unit vote electoral system and how an appeal centered in the major industrial States could win the day for a Democratic presidential candidate. In regard to the 1960 campaign, I think it would be safe to speculate that as soon as any State appeared safe, so to speak, for either candidate, it was no longer of great interest to the campaign managers, because the candidate's actual percentage in such State would be of little importance. I would venture a guess, for instance, that the managers of both candidates made a fairly early decision not to concentrate major efforts in States like Vermont, Kansas, Nebraska, and Iowa-all of which were clearly going to Nixon; or in States such as Georgia, Arkansas, Rhode Island, or Massachusetts-all of which were clearly headed into the Kennedy column. The real battle of the campaign centered on the key pivotal States like California, Ohio, Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Surely, the campaign would have been waged differently by both parties if another electoral vote system or a direct popular system had been in effect. The emphasis would have switched away from the big key States, at least, to some extent, if the proportional method or a direct vote had been in effect, each vote from every State would have been of approximately equal impact, and the compaign efforts would have been spread more evenly throughout the country. Or let us assume that the district system had been in effect in 1960. The emphasis would then have switched to the close districts all around the country. The downtown districts, generally assumed safe for the Democrats, or areas in which the Republicans always win, would have received less attention by the presidential candidates. The truth of the matter is that we have no way of knowing just how the results of the 1960 election might have varied if another electoral system had been in effect with correspondingly altered national campaigns and patterns of voter behavior. Either candidate might have gained or lost votes as a result of different voting patterns. As we review the hypothetical results under other systems, showing that Mr. Nixon would have been a likely winner under many of them it is important to remember that even under the current system a shift of a few thousand votes in three or four States could have made Mr. Nixon President today. The basic fact of 1960 was that it was an exceedingly close election, and the fact that some other systems of counting the vote show a slight Kennedy margin and others a slight Nixon margin is primarily an illustration of the element of pure chance in any system under which two candidates receive virtually the same number of votes out of almost 69 million cast. So really, for the most part, there is no great lesson to be learned from the figures. They are merely interesting in a hypothetical sense to show the general direction of how the campaigns might have gone under different circumstances. That is the conclusion of what I have on the actual statistical question of last year. Are there any questions that you might have on that aspect? Senator KEFAUVER. Please explain further how the proportional system in Alabama caused you to give Kennedy 265.623, Nixon 266.075, and gave the unpledged 3.608. Mr. PEIRCE. The Nixon vote is the standard for the State pretty much. There is no question about what he received. Basically, the question is how the Democratic vote which, in effect, was split between Kennedy and the unpledged electors-the question is how that votes in a great part: is that correct? Senator KEFAUVER. As I get it here, Nixon received 237,981. Senator KEFAUVER. And Kennedy received 318,000? Mr. PEIRCE. That is correct. Senator KEFAUVER. So it would seem that under the proportional system that Kennedy would have had larger proportional votes than Nixon. Mr. PEIRCE. Our problem there is that if we counted the Kennedy vote fully, then we were obliged to completely disregard the unpledged elector vote from the State in your proportional groupings. Senator KEFAUVER. That is, the Kennedy votes were also unpledged votes in a great part; is that correct? Mr. PEIRCE. Well, they shared the same slate. Normally, we do not have the problem of having to divide up how different members of the slate felt or how people felt when they voted for two people simultaneously, one was going to vote one way in the electoral college and the other who had another man. Senator KEFAUVER. Officially, the Congressional Quarterly gave him the majority by what? Mr. PEIRCE. 111,000, approximately. The exact total is 111,803, and this is based on the system of counting double in Alabama-on that basis. Senator KEFAUVER. Do you have any questions, Mr. Kirby? Mr. KIRBY. I take it that this shows Alabama voted in favor of Nixon over Kennedy almost 2 to 1 proportionally? Mr. PEIRCE. Yes. Mr. KIRBY. In reality, it is just impossible to equate the Alabama type of situation accurately to the proportional plan or even a popular vote plan? Mr. PEIRCE. That is correct. We have merely done what we could with the crude tools that the State totals make available to us. Mr. KIRBY. Under the district system, you gave the unpledged electors all nine of the congressional districts in Alabama? Mr. PEIRCE. Eight of the nine. They ran slightly ahead of Kennedy in each one of these districts. Mr. KIRBY. You didn't apply the six-elevenths fraction in each district? Mr. PEIRCE. No; actually in every district of the State the unpledged electors had a stronger vote than the Kennedy elector member on the same slate. Mr. KIRBY. But there were 316,000 people in Alabama who did vote for Kennedy electors? Mr. PEIRCE. There were. Mr. KIRBY. And of the popular vote in Alabama, only 237,000 people voted for Nixon electors? Mr. PEIRCE. That is correct. We wish our problem had ended there. The difficulty was that we had those unpledged votes, also, being registered from