be compacted in a 7-year period, but I do not think it should have to be the 7 years it is offered. They may not be ready to, the first 7 years, but they may be in a hurry to, following the backfire in some future presidential election.

So the alternative to this, which I also lean toward but which I do regard as a compromise, is the-let me call it the ratio division, because some of the people have argued against it when they see the word "proportional" in it.

The proposal is the kind, Mr. Chairman, you have introduced, and that Senator Dodd of the subcommittee has introduced.

I might say, in connection with them, that I would rather see it without the do you still call it the Lucas amendment, the 40-percent requirement?

Senator KEFAUVER. That is where it came from originally.

Mr. PICCARD. I would like to see at least this, that the committee propose it to Congress without the 40 percent and use that as a bargaining point. I am afraid if you put in the compromise ahead of time, you will be asked to compromise further. The 40 percent is pretty safe on the record that we have in the past, with the majority requirement. In fact, winning presidential candidates have been able to get always well over 40 percent of the popular vote, and I would suppose that under the ratio system, they would continue, then, to get over 40 percent of the popular vote. This would be accurately enough reflected in the electoral vote so that I think it is very safe to have 40 percent. Of course, it would not be safe to have a majority requirement, because this would be saying to any splinter party, just get a little fraction out of the middle and you break up the election. But if you say 40 percent, this means you have to get a big chunk out of the middle before it upsets the election.

Senator Norris years ago was trying to change the electoral college and he kept making his compromises ahead of time until, finally, he had such a watered-down proposal that it no longer had any support. I think this is perhaps the condition of Senate Joint Resolution 26, which has slight change. This is by Senator McGee and would keep the State unit vote. All it would do would be to get rid of the human electors and I think when you have made that compromise, you finally do not have enough left.

I think one of the problems the subcommittee has is how, after all this talk after all these years, you can still arouse two-thirds of both Houses of Congress to the fact that it is a real problem, it is not just a hypothetical or academic question.

The electors in the electoral college are not to be condemned because they are anachronisms. If that is all they were, it would be a pleasant reminder of our constitutional origin. But the condemnation, as you know, is in terms of their influence on presidential elections.

Senator KEFAUVER. I think our problem here is this: I believe certainly the majority of the people-and I think two-thirds of the people as shown by the polls, and probably two-thirds of the Members of Congress-would like to see some change made. But we have so many different proposals that the division as to which one will make it difficult to get the necessary two-thirds behind any one.

Mr. PICCARD. Yes, sir. For that reason, I think that people who favor the direct popular election are on very reasonable grounds when they fall back on the ratio system as a compromise. This avoids the

problem of State suffrage qualifications although I know that at least some members of the subcommittee are ready to tackle his problem in terms of 18-year-old vote and in terms of residence requirements.

I also recognize, however, that many Members of Congress want to preserve the power of the States in this area. I am sure this is the case of at least some members of the subcommittee.

Senator KEFAUVER. This has been a very useful discussion, Mr. Piccard. Do you have anything else to add?

Mr. PICCARD. No; I want to thank you very much for the opportunity to discuss it with you. I have considered it a real privilege to be here.

Senator KEFAUVER. We appreciate all the research and study and care you have put into the preparation of your statement and your advice and counsel here.

Mr. PICCARD. Thank you.

(The prepared statement submitted by Mr. Piccard follows:)

OUTLINE

I. Criticism of the present electoral college system:

A. Potential dangers-the least worry.

B. Actual current effect:

1. Arithmetic-distortions.

2. Politics-corruption, splinter parties, maneuvering, popular misunderstanding.

3. Summary criticism.

II. Criticism of proposed reforms, by type:

A. Fixed State unit votes without human electors-undesirable.

B. District system:

1. Gerrymandering.

2. Historical failure to divide State votes.

3. Districts become units (cf. British practice).

C. Senate Joint Resolution 2 (1961), Senate Joint Resolution 4 (1961), and so forth:

1. Review of some past analysis:

(a) It is not proportional representation.

(b) Old election results not applicable.

(c) Alleged partisan advantage or disadvantage unknown.

2. Relevant criticism:

(a) Still permits distortion and reversal.

(b) Computations to third or fourth decimal would be hard to explain to those who voted for the loser.

3. The plurality requirement:

(a) Record of single-member districts with simple plurality requirements.

(b) 40-percent requirement as a compromise still offers bait.

4. Advantages:

(a) Retains State suffrage qualifications.

(b) Approximates popular vote by States.

