and the highest court of the State has held in another case that it does not affect the case at issue. Writ of error to review 62 Washington, 544, dismissed. THE facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this court to review judgments of the state courts, are stated in the opinion. Mr. James A. Kerr for plaintiff in error, submitted. Mr. Howard A. Hanson, with whom Mr. William B. Allison, Mr. James E. Bradford and Mr. Ralph S. Pierce were on the brief, for defendant in error. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court. This writ of error seeks to reverse a judgment in mandamus requiring the plaintiff in error, a street railway, to issue and accept transfers to and from the Seattle Electric Company, another street railway, redeemable by payment of two cents and a half for the ordinary five cent fares and of one cent and a quarter for school childrens' tickets costing two cents and a half. 62 Washington, 544. The Seattle Electric Company was made a defendant but did not appeal from the judgment of the court of first instance, affirmed by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff in error contends that its property is taken without due process of law by the construction given to the ordinance under which it was operating its line when the suit was brought. That ordinance requires a division "on the basis of settlement that the transfer is to be redeemed at or for such a proportionate part of the fare paid as the run or local route of the car on which transfer is received, bears to the sum of the runs of the local route of the cars from which the transfer is issued and on which the transfer is received." The Supreme Court construed the words 'or local route' as meaning 'the entire distance the passenger may travel upon that system of railway as if he had paid the ordinary fare, whether he changes cars upon that system or not.' 62 Washington, 549. Noting that the Electric Company had not appealed, it decided for an equal division of the fares. At every point of intersection between the two roads, the line of the Electric Company is longer than that of the plaintiff in error. In some cases a single car is routed over the entire length, in others the routes are divided, but a passenger is entitled to a transfer that will take him the whole length in the same general direction. Whether there shall be a continuous single route or a divided one is determined by each company for itself. The possibility of a different construction and the grounds for the one adopted both are obvious, but this court does not sit to revise the construction of documents by state courts, even if alleged, as this ordinance is not alleged, to be contracts protected by the Constitution of the United States. Fisher v. New Orleans, 218 U. S. 438. There is no impairment of rights by later legislation, and it takes more than a possible misconstruction by a court to make a case under the Fourteenth Amendment. Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632, 638; Ross v. Oregon, 227 U. S. 150, 162; McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363, 370, 371. The plaintiff in error put forward suggestions of want of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, &c., on the ground that since this suit was begun the ordinance referred to has been superseded by another. The Supreme Court, not we, is the judge of its own jurisdiction, but the later ordinance does not appear in the record. It was held not to affect the case when brought up at an earlier stage. 62 Washington, 124. In short, while the Railway seems to have brought the case here under a strong conviction as to what were its rights and although it refers to the Constitution in its answer, it discloses no grievance for which it is entitled to any remedy in this court. Writ of error dismissed. 231 U.S. Statement of the Case. THE PULLMAN COMPANY v. CROOM, COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA. SAME v. SAME. APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA. Nos. 28, 158. Argued October 31, November 3, 1913.-Decided A suit to enjoin a public officer from enforcing a statute is personal, and in the absence of statutory provision for continuing it against his successor, abates upon his death or retirement from office. United States v. Boutwell, 17 Wall. 604. The only exceptions recognized to this rule are boards and bodies of quasi-corporate character having continuous existence. Marshall v. Dye, ante, p. 250. The act of February 8, 1899, c. 121, 30 Stat. 822, providing for substituting the successors in office of public officers, applies only to Federal officials and not to state officials. Where the only state official, as to whom an injunction against enforcing a state statute has been applied for under § 266 of the Judicial Code and denied, dies pending the appeal, the action abates and the appeal to this court will be dismissed. In such a case an order based upon a stipulation continuing the case against the successor of the deceased defendant must and can be vacated, there having been no final judgment in the case. The fact that other officials had been joined as defendants cannot give this court jurisdiction of an appeal from an order denying an injunction applied for under § 266 of the Judicial Code where the injunction had only been asked against an officer who has died pending the appeal. THESE are appeals from orders of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. The Pullman Company, appellant herein, in its complaint filed in the court below, in the first case (No. 28 of this term), alleged that it was an Illinois corporation, engaged in furnishing to railroad companies under contract parlor, dining and sleeping cars in Florida and other States and had complied with the laws of Florida requisite to engaging in that business; that the defendant, A. C. Croom, was the duly qualified Comptroller of the State of Florida, charged with the collection of all taxes due from such companies. It averred that chapter 5597 of the laws of Florida for the year 1907 provides for the payment of license taxes to the State, and that it had paid such taxes; that § 46 of chapter 5596 provides for the collection of an ad valorem tax upon the cars of sleeping and parlor car companies, and that it had satisfied such tax. The appellant further averred that by the provisions of an act approved June 1, 1895, which by sundry amendments had been reenacted and incorporated into chapter 5596, being § 47, sleeping and parlor car companies operating their cars in the State were required to annually report, under oath, the total amount of the gross receipts of business done between points in the State to the Comptroller of the State, and to pay into the State Treasury $1.50 upon each $100 of such gross receipts, and in event of failure to make the report and pay the tax the Comptroller was authorized to estimate the amount of such gross receipts from the information he might obtain and to add a penalty of ten per cent. of the tax, and to collect it, with costs and penalties, the same as other delinquent taxes. The appellant stated that since the passage of the act in 1895 and up to 1907, no property tax had been levied upon it and that it had therefore taken the act of 1895 to impose a tax upon its property and had paid the amount required by it; but it asserted that the act of 1907, § 46 of chapter 5596, contained an ad valorem tax, and it stated that it had not made a report of its business on January 1, 1910, or January 1, 1911, as required by the act and had not paid the tax provided for, and that the defendant had demanded 231 U. S. Statement of the Case. by wire that the reports be sent in at once. It assailed the constitutionality of the law, and pleaded allegations to support its claim to jurisdiction of the case by the court in equity. It prayed that the defendant be restrained and enjoined from estimating the gross receipts of the company and adding the penalty and from issuing a warrant for the collection of the tax, as provided by § 47 of chapter 5596, and from taking any action to enforce the payment of such tax or penalty, and that the act be declared void. A restraining order was granted, but upon application for an injunction pendente lite, the Circuit Judges for the Fifth Circuit held that § 47 of chapter 5596, taken in connection with chapter 5597, provides for a graded license tax on all sleeping and parlor car companies operating their cars in the State and is within the legislative power of the State, and that until the complainant had complied with the requirements of the act it had no standing in equity, and denied the application. Thereupon an appeal was sued out to this court. Thereafter the defendant notified the complainant that unless it made report within a time stated he would proceed to estimate the amount of the gross receipts and take such further action as the statute warranted. The complainant then, under protest, filed its return for the years ending October 31, 1909, and October 31, 1910, but did not pay the tax required by the act. The defendant issued a warrant of the State to the sheriff of Duval County, who levied upon one of the complainant's cars, and the complainant paid the taxes for the years 1909 and 1910, with costs. The complainant later filed its bill in the second case (No. 158 of this term), containing practically the same allegations as its former bill, with additional averments with reference to the return and tax for the year 1911, and statements concerning the payment of the taxes for 1909 |