the State and making a total far higher than the number of voters in the State. Mr. KIRBY. It just cannot be stated who would have won the presidential election if some other system had been in effect, can it? Mr. PEIRCE. Not definitely, no. Mr. KIRBY. Thank you. Senator KEFAUVER. We thank you very much, Mr. Peirce. And I want to say that your article is very illuminating and interesting. Mr. PEIRCE. I have some personal comments I would like to make, if I may, on the general question of electoral reform. Senator KEFAUVER. We will be glad to have that. Mr. PEIRCE. I have some general observations which I would like to emphasize are my own, and not necessarily those of the Congressional Quarterly, about the criteria I think a person might use in judging the relative merits of the current system and other systems. One may simply analyze the various proposed systems with an eye as to which party they would benefit the most. For instance, it is often claimed, and I imagine with some justification, that the current system benefits the Democratic Party because of that party's strong appeal to minority groups in large key States, while the district system would benefit the Republican Party because it would tend to shift power to rural areas. It seems to me, though, that the test of political expediency has little relation to the more important question which system is best for the Nation, which would most truly reflect the will of our people, which would provide the best protection against the abuses which might destroy faith in the Office of the Presidency and the man who holds it. If one accepts these basic assumptions, then the question is whether the actual nationwide popular vote is the most important consideration, or whether one feels that the preservation of the American Federal system in the choice of the President is of primary importance. If a person feels that the popular vote should be the decisive factor, then he should support the establishment of the direct national vote for President, or if he feels the political considerations regarding whether it could be approved or not by the State legislatures would make that goal impossible of achievement, he should favor the proportional system. If a person believes, on the other hand, that the American Federal system should be strongly reinforced and is more important than a direct popular vote, then he should support the proposed district system. Again, if he feels that that goal is impossible because it could not be approved, he might favor the proportional system which does retain guarantee of two extra electoral votes for each State regardless of population. Personally, I can see little ideological justification for the current system. It certainly causes gross distortions of the popular vote. Three times before 1960 it resulted in the election of à President who actually trailed in the popular vote. Only through sheer luck have we avoided repetition of this in recent years, especially in 1960. Nor does the electoral college as it functions today really defend the Federal system. The power exercised in it under the current system by the large States, certainly, cancels out any advantage that the small States enjoy through their two extra electoral votes. Moreover, the current system seems to me to encourage fraud because the juggling of a few votes can swing the electoral vote of an entire State. We were indeed fortunate, for instance, that the electoral vote last fall was not so close that the entire election would have depended on the electoral vote of one of the States where there appeared to be some question as to the honesty of the vote count. In summation, it seems to me if we are to believe the public opinion polls which have shown time and time again that a substantial majority of the American people favor reform of the electoral college system, then it remains incumbent upon the Congress and the State legislatures to continue their search, no matter how difficult it may be, for a fair and equitable plan for the election of our Presidents. Senator KEFAUVER. We certainly do thank you, Mr. Peirce, for not only your analysis of this subject but for your personal and individual views. We know that you are a deep student of this problem. Mr. PEIRCE. Thank you. (The document submitted by Mr. Peirce, being a marked and excerpted copy of the Congressional Quarterly fact sheet of Febru ary 13, 1961, follows:) [CQ Fact Sheet on Electoral Reform] NEW INTEREST SHOWN IN REFORM OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM The razor-thin margin dividing the popular votes received by John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon in the 1960 presidential election stimulated renewed interest in a variety of proposals to reform the electoral college method of electing a President. This Congressional Quarterly Fact Sheet reviews the origin and development of the current electoral system, proposals for reform, their fate in past years, the arguments for and against major alternative reform proposals, and how the 1960 presidential election might have been decided had another system been in effect. