231 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. ment of Federal statutes, and not those of state courts. Calhoun Mining Co. v. Ajax Mining Co., 182 U. S. 499, 510. Mr. Charles A. McCoy, with whom Mr. Leland H. Moss and Mr. Robert L. Knox were on the brief, for defendant in error: Section 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, like § 5057, Rev. Stat., is a statute of limitation. It is precisely like other statutes of limitation and applies to all judicial contests between the assignee and other persons touching the property or rights of property of the bankrupt transferable to or vested in the assignee, where the interests are adverse and have so existed for more than two years from the time when the cause of action accrued, for or against the assignee. Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342. There must be reasonable diligence and a means of knowledge is the same thing in effect as knowledge itself. Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; Johnson v. Standard Co., 148 U. S. 370; Pearsal v. Smith, 149 U. S. 236; Kirby v. Lake Shore Ry., 120 U. S. 130; Putnam v. New Albany &c. Ry., 16 Wall. 390; Johnson v. Atlantic G. & W. I. T. Co., 156 U. S. 648; Bates v. Peebles, 151 U. S. 162; Foster v. Mansfield, 146 U. S. 88; Norris v. Hagan, 136 U. S. 329. Whatever is notice enough to excite attention to a fact and put a party on his guard and call for an inquiry, is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant with it. Johnson v. Stanard M. Co., 148 U. S. 307; Succession of Dauphin, 112 Louisiana, 139; Poirier v. Cypress Co., 54 So. Rep. 298; Citizens Bank v. Jansonne, 120 Louisiana, 399. Concealment must be the result of positive acts, mere silence is insufficient. Woods v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317; Pearsal v. Smith, 149 U. S. 236; Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342. Opinion of the Court. 231 U.S. MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to recover land alleged to have been conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of creditors. The defendant pleaded that the estate had been closed and that the action was barred by the lapse of two years, under § 11d of the Bankruptcy Act, July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 549, and also that he purchased the land for its full value and in good faith. The estate had been closed and the two years had run, but after they had elapsed the former trustee petitioned to have the proceedings reopened on the ground that he had just discovered the facts and that the sale should be set aside. The petition was granted, this suit was brought and the judge of first instance ordered a reconveyance. The Supreme Court of Louisiana found, as it was compelled to by the testimony of the trustee himself, that during the pendency of the original proceeding the trustee suspected the alleged fraud, made some inquiries, but dropped the matter because he thought that it was not worth while, that is, that it would not pay to go farther. He 'voluntarily abstained from availing himself of the means put in his hand by the law itself for the ascertainment of a suspected fact,' by examining the bankrupt and otherwise. On this ground the court held that he could not remove the bar of the statute, reversed the judgment and dismissed the suit. 129 Louisiana, 218. We are of opinion that the decision of the Supreme Court was right. It is not necessary to consider whether the running of the two years after the estate is first closed is a bar to all suits upon claims that might have been collected if they had been known, or to controvert the conclusion of Bilafsky v. Abraham, 183 Massachusetts, 401, that such suits are not barred. But it is obvious that there must be some limits if the promise of repose after two years in § 11d is not to be a mirage. The power to reopen 231 U.S. Opinion of the Court. estates given in § 2 (8) 'whenever it appears that they were closed before being fully administered' cannot be taken to put it into the power of the court of bankruptcy to remove the bar of § 11 at its own will simply because a trustee may have changed his mind. It was argued that the court of first instance found fraud and that we could not review the findings of fact. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U. S. 86, 97. But if so, we equally are barred from reviewing the findings of the Supreme Court, that the trustee was chargeable with knowledge of the fraud, if there was one. Therefore, apart from the difference between the statutes considered there and here, cases like Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, and Traer v. Clews, 115 U. S. 528, where the cause of action for fraud was concealed, do not apply. The question is simply whether, when, after an estate is closed, and more than two years later a trustee comes to the conclusion that he undervalued a claim that he knew of and might have sued upon, or finds that the value has risen since, the Bankruptcy Court may reopen the estate for the sole purpose of getting rid of the statute, and allowing the trustee to sue. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 135. Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U. S. 185, 196. The judge had no power by an ex parte order reopening the estate to remove the bar that was completed, and that there was no ground for removing. Whether it be put on the construction of the Bankruptcy Act or on the ground that the estate was fully administered quoad hoc, or of laches on the part of the trustee, it comes to the same thing. The claim in controversy cannot be made the ground of a suit. Judgment of the Supreme Court affirmed. MR. JUSTICE PITNEY Concurs in the result. Opinion of the Court. 231 U. S. LUDVIGH, TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF HOROWITZ, v. AMERICAN WOOLEN COMPANY OF NEW YORK. APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 55. Argued November 7, 10, 1913.-Decided December 15, 1913. A contract under which goods are delivered by one party to another to be sold by the latter and proceeds paid to the former less an agreed discount, the unsold goods to be returned to the consignor, is really a contract of bailment only, and the consignor can, in the absence of fraud, take them back in case of the consignee's bankruptcy. 188 Fed. Rep. 30, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the construction of a contract for consignment of goods to a bankrupt and the rights of the consignor thereunder, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Abram I. Elkus, with whom Mr. Garrard Glenn was on the brief, for appellant. Mr. Daniel P. Hays, with whom Mr. Edwin D. Hays was on the brief, for appellees. MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the court. This was a suit in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York by Ludvigh, as trustee in bankruptcy of the firm of Philip Horowitz & Son, to set aside as fraudulent certain transactions of the bankrupts with the American Woolen Company of New York (which we will call the "Woolen Company”), and to recover for goods taken from the bankrupts by the Woolen Company prior to the institution of proceedings 231 U.S. Opinion of the Court. in bankruptcy. The District Court held in favor of the trustee and sustained his right to recover the value of the goods so taken (176 Fed. Rep. 145). Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the judgment of the District Court was reversed (188 Fed. Rep. 30), and the case is here upon appeal. The facts as found by both courts are very little in dispute. It appears that Horowitz & Son, the bankrupts, had had a contract in writing with the Woolen Company which expired on December 1, 1902, whereby goods were to be consigned to Horowitz & Son, the title to the merchandise or its proceeds to remain in the Woolen Company until fully accounted for, all bills of such consigned goods to be payable to the Woolen Company and accounts of sales to be rendered to that company at least once a month. The Horowitzes were also to give security to protect the Woolen Company from any failure to perform the contract; the profit of the Horowitz firm was to be the difference between the invoice prices and the selling prices of the goods; they were to have seven per cent. discount for payment within four months and any increase in profits by varying the terms of trade was to go to them, and they were to have a drawing account of $1,200 a month, provided the goods sold by them warranted such payment. In 1902, for reasons which do not distinctly appear in the record, the Woolen Company expressed its desire to have the Horowitz firm incorporated, and a corporation was formed under the name and style of The Niagara Woolen Company (which we will designate the "Niagara Company"), for the purpose of contracting and dealing with the Woolen Company and of dealing in fabrics received therefrom. One hundred and ninety-five of the two hundred shares of the Niagara Company were issued to Philip Horowitz, as fully paid up, in consideration of a mortgage by him on certain real estate for $19,500. A contract in writing was entered into by the |