in which the depositor would have full opportunity to resist any
illegal demand. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
13. Due process of law; effect to deny, of changes in rules of evidence.
The right to have one's controversy determined by existing rules of
evidence is not a vested right and a reasonable change of such rules
does not deny due process of law. Luria v. United States, 9.
14. Due process of law; effect to deny, of establishment of presumption
from facts.
The establishment of a presumption from certain facts prescribes a
rule of evidence and not one of substantive right; and if the in-
ference is reasonable and opportunity is given to controvert the
presumption, it is not a denial of due process of law, Mobile &c.
R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, even if made applicable to
existing causes of action. Ib.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3, 5; RATE REGULATION, 1, 2.
15. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of classification for taxation
of interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing deposits in bank.
A state tax on interest-bearing deposits in national banks does not
deny equal protection of the law on account of exemptions which
it is within the power of the State to allow or on account of the
exemption of non-interest-bearing accounts. The classification is
reasonable. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
16. Equal protection of the laws; validity of classification in employment of
labor.
A classification in employment of labor of persons below sixteen years
of age is reasonable and does not deny equal protection of the laws.
Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 320.
17. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of compelling lessee of State
to pay taxes.
Whether landlords or tenants shall pay taxes and assessments on leased
property is a matter of private arrangement, and compelling ten-
ants of the State to pay them does not deny them equal protection
of the law because there may be a practice the other way in private
leases. Trimble v. Seattle, 683.
18. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of exemption from taxation;
quære as to.
Quare, whether exemption from taxation would not create a favored
class and thus deny equal protection to other property owners. Ib.
See SUPRA, 3, 8, 15;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 2.
19. States; republican form of government; enforcement of guarantee of
Art. IV, § 4.
The enforcement of the provision in Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution,
that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union
a republican form of government, depends upon political and
governmental action through the powers conferred on the Congress
and not those conferred on the courts. (Pacific Telephone Co. v.
Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.) Marshall v. Dye, 250.
Generally.-See NATURALIZATION, 7.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Ambiguities; proof to dispel.
In this case there was such ambiguity in the contract involved as
justified proof beyond the terms of the instrument to clear up the
situation, and findings of the trial court based upon such proof
are not void because of want of power to consider it. Van Syckel v.
Arsuaga, 601.
2. Government; breach; accrual of right of action for.
Where the contractor refuses to go on with the work there is no question
of revision of judgment of an officer annulling the contract, and a
right of action accrues to the Government without need of any use-
less ceremony of approval by the superior officer or board. United
States v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, distinguished. Graham v.
United States, 474.
3. Government; responsibility for delay.
Under a contract that the Government would furnish the contractor
with granite blocks free on board cars at the quarry, he to transport
them, held that the contractor was to furnish the cars and was re-
sponsible for delay in that respect. Ib.
4. Government; purchase of land; implication.
A contract with the Government to take and pay for property cannot
be implied unless the property has been actually appropriated.
Peabody v. United States, 530.
5. Nature of instrument as contract to convey and not conveyance.
Although containing some words adapted to a present transfer, if the
instrument taken in its entirety shows that it was a mere contract
to convey upon a specified contingency it will be construed as such
(Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55.)
6. For purchase of land on condition that Mexican grant be confirmed;
right of recovery by one in possession on rejection of grant.
Where an alleged Mexican grant was rejected, one who was in posses-
sion under a contract to purchase the same if confirmed, and who
thereafter acquired portions thereof under the public land laws,
was not obliged to surrender such portions in order to recover what
he had paid his vendor on account of the contract to purchase the
entire tract. Ib.
7. Intention of parties in contract for purchase of Mexican grant.
Manifest intention of the parties must be given full effect; and so held
that approval by the Surveyor General of a Mexican grant re-
ferred to the approval of the grant by the proper authority. Ib.
See BANKRUPTCY, 19;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 6, 7;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 21;
JURISDICTION, E 3;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 23;
TAXES AND Taxation, 6;
VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Monopoly conferred by act; conflict with Sherman Act.
No more than the patent statute was the copyright act intended to
authorize agreements in unlawful restraint of trade and tending to
monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. Straus v. American
Publishers' Ass'n, 222.
See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 2.
CORPORATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 5;
CORPORATION Tax Law;
STATES, 5, 6.
1. Application generally.
The Corporation Tax Law deals with corporations engaged in actual
business transactions and presumably conducted according to busi-
ness principles. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 399.
2. Application to mining corporations.
The Corporation Tax Law of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, applies
to mining corporations. Ib.
3. Application to mining corporations.
The process of mining ores is in a sense a manufacturing process and
is a business within the Corporation Tax Law of 1909. Ib.
4. Nature of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law of 1909 was enacted before the adoption of
the Sixteenth Amendment and was not intended as, nor was it in
any sense, an income tax; but it was an excise tax for the conduct
of business in a corporate capacity measured by the income with
certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself. Ib.
5. Nature of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law of 1909 was adopted before the ratification of
the Sixteenth Amendment and imposed an excise tax on the doing
of business by corporations, and not in any sense a tax on property
or upon income merely as such. (Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220
U. S. 107.) United States v. Whitridge, 144.
6. Scope of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law does not in terms impose a tax upon corpo-
rate property or franchises as such, nor upon the income arising
from the conduct of business unless it be carried on by the cor-
poration. Ib.
7. Effect to reach income from management by receivers.
The act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112, does not impose
a tax upon the income derived from the management of corporate
property by receivers under the conditions of this case. Ib.
Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or
from both combined. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 399.
9. Income; power of Congress to fix.
In fixing the income by which the excise on conducting business should
be measured, Congress has power to fix the gross income even
though such income involved a wasting of the capital as in mining
ores. Ib.
10. Income within meaning of.
Income, within the meaning of the Corporation Tax Law of 1909, in-
cludes the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own
premises. Ib.
11. Depreciation within meaning of; ore in place as.
A corporation mining ores from its own premises is not entitled, under
the facts certified in this case, to deduct the value of such ore in
place and before it is mined as depreciation within the meaning of
the Corporation Tax Law of 1909. Ib.
12. Depreciation; computation in case of mining company.
Whatever may be the proper method of computing depreciation under
the Corporation Tax Law by reason of taking ore from the premises
of a mining corporation, the rules applicable to liability of tres-
passers for taking ore have only a modified application thereto. Ib.
COUNTY CLERKS.
See NATURALIZATION, 10, 11.
COURT AND JURY.
See HOURS OF SERVICE LAW, 5;
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
COURT OF CLAIMS.
See JURISDICTION, E.
1. Judges; liability to civil action.
Judges of United States courts are not liable to civil actions for their
judicial acts. (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335.) Alzua v. Johnson,
106.
2. Judges; liability to civil action; effect of Act 190 of Philippine Commis-
Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission did not impose any liability
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