provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, as already stated, these provisions are separable. It is also objected that the order of the Commission constitutes an unwarrantable interference with, and a regulation of, interstate commerce. The questions thus raised cannot be distinguished from those which were considered and decided in The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352.

Second. The order for reparation.

This order was not made under the statute of March 10, 1900, authorizing the Commission to fix rates. It is conceded on behalf of the appellees that if the Commission was not authorized by § 821 or 829 of the Kentucky statutes to award reparation, it had no authority whatever for that purpose. Section 821 provides that it shall be the duty of the Railroad Commissioners to see that the laws relating to railroads are faithfully executed and to exercise a general supervision over the railroads of the State. Section 829 authorizes the Commission to "hear and determine complaints" under §§ 816, 817 and 818, to the provisions of which we have already referred. It provides that such complaints shall be in writing, that the company complained of shall have notice of hearing, that the Commission shall hear and reduce to writing all the evidence adduced and that it shall render such award as may be proper. If the award be not satisfied within ten days, the chairman of the Commission is to file a copy of it and the evidence heard, in the office of the clerk of the proper circuit court, whereupon it is to be docketed for trial and summons is to be issued, as in other cases, requiring the party against whom the award has been made to show cause why it should not be satisfied. If the party fails to appear, judgment is to be rendered by default, and, if a trial is demanded, the case is to be tried as other ordinary cases, except that no evidence is to be introduced by either party save that heard before the Commission, unless the court shall be satisfied by sworn testimony that

it could not have been produced before the Commission by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

It thus appears that the two proceedings, though they were conducted at the same time, were distinct in their nature. The one resulted in a legislative rule for the future; in the other, there was an award of specific sums of money to particular persons upon the basis of past transactions and this award, according to the provisions of the statute, on being filed could be enforced by proceedings in the courts of the State. The persons in whose favor the award was made were not parties to the suit, and we think that the court was right in declining to determine its validity.

The order denying the application for injunction is

STURGES & BURN

Affirmed.

MANUFACTURING COM

PANY v. BEAUCHAMP.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS.

No. 54. Submitted November 3, 1913.-Decided December 1, 1913.

A State is entitled to prohibit the employment of persons of tender years in dangerous occupations; and in order to make the prohibition effective it may compel employers at their peril to ascertain whether their employés are in fact below the age specified.

Absolute requirements as to ascertaining age of employés of tender years are a proper exercise of the protective power of government; and if the legislation has reasonable relation to the purpose which the State is entitled to effect it is not an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.

A classification in employment of labor of persons below sixteen years of age is reasonable and does not deny equal protection of the laws. The provisions of the Child Labor Act of Illinois of 1903 involved in this case are not unconstitutional as denying due process of law, as

231 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

depriving the employer of liberty of contract, or of his property by requiring him at his peril to ascertain the age of the person employed, or as denying him the equal protection of the law.

250 Illinois, 303, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Illinois Child Labor Act of 1903, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. A. W. Bulkley and Mr. C. E. More for plaintiff in

error:

The common-law rule of contributory negligence applies to minors. 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., p. 409; Heiman v. Kinare, 190 Illinois, 156.

The common-law rule of contributory negligence has not been abolished by child labor statutes. Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Massachusetts, 489-498; Beghold v. Auto Body Co., 149 Michigan, 14; Bromberg v. Evans Laundry Co., 134 Iowa, 38, 46; Braasch v. Michigan Stove Co., 118 N. W. Rep. 366; Burke v. Big Sandy Coal Co., 68 W. Va. 421; Darsam v. Kohlmann, 123 Louisiana, 164, 171, 172; Dalm v. Bryant Paper Co., 157 Michigan, 550; Evans v. American Iron Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 519; Gaines Leathers v. Blackwell Tobacco Co., 144 N. Car. 330; Iron & Wire Co. v. Green, 108 Tennessee, 161, 165; Jacobson v. Merrill Mill Co., 107 Minnesota, 74; Kirkham v. WheelerOsgood Co., 39 Washington, 415; Nairn v. National Biscuit Co., 120 Mo. App. 144, 147; Nickey v. Steuder, 164 Indiana, 189, 196; Norman v. Virginia-Pocahontas Co., 68 W. Va. 405; Perry v. Tozer, 90 Minnesota, 431; Peters v. Gille Mfg. Co., 133 Mo. App. 412, 419; Queen v. Dayton Coal Co., 95 Tennessee, 458, 465; Rolin v. Tobacco Co., 141 N. Car. 300; Roberts v. Taylor, 31 Ontario, 10; Sharon v. Winnebago Mfg. Co., 141 Wisconsin, 185, 189; Smith v. National Coal Co., 135 Kentucky, 671; Sterling v. Union Carbide Co., 142 Michigan, 284; Syneszewski v. Schmidt, 153 Michigan, 438.

