in which the depositor would have full opportunity to resist any illegal demand. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
13. Due process of law; effect to deny, of changes in rules of evidence. The right to have one's controversy determined by existing rules of evidence is not a vested right and a reasonable change of such rules does not deny due process of law. Luria v. United States, 9.
14. Due process of law; effect to deny, of establishment of presumption from facts.
The establishment of a presumption from certain facts prescribes a rule of evidence and not one of substantive right; and if the in- ference is reasonable and opportunity is given to controvert the presumption, it is not a denial of due process of law, Mobile &c. R. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, even if made applicable to existing causes of action. Ib.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 3, 5; RATE REGULATION, 1, 2.
15. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of classification for taxation of interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing deposits in bank.
A state tax on interest-bearing deposits in national banks does not deny equal protection of the law on account of exemptions which it is within the power of the State to allow or on account of the exemption of non-interest-bearing accounts. The classification is reasonable. Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 120.
16. Equal protection of the laws; validity of classification in employment of labor.
A classification in employment of labor of persons below sixteen years of age is reasonable and does not deny equal protection of the laws. Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 320.
17. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of compelling lessee of State to pay taxes. Whether landlords or tenants shall pay taxes and assessments on leased property is a matter of private arrangement, and compelling ten- ants of the State to pay them does not deny them equal protection of the law because there may be a practice the other way in private leases. Trimble v. Seattle, 683.
18. Equal protection of the law; effect to deny, of exemption from taxation; quære as to.
Quare, whether exemption from taxation would not create a favored class and thus deny equal protection to other property owners. Ib.
See SUPRA, 3, 8, 15;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 2.
19. States; republican form of government; enforcement of guarantee of Art. IV, § 4. The enforcement of the provision in Article IV, § 4 of the Constitution, that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government, depends upon political and governmental action through the powers conferred on the Congress and not those conferred on the courts. (Pacific Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. 118.) Marshall v. Dye, 250.
Generally.-See NATURALIZATION, 7.
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
1. Ambiguities; proof to dispel.
In this case there was such ambiguity in the contract involved as justified proof beyond the terms of the instrument to clear up the situation, and findings of the trial court based upon such proof are not void because of want of power to consider it. Van Syckel v. Arsuaga, 601.
2. Government; breach; accrual of right of action for. Where the contractor refuses to go on with the work there is no question of revision of judgment of an officer annulling the contract, and a right of action accrues to the Government without need of any use- less ceremony of approval by the superior officer or board. United States v. McMullen, 222 U. S. 460, distinguished. Graham v. United States, 474.
3. Government; responsibility for delay.
Under a contract that the Government would furnish the contractor with granite blocks free on board cars at the quarry, he to transport them, held that the contractor was to furnish the cars and was re- sponsible for delay in that respect. Ib.
4. Government; purchase of land; implication.
A contract with the Government to take and pay for property cannot be implied unless the property has been actually appropriated. Peabody v. United States, 530.
5. Nature of instrument as contract to convey and not conveyance. Although containing some words adapted to a present transfer, if the
instrument taken in its entirety shows that it was a mere contract
to convey upon a specified contingency it will be construed as such
(Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55.)
6. For purchase of land on condition that Mexican grant be confirmed; right of recovery by one in possession on rejection of grant. Where an alleged Mexican grant was rejected, one who was in posses- sion under a contract to purchase the same if confirmed, and who thereafter acquired portions thereof under the public land laws, was not obliged to surrender such portions in order to recover what he had paid his vendor on account of the contract to purchase the entire tract. Ib.
7. Intention of parties in contract for purchase of Mexican grant. Manifest intention of the parties must be given full effect; and so held that approval by the Surveyor General of a Mexican grant re- ferred to the approval of the grant by the proper authority. Ib. See BANKRUPTCY, 19;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5, 6, 7;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 21; JURISDICTION, E 3;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 23; TAXES AND Taxation, 6; VENDOR AND VENDEE.
Monopoly conferred by act; conflict with Sherman Act.
No more than the patent statute was the copyright act intended to authorize agreements in unlawful restraint of trade and tending to monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. Straus v. American Publishers' Ass'n, 222.
See RESTRAINT OF TRADE, 2.
CORPORATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 5; CORPORATION Tax Law; STATES, 5, 6.
1. Application generally.
The Corporation Tax Law deals with corporations engaged in actual business transactions and presumably conducted according to busi- ness principles. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 399.
2. Application to mining corporations.
The Corporation Tax Law of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, applies to mining corporations. Ib.
3. Application to mining corporations.
The process of mining ores is in a sense a manufacturing process and is a business within the Corporation Tax Law of 1909. Ib.
4. Nature of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law of 1909 was enacted before the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment and was not intended as, nor was it in any sense, an income tax; but it was an excise tax for the conduct of business in a corporate capacity measured by the income with certain qualifications prescribed by the act itself. Ib.
5. Nature of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law of 1909 was adopted before the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment and imposed an excise tax on the doing of business by corporations, and not in any sense a tax on property or upon income merely as such. (Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107.) United States v. Whitridge, 144.
6. Scope of tax imposed by.
The Corporation Tax Law does not in terms impose a tax upon corpo- rate property or franchises as such, nor upon the income arising from the conduct of business unless it be carried on by the cor- poration. Ib.
7. Effect to reach income from management by receivers.
The act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112, does not impose a tax upon the income derived from the management of corporate property by receivers under the conditions of this case. Ib.
Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined. Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 399.
9. Income; power of Congress to fix.
In fixing the income by which the excise on conducting business should be measured, Congress has power to fix the gross income even though such income involved a wasting of the capital as in mining ores. Ib.
10. Income within meaning of.
Income, within the meaning of the Corporation Tax Law of 1909, in- cludes the proceeds of ores mined by a corporation from its own premises. Ib.
11. Depreciation within meaning of; ore in place as.
A corporation mining ores from its own premises is not entitled, under the facts certified in this case, to deduct the value of such ore in place and before it is mined as depreciation within the meaning of the Corporation Tax Law of 1909. Ib.
12. Depreciation; computation in case of mining company. Whatever may be the proper method of computing depreciation under the Corporation Tax Law by reason of taking ore from the premises of a mining corporation, the rules applicable to liability of tres- passers for taking ore have only a modified application thereto. Ib.
COUNTY CLERKS.
See NATURALIZATION, 10, 11.
COURT AND JURY.
See HOURS OF SERVICE LAW, 5; INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY.
COURT OF CLAIMS.
See JURISDICTION, E.
1. Judges; liability to civil action.
Judges of United States courts are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts. (Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335.) Alzua v. Johnson, 106.
2. Judges; liability to civil action; effect of Act 190 of Philippine Commis-
Act No. 190 of the Philippine Commission did not impose any liability
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