obedience is usually most definite in cases where bargains or agreements are to be upheld.

For these reasons, it seems to us unnecessary to maintain a class of moral duties as distinguished from social duties, or to set up any ends apart from social ends. In other words, we do not admit any contrast between the useful and the right, nor do we see any motive for a compulsory enforcement of the integrity class of duties, irrespective of their importance to the welfare of human society.

V. It will thus appear, if the foregoing analysis is correct, that the primary, fundamental, and indispensable moral duties-the duties that constitute 'eternal and immutable morality'-are dictated by what is necessary for individual and social preservation, according to a high and progressive standard. The ends of morality must evidently include these things in the first place. That man, once created, should exist, and go through his term of years with a healthy body, with satisfied wants, and with a character neither mutilated nor degraded, is an assumption that we are compelled to make, and that every sound mind must acquiesce in. We can offer no proof for it, if it is denied, because there can be nothing more fundamental than itself to prove it from. We cannot prove to a man that he ought to eat when he is hungry, sleep when he is worn out, or work in order to subsist; we assume such points as granted by every one, and as giving us a medium for obtaining assent to other duties wrapt up in these. In like manner, we are under the necessity of adopting as a first principle, the propriety of preserving the individual and social existence of men; and this principle constitutes the foremost portion of the ethical end, or the first group of aims that are to guide us in the construction of the science of morality, as they have, ever since the creation of man, been the prompting influences in constructing and maintaining empirical morality.

If we look at what are termed the cardinal virtues, we shall find that they have all been conceived so as to attain some one or other of the ends now stated. The most complete and precise enumeration of these moral generalisations of the past, is the one given by Dr Whewell, and is as follows: 1st, Humanity or Benevolence; 2d, Justice; 3d, Truth; 4th, Purity; 5th, Order, meaning obedience to law, and also the fulfilment by each person of the duties belonging to his place in society.

1st, And first with reference to the virtue and duty of Order, it is evident that this is nothing else than an expression of the necessity of keeping up the social organisation, and of all the

interests that hang upon it. It means that we are to prefer security, quietness, and the means of obtaining subsistence, and enjoying life, not to another state of slightly diminished happiness, but to a Pandemonium and universal shipwreck of the human species.

This duty refers at once to the structure of human society, and to the establishment of authority for carrying into effect the purposes of society. It includes the strict fulfilment of each person's part in the social scheme, and consequently also the acquiring of capacity for professional and other duties. Over and above the obligations of truth, justice, and humanity, there is a duty incumbent upon every man of standing to his post, of acting under lawful superiors, and of rightly directing and controlling inferiors. It is obvious at a glance, that our obligation to this duty lies mainly in the regard to consequences, although strengthened by custom, by reverence for authorities, and by the established sanctions. The military conscience, which sustains the most rigorous of all forms of social organisation, is nothing else than a sense of disorder, destruction, and ruin, as the consequences of disobedience. The infinite difference between Order and Disorder is the outward fact corresponding to the infinite difference between right and wrong as an inward sentiment.

2d, The virtue of Justice implies equality of treatment, and the returning of equivalents to good or evil received. A man may feel that he has done so much good to his fellows, that if they only return a fair equivalent, he can never be in want; he has placed himself above appealing to mere benevolence, so as not to suffer by the absence of humane impulses in others. But what is he to do if justice is disregarded, if his lawful property is not respected, nor his claim of a fair return for benefits conferred at all attended to? Then, indeed, the world reels, the ground sinks beneath; footing he has none in the wide creation. The mere abridgment of pleasure, the diminution of happiness by a few degrees, is perfectly inadequate to represent the endless horrors of injustice. They are only to be expressed by the most fearful imagery and anticipations of ruin that can enter into the most terror-stricken imagination. A conspiracy for universal massacre, a war of extermination, the abrupt arrival of the final doom of the species-are alone comparable to the consequences of a general disregard for the obligation of justice. To say that the sense of such consequences would not suffice to keep the mass of men under some degree of restraint, is a libel on the fears of all that class of persons who have something to lose.

3d, The virtue of Humanity or Benevolence commends itself as being the offspring of one of the most powerful and luxurious of

our constitutional impulses-namely, the emotion of natural tenderness, which enters into and sweetens all the relations of mutual dependence. It further commends itself as being the spur to relieve distress and assist the needy. Now, this act of rendering assistance to the afflicted, is one that commands not merely our emotional sympathy, but also our strong rational approbation. Every human being has a positive interest in it. We are all liable to fall into dependent situations, where we must perish but for the outstretched hand of tenderness and compassion. A flagrant contempt of affliction makes the blood of the spectator run cold; it produces the feeling of insecurity and desolation, and unhinges all confidence in human affections. We treat the offender in such a case not as a person seeking the reduction of our lawful pleasures, but as one aiming a blow at the very root of our existence, and disturbing the security of the human race.

