15. Validity of order of state commission; confiscation; sufficiency of
basis for holding.
An order of a state railroad commission prescribing maximum freight
rates on specified intrastate traffic will not be declared unconsti-
tutional as confiscatory and depriving a railroad company of its
property without due process of law where there is no proof of
the value of the company's property within the State or of its
receipts from its entire intrastate traffic, or of the value of that
portion of the property affected by the order. Wood v. Vandalia
R. R. Co., 1.
16. Validity of order of state commission; confiscation; evidence to es-
tablish.
It does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that the total operat-
ing expenses of a railroad or of a division thereof bear a given rela-
tion to the entire receipts of that road or division, that the same
ratio of expenses to receipts are maintained in regard to each
particular class of traffic, and this court will not declare an order
of a state railroad commission unconstitutional as confiscatory
without proof as to the actual facts in regard to the particular
rates complained of. Ib.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 22;
LOCAL LAW (Kan.);
PARTIES, 1, 2, 3.
REAL PROPERTY.
See TAXES AND TAXATION, 1.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 15.
See CORPORATION TAX LAW, 7.
RECORD ON APPEAL.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 7.
REPEALS.
See STATUTES, A 15.
REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19.
While the enforcement of the rule of res judicata is essential to secure
the peace and repose of society, it is equally true that to enforce
the rule upon unsubstantial grounds would work injustice. Vicks-
burg v. Henson, 259.
2. Estoppel; operation of.
Where the suit in which the former judgment is set up is not upon the
identical cause of action the estoppel operates only as to matters
in issue or points controverted and actually decided in the former
suit. Radford v. Myers, 725.
Judgments become estoppels because they affect matters upon which
the parties have been heard, but are not conclusive upon matters
not in question or immaterial. (Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S.
254.) Ib.
In a suit in which two of the parties successfully unite in asking the
court to award the fund to one of them against a third party claim-
ing it under an assignment, the judgment is not, as between the
two so uniting, res judicata so that the one to whom it is awarded
is not obligated to account therefor to the other under an agree-
ment so to do if the record does not show that such question was
also at issue and determined. Ib.
5. Decree construed and held not to be res judicata of right of municipality
to issue bonds for erection of water works.
A decree in a former action between a municipal water company and
the municipality that the former had an exclusive contract for a
specified period and that the latter could not issue bonds for the
purpose of establishing a municipal water supply to be forthwith
put into operation, rendered while the franchise had a long period
to run, held in this case not to be res judicata as to the right of the
municipality to issue bonds within a short time prior to the ex-
piration of the franchise for the purpose of erecting water works
which were not to be put into operation until after the expiration
of the existing franchise. Vicksburg v. Henson, 259.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
1. Anti-trust Act; combinations within.
The Sherman Act is broadly designed to reach all combinations in
unlawful restraint of trade and tending because of the agreements
or combinations entered into to build up and perpetuate monop-
olies. The act is a limitation of rights which may be pushed to
evil consequences and may, therefore, be restrained. (Standard
Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20.) Straus v. Amer-
ican Publishers' Ass'n, 222.
2. Anti-trust Act; combinations within; agreement as to sale of copy-
righted books.
As the agreement involved in this case went beyond any fair and legal
means to protect trade and prices, practically prohibited the
parties thereto from selling to those it condemned, affected com-
merce between the States, it was manifestly illegal under the
Sherman Act, and was not justified as to copyrighted books under
any protection afforded by the copyright act. Ib.
See COPYRIGHTS.
RETROSPECTIVE LAWS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
PUBLIC LANDS, 7;
RAILROADS, 1.
STATUTES, A 12, 13, 14.
RIDERS IN LEGISLATION.
See STATUTES, A 16.
SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT.
1. Employés protected by; quære as to.
Quare, and not decided on this record, whether the purpose of the
Safety Appliance Act is to protect all employés of every class and
the mere absence of an automatic coupler is enough for liability
if accident and injury result to an employé. Pennell v. Philadel-
phia & Reading Ry., 675.
2. Automatic couplers not required between locomotive and tender.
Under the Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat.
531, as amended March 2, 1903, c. 976, 32 Stat. 943, automatic
couplers are not required between the locomotive and the tender.
Ib.
3. Custom of railroad; effect on construction of act.
While a custom of railroads cannot justify a violation of a mandatory
statute, a custom which has the sanction of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission is persuasive of the meaning of that statute. Ib.
The sanction of the rule of stare decisis urges this court against revers-
ing a long series of decisions where state legislation has been en-
acted in reliance thereon, and the reversal would involve the
promulgation of a new rule of constitutional inhibition on state
legislation necessitating readjustment of policy and laws. New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge Co., 495.
1. Controversies between; allowance of time for settlement.
In a controversy between States, this court will not refuse a request
made in good faith by one of the parties for reasonable time to
effect a settlement, but will comply therewith as near as it can
consistently with justice. Virginia v. West Virginia, 89.
On complainant's motion to proceed to final hearing and respondent's
request for reasonable time to proceed with negotiations for amica-
ble adjustment the case is assigned for next April. Ib.
3. Enabling acts; power of Congress to make conditions in.
Congress has power to make conditions in an Enabling Act, and require
the State to assent thereto, as to such subjects as are within the
regulating power of Congress. (Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559,
574.) United States v. Sandoval, 28.
4. Enabling acts; power of Congress to make conditions in; effect to re-
strain power of State.
Such legislation, when it derives its force not from the resulting com-
pact but solely from the power of Congress over the subject, does
not operate to restrict the legislative power of the State in respect
to any matter not plainly within the regulating power of Con-
gress. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, distinguished. Ib.
5. Foreign corporations; right to exclude or regulate.
A State may, so long as it does not violate any principle of the Federal
Constitution, exclude from its border a foreign corporation or
prescribe the conditions upon which it may do business therein.
Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 68.
6. Foreign corporations; imposition of excise tax; validity under Consti-
tution.
Where a foreign corporation carries on a purely local business separate
from its interstate business, the State may impose an excise tax
upon it for the privilege of carrying on such business and measure
the same by the authorized capital of the corporation. Ib.
7. Police power; prohibition of child labor in dangerous occupations
within.
A State is entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender
years in dangerous occupations; and in order to make the prohibi-
tion effective it may compel employers at their peril to ascertain
whether their employés are in fact below the age specified. Sturges
& Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 320.
8. Taxation; right to lay privilege tax on commercial agencies.
A State may lay an excise or privilege tax on conducting commercial
agencies unless it has the effect of directly violating a Federal
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