(c) Placates those who make an issue of the two "senatorial" electoral votes assigned small States as well as large.

(d) Nationalize campaign-avoids sure versus pivotal

areas.

D. Direct popular election:

1. Need for national suffrage qualifications.

2. Represents voters, not artificial concepts.

3. Some small State representatives have already supported this.

4. It could be offered to the States on a standby basis.

III. Political or partisan advantages:

A. Hypothetical analysis:

1. Pro-Republican.

2. Pro-Democratic.

3. Pro-third-party movement (e.g., a southern movement). B. None conclusive.

IV. Incidental considerations-other reforms:

A. Electoral count:
1. Danger.

2. Remedy-a law not to be changed between election and solution.

B. Resolution of deadlocks:

1. Danger of House voting by States-the role of key individuals from balanced State delegations.

2. Congress voting in joint sessions.

3. Resort to total national popular vote.

C. Safeguarding the 23d amendment (later laws abrogating former laws.)

V. Specific commentary on various proposals actually before the subcommittee-but with remarks restricted to the electoral college features proper, without going into the proposals dealing with the nomination process. VI. Conclusion:

A. Analysis.

B. Personal preferences if called for.

STATEMENT

I. CRITICISM OF THE PRESENT ELECTORAL COLLEGE SYSTEM

Objections to the electoral college system have been raised so often over such a long period of time-while on a superficial level the device itself has seemed to "work"-that many thoughful people are no longer concerned. Insofar as an attack upon the electoral college has rested upon warnings about what might happen, the failure of the predictions to come true has created a false sense of security. We have heard the cry "Wolf" so often without seeing him (that is, we have not seen a minority President chosen over a defeated majority candadite during our lifetimes) that we now refuse to get excited about the possibility that trouble really is just around the corner.

While the warning of possible danger needs to be sounded, the whole argument against the electoral college system should not be left to rest on that point; neither should the attack be played down. The real evils in the system should be demonstrated constantly so as to support the very healthy reform efforts of such people as some of the members of this subcommittee.

A. Potential dangers-The least worry

Some witnesses before predecessors of this subcommittee have attempted to gloss over the historical record of backfires by the electoral college. One authority tried to reassure us by pointing out that our knowledge of the popular vote in 1824 is incomplete and that the popular vote in 1876 was so corrupt that we should not argue that the Democrats were entitled to the Presidency. But we do not cite those two elections to argue that Jackson and Tilden should have been elected. We refer back to those precedents-and we add 1888 which that other witness so conveniently ignored-because they demonstrate accurately the mechanical operation of the system upon which we still rely. The simple fact is that reasonable (not simply wild and improbable) combinations of popular votes from State to State can result in the election of a candidate with fewer votes than his chief opponent, even if the loser has an actual majority of the total popular vote.

A popular plurality winner, however, has not lost in the electoral voting since Cleveland's loss to Harrison. We cannot say when, if ever, it will happen again. If this were the only thing wrong with our system of presidential elections we could go on without change just as a man can play Russian roulette an average of five out of six times without damage.

B. Actual current effect

While we cannot note all of the hidden evils of the present system any more than we can be sure of all of the consequences of reform, some difficulties can be identified.

1. Arithmetic-Distortions.-Starting with the popular vote of 1824 (insofar as we know it), the electoral vote has never reflected the popular vote exactly. For winning candidates, the distortion has been as low as 2 percentage points (Adams, 1824; Hayes, 1876; Wilson, 1916), and as high as 38 percentage points (Lincoln, 1864; Roosevelt, 1936), with typical distortions between 10 and 20 points. Losing candidates-particularly those from minor parties--suffer even greater relative distortions. Taft's 21 percentage point loss in 1912 wiped out 97 percent of his tabulated strength. Henry Wallace in 1948, like Eugene Debs and all those others seeking some recognition, lost 100 percent of their standing. Thurmond, in 1948, on the other hand, got a percentage of the electoral vote (7.3) that was considerably larger than his popular vote percentage (2.4). Therein lies a lesson that is better considered under the heading of politics than under arithmetic. While these distortions have usually exaggerated the lead of the winnerenabling close calls to be represented as landslides-they have also resulted in bringing home the popular runner-up.