VOL CCXXXI-21

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

231 U.S.

Corporations are persons within the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377; Gulf, Col. &c. Railway v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 154; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 88; Minneapolis Railroad Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 29; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U. S. 394.

Courts will interfere to correct errors of state tribunals if law is administered so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275–279; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259–273; Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 710; Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356–373.

Defendant in error Beauchamp was an adult and not a child. Allen v. State, 7 Tex. App. 298; 16 Am. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 263; 51 Am. Reports, 293; Bell v. State, 18 Tex. App. 53; Black's Law Dict.; Century Dict.; Hurd's Illinois Stat. 1912, c. 38, Par. 282, p. 818, and § 7, Pars. 279, 280, 281 and 282; Id., c. 3, § 18, p. 11; Id., c. 4, § 4, p. 36; Id., c. 64, §§ 1, 3, p. 1261; McGregor v. State, 4 Tex. App. 599; Quattlebaum v. Triplett, 69 Arkansas, 91.

For distinction between contributory negligence and assumption of risk, see Berdos v. Tremont Mills, 209 Massachusetts, 489-497; Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Baker, 33 C. C. A. 468; 91 Fed. Rep. 224; Narramore v. Cleveland & St. L. Ry. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298-304; Un. Pac. Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 161 U. S. 451.

The judgment of the Illinois courts deprives plaintiff in error of equal protection of the laws. Chicago &c. R. R. v. Westby, 178 Fed. Rep. 619; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540; Cotting v. Kansas Stockyards Co., 183 U. S. 79; Cooley on Const. Lim., 3d ed., p. 391; Gulf, Col. &c. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340; Southern Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400.

The legislature has no power to give civil remedy to one

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Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

guilty of fraud and deceit. Black on Const. Law, 2d ed., p. 373; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Story on Const., 5th ed., § 1945; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Pet. 627, 657; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274.

Reading into the statute a civil remedy and abolishing common-law defenses are legislative and not judicial acts and transcends power of court. 26 Amer. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 597; Bate Refrigerating Co. v. Sulzberger, 157 U. S. 1; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall. 458; Home Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34– 45; St. Paul &c. Ry. Co. v. Phelps, 137 U. S. 528; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 202; United States v. St. Anthony R. R. Co., 192 U. S. 524; United States v. Fisher, 2 Cr. 358; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 95; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 282.

The statute as held and enforced is not within the police power. Chicago v. Gunning System, 213 Illinois, 628; Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30; In re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661; Ruhstrat v. The People, 185 Illinois, 133; State v. Caspare, 80 Atl. Rep. 606. 613 (Md.); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 370.

The maxim "No one acquires a right of action from his own wrong" applies to minors. 16 Amer. & Eng. Ency., 2d ed., p. 311; Barham v. Turbeville, 1 Swan. 437; Bigelow on Estoppel (5th ed.), p. 606; Commander v. Brazil, 41 So. Rep. 497 (Miss.); Coleman v. Himmelberger Land Co., 79 S. W. Rep. 981; 22 Cyc., Title Infants, p. 512; Ex parte Banking Asso., 3 DeG. & J. 63; Edgar v. Gertison, 112 S. W. Rep. 831; Ferguson v. Bobo, 54 Mississippi, 121; Hall v. Timmons, 2 Rich. (S. C.) 120; 57 L. R. A. 673, n.; Matthews v. Cowan, 59 Illinois, 341; Munden v. Harris, 134 S. W. Rep. 1076-1080; Pace v. Cawood, 110 S. W. Rep. 414 (Ky.); Parker v. Elder, 11 Humph. 546; Rice v.