Courts are repelled from giving such a construction to a statute as will
raise grave doubts of its legality as well as of its justice. Union
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Snow, 204.
5. Literal interpretation; when not to be given.
Courts will not enforce a literal interpretation of a statute if antecedent
rights are affected or human conduct given a consequence the
statute did not intend. Ib.
6. Meaning of words "provisions of this section."
The words "provisions of this section" used in a statute naturally
mean every part of the section, one paragraph as much as another.
Luria v. United States, 9.
7. Manifest purpose controlling.
A statute, the evident purpose of which is to save expense in litigation,
will be construed in the light of this manifest purpose. Rainey v.
Grace & Co., 703.
8. Manifest purpose controlling; effect of better rule in earlier statute.
Even if it might be true that the earlier act prescribed the better rule,
where Congress having full authority has acted it is the duty of
the courts to enforce the legislation with a view of effecting the
purpose for which it was enacted. Ib.
9. Purpose as controlling consideration.
The purpose of a statute is the ever insistent consideration in its in-
terpretation, and this court will not attribute to a statute so im-
portant as the Food and Drugs Act the defect of ineffectiveness as
to its execution. United States v. Antikamnia Co., 654.
10. Penal provisions in; effect of.
The fact that a statute has penal character does not mean that it
should not be given its reasonable intendment. Ib.
11. Policy and spirit considered.
The policy and spirit of a statute should be considered in construing it
as well as the letter. Eastern Extension, A. & C. Telegraph Co. v.
United States, 326.
12. Prospective and not retrospective operation the rule.
The first rule of construction of statutes is that legislation is addressed
to the future and not to the past. This rule is one of obvious
justice. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 190.
13. Retrospective operation not favored.
Unless its terms unequivocally import that it was the manifest intent
of the legislature enacting it, a retrospective operation will not
be given to a statute which interferes with antecedent rights or by
which human action is regulated. Ib.
14. Retrospective operation not favored.
In the absence of clearly expressed legislative intent, retrospective
operation will not be given to statutes; nor in absence of such in-
tent will a statute be construed as impairing rights relied upon in
past conduct when other legislation was in force. (Union Pacific
R. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards, ante, p. 190.) Cameron v.
United States, 710.
15. Repeals by implication; when later act held to repeal earlier one.
Repeals by implication are not favored and only in cases of clear in-
consistency will a later act be held to repeal an earlier one on the
same subject, but if there is clear inconsistency, as in this case, the
earlier act cannot stand. (King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395.) Rainey
v. Grace & Co., 703.
16. Riders to appropriation bills; effect of practice.
Even though it may have become a modern practice in Congress to
adopt independent legislation by attaching "riders" to appro-
priation bills, the judiciary is not relieved from the old duty of
correctly interpreting the statute when enacted. Pennington v.
United States, 631.
17. Of state statute; questions of relations of state officers to State avoided.
An act of a State will not be construed in such a manner as to raise
questions concerning relations of state officers to the State if such
a construction can be avoided. Mulcrevy v. San Francisco, 669.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED JUDICIAL CODE;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 7-
11; 14-16;
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
C. STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
See LOCAL LAW.
See ACTIONS, 5;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 33.
SUBROGATION.
See BANKS AND BANKING, 2;
INDIANS, 3.
SWAMP LANDS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 8, 9, 10.
1. Of separate estates in realty.
While real estate is generally taxed as a unit, separate estates therein
may be taxed to the separate owners of such estates, where the
title has been severed. Downman v. Texas, 353.
2. Same; constitutional validity of taxation of mineral rights to one and
surface estate to another.
One who has purchased the mineral rights in land with the present
right to enter and work the same is not denied equal protection
of the law because in his case the mineral rights are taxed to him
and the surface estate is taxed to the owner of the fee. Ib.
3. Over-assessment of one of two estates in land; effect of.
If his mineral rights are not over-assessed it is no defense that the
surface estate may be over-assessed. Ib.
4. Of interest in lands segregated from public domain.
When an interest in land, whether freehold or for years, passes from
the public domain into private hands, there is a natural implication
that it goes with the ordinary incidents of private property and
subject to be taxed. (New York ex rel. Metropolitan Street Ry.
v. Tax Commissioners, 199 U. S. 1.) Trimble v. Seattle, 683.
5. Of leased property; restrictions on; leases by State.
In ordinary cases of leased property, whether the lessor or lessee shall
bear the burden of taxation is not a matter of public concern, but
an obligation not to tax property leased by the State is a restric-
tion of public import not lightly to be imposed. Ib.
6. Of property leased by State; validity of.
In this case held, that the imposing of assessments for benefits on prop-
erty in Seattle leased by the State of Washington is not an uncon-
stitutional impairment of an implied covenant in the lease that
the lessor will pay assessments. Ib.
7. State; process to collect; agency to collect.
A State may provide for garnishment or trustee process to collect a
valid tax and may constitute a bank its agent to collect the tax
from its depositors. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
See BANKS AND BANKING, 3;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 3, 7,
12, 15, 17, 18;
CORPORATION TAX LAW;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 23-28;
NATIONAL BANKS, 1-9;
PLEADING, 2;
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.
TELEPHONE COMPANIES.
See PARTIES, 2, 3.
TERMINALS.
See COMMON CARRIERS;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 14, 16.
RAILROADS, 8, 9.
TERRITORIAL COURTS.
See COURTS, 8;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 25.
Time may sometimes be disregarded when it is insignificant, but not
where it has sufficed to materially change the financial positions
of the parties. National City Bank v. Hotchkiss, 50.
Argument of counsel; prejudicial error in.
This court will not upset a verdict upon the speculation that the jury
did not do their duty and follow the instructions of the court; the
fact that the attention of the jury was called by counsel for the
Government to the statement on the letter-head of the surety
company defendant that its capital was $1,000,000, held not to
have been prejudicial. Graham v. United States, 474.
See EVIDENCE, 1;
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
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