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION The method of selecting a President was the subject of long debate at the Constitutional Convenion of 1787. Several plans were proposed and rejected before a compromise solution, which has been modified only slightly in the intervening 174 years, was adopted. The records of the Convention' indicate that the Founding Fathers did not consider the appointment of a king or other monarchial system, but agreed that the President should be an elected official. The problem was whether the Chief Executive should be chosen by direct popular election, by the Congress, by the State legislatures, or by intermediate electors. Direct election was opposed because it was generally felt that the people lacked sufficient knowledge of the character or qualifications of possible candidates to make an intelligent choice. "It would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper character for Chief Magistrate to the people," George Mason of Virginia said, "as it would, to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." Many delegates feared that the people of the various States would be unlikely to agree on a single candidate, usually casting their votes for favorite son candidates well known to them. Southerners opposed direct election because suffrage was more widespread in the North than in the South, where Negro slaves did not vote. The Convention, August 24, 1787, rejected direct election by a vote of two States (Delaware, Pennsylvania) for, nine against. The possibility of allowing the Congress to pick the President was given full consideration. This plan ran into opposition, however, because it appeared to conflict with the principle of Executive independence. The President was 1 Source: "Documents of the Formation of the Union of the American States," Govern ment Printing Office. 1927; and Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., "The Electoral College," Rutgers University Press, 1958. to be the guardian of the people and their great protector against legislative tyranny. James Madison of Virginia argued, “A dependence of the Executive on the legislature would render it the executor as well as the maker of laws; and then, according to the observation of Montesquieu, tyrannical laws may be made that they may be executed in a tyrannical manner." A proposed alternative was to let the Congress appoint the President but make him ineligible for a second term, but this was opposed because it was felt that a second term should not be prohibited. A single long term, perhaps 7 years in length, was proposed but rejected because of the long period of time that would pass before a "bad" President could be voted out of office. Many delegates favored letting the State legislatures choose the President, but this was finally rejected because of fear that the President would be overly beholden to the States and might allow the States to encroach on Federal authority. Unable to agree on a plan for electing the President, the convention, August 31, appointed a "Committee of Eleven" to present a solution to the impasse. The Committee of Eleven, September 4 reported a compromise under which each State would appoint presidential electors in a manner set by its legislature, each State to have as many electors as it had Representatives and Senators combined. The electors would meet in their own States and cast two votes for President. The votes would be counted in Congress and the candidate receiving a majority of the votes cast would be elected President and the second highest candidate would be elected Vice President. The plan constituted a great concession to the smaller States since they were assured two extra votes (corresponding to their Senators), regardless of how small their populations might be. The method of choosing electors was left to the complete discretion of the State legislatures. The one section of the Committee of Eleven's plan which aroused serious opposition was the provision giving the Senate the right to decide elections where no candidate received a majority of electoral votes. Some delegates feared that the Senate, which had already been accorded treaty ratification powers and responsibility to advise and consent to all important appointments, might become too powerful. So the proposal was made, and approved to let the House decide when the electors failed to give a majority of their votes to a single candidate. But the interests of the small States were preserved by giving each delegation only one vote in the House on the election of the President. Only once since the ratification of the Constitution has an amendment been adopted which substantially altered the method of electing a President. In the 1800 presidential election the Republican (anti-Federalist) electors inadvertently caused a tie in the electoral college by casting equal numbers of votes for both Thomas Jefferson, whom they wished to elect President, and Aaron Burr, whom they wished to elect Vice President. The election had been thrown in the House and 36 ballots were cast before Jefferson was finally elected. The 12th amendment, ratified in 1804, sought to prevent a recurrence by providing that the electors should vote separately for President and Vice President. EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM The authors of the Constitution had intended that each State would choose its most distinguished citizens as electors and that they would deliberate and vote as individuals in choosing the President. But as strong political parties began to emerge the electors were chosen merely as representatives of the parties. From 1800, independent voting by electors almost disappeared. As democratic sentiment mounted early in the 19th century, the practice quickly developed in the several States of choosing electors by popular vote. Until 1800, most State legislatures chose the electors themselves, but by 1804 the majority of the State legislatures had provided for direct popular election of the electors. At first, most "popular election" States provided that the electors should be elected from districts similar to congressional districts. The electoral votes from a State were split if the various districts differed in their political sentiments. The district plan of choosing electors was supported by the leading statesmen of both parties, including Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, and Daniel Webster. The district plan tended, however, to dilute the power of State political bosses and the dominant majorities in State legislatures, who were unable to "deliver" their States for one candidate or another. Thus the unit rule system evolved, |