The emotion of natural tenderness, which is the mainspring of benevolence and humanity, is opposed to another emotion equally natural-namely, the resentful and wrathful impulse, excited by harm or injury done to the individual. These two contrasting emotions divide between them the occupation of the human breast; but moralists have very generally done all they could to encourage the one and restrain the other. Some sects-like the Society of Friends, and the followers of Robert Owen-propose little less than the entire extinction of the resentful emotion, maintaining that the exclusive empire of the various forms of tender affection would be most conducive to the happiness of mankind, and might even suffice for maintaining security. It is not difficult to discern the grounds of the preference thus given to one of the two great impulses that act upon human beings in their relations with one another. Tenderness is the multiplication of good, resentment aims at destruction; the one binds men together, the other drives them asunder. A reign of universal love is the ideal of human perfection; a reign of universal resentment would reduce civilised man beneath the savage. Although it cannot be denied, that there is a satisfaction in the outgoings of wrath and resentment, yet to a human being equally susceptible to both emotions, the state of tenderness must seem preferable in itself, while it draws other gratifications in its train.

Another important consideration, serving to justify and enforce the virtue of humanity, is the necessity laid on every individual of making some mental provision for calamity and misfortune. Not only is it requisite to lay up store of worldly good, and of relations of affection and mutual tenderness, it is also essential to lay up a character that will sustain the pressure of evil days.

This the Stoics acted upon in their discipline for enduring pain with fortitude and calmness. But one of the most powerful means of consolation in times of adversity, is founded in this very tender emotion. Religion, in its consolations, takes its stand almost entirely upon the feelings of the tender kind.

4th, Truth maintains a high position among the cardinal virtues, for the reasons we have assigned in speaking of integrity in general. 5th, The fifth of the cardinal virtues in Dr Whewell's enumeration is Purity. By this, he understands the control of the two appetites of hunger and sex. It seems to us, however, that the word 'temperance' would better correspond to this meaning. Since both these appetites are allowed to be indulged, as sources both of preservation and of pleasure, the only thing that is a matter of virtue, is their regulation or restriction within certain limits. But the term 'purity,' as commonly understood, implies the absolute exclusion of certain ingredients that are reckoned objectionable in every degree; as when a man's public character is said to be pure when perfectly free from every taint of self-seeking or sinister objects. The government of those two appetites, as an obligatory duty, would come under the necessities of individual and social preservation. We must consider the consequences of the different modes of gratifying those propensities, on the welfare of the individual, and on the security and interests of society.

To the five cardinal virtues of Order, Justice, Humanity, Truth, and Purity, Dr Whewell adds two others, with the view of comprising in the series a complete body of morality; these are Earnestness and Moral Purpose. The virtue of Moral Purpose, means that every action that we perform, is to be done for a moral end, or at least is to have a moral end in addition to the primary motive : this is to convert morality into a permanent vesture of the life, an ingredient in the current of thought, purpose, and action. It recognises the dignity of human nature, and indirectly implies, that many of the actions of everyday life are in themselves trivial, vulgar, and inconsiderable, and fail to give occupation to the more elevated portions of the human being. It is, as far as the intention goes, parallel to the cultivation of grace and beauty in all the actions that we perform, in order that what would be otherwise tame and insignificant, may call into play some of the refined susceptibilities of our nature. The same effect is produced by introducing affection and sentiment into the colder relations of business life. It would, without doubt, add greatly to the dignity and refined enjoyment of human beings, if this method of connecting high moral ideas with all kinds of actions were put in practice. It would also materially increase the securities for virtue in the individual, which can hardly be said of the cultivation of grace

and affectionateness of demeanour. But the difficulty lies in rendering this prevalence of moral purpose a matter of primary obligation upon all men. It may be recommended for their adoption, and many inducements may be suggested in its favour; but besides that it cannot be compelled in any shape, it is not the sole method of elevating and dignifying the human character, and of giving additional meaning to common acts. The æsthetic or poetic culture may also be an object of undivided solicitude; so may the search for scientific truth, and the attainment of large ends of general good. If objects like these are carried out without sacrificing any of the primary moral obligations, no one would ever think of attaching blame or vice to such individuals, because of their not aiming at giving a moral meaning to all classes of actions; or because their love to their kindred or friends proceeds from their affectionateness alone, and their obedience to the laws solely from love of country, self-interest, or a good training.

Not only is there no means of compelling men to act from Moral Purpose, such as may be brought to bear on the more fundamental duties of morality, but the imposing of it as a universal obligation, and as the one indispensable means of giving elevation and dignity to the human character, is a stretch of arbitrary power which no one has a right to assume. There is a tendency in moral teachers to the excessive imposition of burdens and of obligations, probably from the impression, that by urging men to do many things, there is a chance of securing the performance of a few. But this proceeding is as impolitic as it is unwarranted. In order to succeed with human nature as actually constituted, we should reduce our imperative exactions to the smallest possible bulk, and we shall then be the better supported when we insist on their performance. One of the ends of a highly-advanced morality, is to reduce more and more the constraints and exactions put upon the individual for the preservation of the society. Every reconsideration of the moral code should be for the purpose of lightening rather than increasing its burdensome requirements. If the good of the individual, and the security of the society, can be maintained at a less expense of self-denial than formerly, the reduction ought to be made. But the dignity and elevation of the human being, the true moral character of man, is especially concerned in the possession of free-will and liberty as opposed to dictation and compulsory exactions-whence it arises that all conduct not involved in the primary morality, should be suggested rather than enforced, and its adoption or rejection should rest with the individual's own unfettered determination. This would be a real step in advance towards the moral dignity of the race; for neither dignity nor integrity is compatible with the imperative dictation of what