The electoral vote does not represent the popular vote accurately because of the influence of three factors, only one of which is a constitutional requirement. The disturbing elements are (1) the assignment of electoral votes to the States only partly on the basis of population (Alaska's three electors represent a much greater percentage of the total number of electors than that State's population represents of the notional total); (2) voter turnout, which in turn depends only partly on legal qualification; and (3) the State unit vote which serves to wipe out different sized minority groups from State to State. In this last connection, some critics of the State unit vote practice have pointed out that within a State the voters who cast ballots for a loser are counted as though they favored the winner since the winner gets all of the State's electors. This is a superficial criticism. Had those voters stayed home (as other qualified voters did), the plurality which actually determined the electoral vote for their State could have achieved the same result. The whole State is counted in one electoral column; the electors represent those who voted for the opposition, those who were nonvoters, and the voters who made up at least a plurality.

After every presidential election these distortions can be illustrated by selecting pairs or other small groups of States in which a popular winner was an electoral loser. Thus in 1936:

When the luck is bad, this can happen on a national scale. Another frequently popular postelection game is to consider the effect of small shifts of votes in certain selected States. Following the last election, at least some Republicans were tantalized by thoughts about the consequences of negating a few Illinois popular votes. While that alone would not have elected Mr. Nixon, it would have opened the door to more threatening maneuvers on the part of some of the electors in the South who were not subject to national party control. In 1948, for example a minimal shift in three key States could have put Mr. Dewey in the White House without depriving Mr. Truman of his popular plurality. The classic case, however, is illustrated when the whole election finally hinges on one State's narrow popular margin. For example in 1844:

Clay needed only 33 of Polk's electoral votes in order to win. The Abolitionists who voted for Birney clearly had the power to tip the scales in Clay's favor. Even aside from their defection, the more than 2,700,000 voters in the Nation left the balance of power in the hands of fewer than 3,000 New Yorkers. What candidate since that day has ever ignored the wishes of a small bloc of New York voters? This question suggests quite properly that electoral arithmetic influences presidential politics.

2. Politics-corruption, splinter parties, etc.-The electoral college grab bag encourages local efforts to prostitute the whole system. Machines, factions, splinter groups, and even legitimate regional political parties are tempted to exercise an influence that would be impossible without the electoral college system and its unit votes. Even the two great national parties may be dragged into corrupt practices because of the unusual rewards to be gained from even a little juggling. Going back once more to the Polk-Clay contest of 1844 (so as to avoid hurting the feelings of any current partisans) we can consider the manner in which Louisiana's unit of six electoral votes was cast for Polk. He carried the State by less than 700 votes, but Plaquemines Parish gave him more than 1,200 votes while Clay got only 44. Polk got more than twice as many votes as all candidates combined normally got in that parish; in fact his vote was nearly twice as great as the number of white men in the parish. Many people are pleased today to note that such corruption is "stopped at the State line" because the State's total weight in the election cannot be inflated by such padding. But the column in which the whole State is counted may hinge on just a couple of hundred extra ballots stuffed into a box or fraudulently added to a voting machine. And that, in turn, may swing the whole national election.

The electoral college system offers as great rewards to honest movements as it does to crooks. By virtually making a lottery out of closely divided Statesand thereby of the final results in a close contest-the present system offers the balance of power to small groups strategically located. In fact, if the location is right, the system encourages the organization of such groups even where they might not otherwise exist. While a new analysis of what used to be called sure States (the Old "Solid" South) might result in a reinterpretation of the impact of the electoral colleges there, the role of key blocs in pivotal States remains crucial.

While most of these dangers and temptations in the system result from the unit vote, others stem from the presence of human electors who are chosen in November to do the official job in December. These men and women can be controlled-and in most cases they are properly controlled by the popular vote that appointed them to their task-or they can act independently or capriciously. At no time in our history have electors been chosen to be independent. The Founding Fathers certainly neither intended nor expected them to be free agents. But in a few exceptional cases, the electors have acted on their own. So far, their betrayal or wandering has not altered the outcome of a presidential election, except perhaps that Clay might have been eligible for election by the House of Representatives instead of Crawford in 1824-25. The odd electoral protests against James Monroe and Adlai Stevenson and the shifting of a single, thirdparty sympathizer, as in 1948 and 1960, have not been crucial.

(The largest number of independent electors are usually ignored. These were the men elected in November 1872, to vote for Horace Greeley. When Greeley died on November 29, his electors became free to vote as they pleased, since Grant was clearly the winner anyway. Three electors voted for Greeley despite his demise.)

Further temptation to those who would manipulate the electors themselves is offered by the really strange requirements for an electoral majority and a House of Representatives choice if no majority is forthcoming. The weirdness of a selection by the House, with the voting by State delegations all equated with each other, is worthy of separate consideration.