the recent election has again stimulated interest in the presidential electoral process. This time I hope the Congress will act-and act so as to strengthen, not weaken, this key element in our political structure.

In the earlier debates, the main controversy revolved about the issue of a proportional allocation of votes within a State versus the present tally on a State-by-State basis. Logically, one might expect the chief issue would be direct popular vote versus the State-by-State count. But there is good reason, I believe, why even now, shortly after an election won by a whisker, there is relatively little demand for direct popular election of the President. That is our enduring belief-based on practical rather than logical grounds-in the balancing of people and interests which a count by States provides. It is, in short, our basic adherence to the Federal principle which, whatever its theoretical failings, has worked so well for this Nation.

There are shortcomings in our electoral system which can and should be remedied. But it makes no sense to throw out the baby with the bath water. We would do more harm than good should we, in the effort to improve the electoral process, scrap the Federal principle.

In Senate Joint Resolution 114, I have put forward those suggestions for changes which I believe are desirable to protect the right of the people to elect, in the context of our unique Federal system.

First of all, Senate Joint Resolution 114 would assure all voters of a direct vote for President and Vice President. Doing away with the electoral college as such, it would require that the names of the candidates actually appear on the ballot. Thus it would avoid the anomalous situation which has prevailed in some States where voters have had a choice only among electors whose preference was not known.

Every voter has the right to know for whom he is casting his ballot. By assuring that he will, my resolution would eliminate the possibility of unpledged or possibly "renegade" electors who could determine the outcome-a possibility that came uncomfortably close to reality when for a time last fall it seemed the choice for the President might lie in the hands of a few unpledged electors. At the same time my resolution would continue to give all of the electoral votes of a State to the candidate who won the majority or plurality of votes within the State. Thus while there would be no electoral college as such, the electoral votes of each State would be cast as a unit.

A number of proposals have been made to apportion the electoral vote of each State according to the percentage of votes for each candidate. They contemplate calculations carried out to the third decimal place. These proposals would mean, I am convinced, a setback to the effort to widen and strengthen the franchise.

Individual votes in the so-called safe States have on the average approximately three times as great a voice in presidential elections as individual votes in larger States. This imbalance is now compensated for in a rough way, by the unit rule. The proportional division of electoral votes would eliminate this compensating factor and the relative importance of the safe States would become even greater.

The late Senator Robert A. Taft made a thorough study of the whole matter and demonstrated conclusively that far from fostering the growth of the twoparty system, proportional division would only "strengthen the grip of the predominant party in one-party States" and encourage restriction, rather than liberalization, of the right to vote.

Further, these proposals would foster the formation of splinter groups, ever hopeful of wielding the margin of victory by garnering even a fraction of an electoral vote. One of the distinguishing features of our political life is the two-party system. The necessity under the present electoral procedure for both major parties to consider the importance of minority groups contributes to the strength of that system and to national unity. The creation of a number of special interest groups into splinter political parties from the major racial and religious groups in the country has been successfully avoided. And by and large the members of these groups have been successfully incorporated into the life of the Nation. The distribution of electoral votes on a proportional basis would lead us in the opposite direction.

The defects of proportional distribution become even more glaring in the district electoral plan. This scheme would retain the electoral system but would provide for electors in the same number and from comparable districts as Members of the House of Representatives. Two additional electors, corres

ponding to the two Senators from each State, would be elected on a statewide basis.

A variation of this proposal was offered in 1955. It would have given each State legislature the opportunity of using this method or proportional division of the vote within a State. As the then Senator Kennedy pointed out, "lumping together of two contradictory, incompatible schemes for counting electoral votes [would enable] the party in control of each State legislature to select every 4 years which device will most benefit their party."

It is difficult, indeed, to look on such schemes as anything but a wide open invitation to gerrymandering and all that that connotes. Practically speaking, such a system would inevitably serve to freeze present inequities and would constitute a real threat to our two-party system.

Secondly, Senate Joint Resolution 114 would change the method of selecting a President and Vice President if neither of the major candidates received at least 35 percent of the whole number of the electoral votes. The choice would, as at present, evolve upon the House of Representatives. There would, however, be this difference. Instead of "one State delegation-one vote," each Member would have a vote. The inequity of the present provision is, I believe, obvious and needs no elucidation.

In 1951, as a member of the House Judiciary Committee, I filed a minority report opposing the division of each State's electoral vote in proportion to the popular vote received by each candidate as proposed in the Lodge-Gossett amendment. Five years later that amendment again came before the Congress and I was glad to join with Senator Kennedy to defeat it and the variations on it then proposed. The grounds for our opposition are as valid today as they were then and with the permission of the committee, I should like to make my earlier report a part of my remarks at this point in the record.

Amending the Constitution is always a serious business. Few of us are wise enough to foresee all the circumstances in which an amendment may have a significant effect. The changes proposed by my resolution are moderate but I put them forward in confidence that they would strengthen our present system without running the risk of great and permanent injury to our society and our form of government contained in more radical proposals.

Senator CASE. And in that connection, Mr. Chairman, if I may, may I also ask that there be included in the record the minority report. which in 1951 I submitted as a member of the House Judiciary Committee then opposing the division of each State's electoral votes in proportion to the popular vote as proposed in what was then called the Lodge-Gossett amendment.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you wish to have that printed in the appendix or at this point in the record?

Senator CASE. Whatever the committee thinks appropriate; just so long as it is referred to in connection with my remarks.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then we will let it follow your remarks.
Senator CASE. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, just to summarize very briefly my proposal, I think that we ought to assure all the voters of a direct vote for President and Vice President, and therefore I think that the electoral college as such ought to be eliminated, and, in place of that, I think we should provide that each State still has the same number of electoral votes computed in the same manner as they are at present.

This is a relatively minor change, and yet I think it is quite important. It will mean that each voter has the right to know for whom he is casting his ballot. The possibilities of unpledged or possibly renegade electors would be eliminated.

This may not be a very great possibility and, yet, I think it is one we ought to guard against. It came pretty close to reality in this last election, or at least it seemed to. It looked as though the choice of President might lie in the hands of a few unpledged electors.

There have been, of course, a number of proposals to apportion the electoral votes of each State in accordance with the percentage of votes for each candidate. The calculation is carried out to the third decimal point. I think this would be a mistake and it would be a setback to the efforts to widen and strengthen the franchise, and, if I may, I would just like to go into that very briefly. It is a familiar argument, I am sure.

Already individual votes of individual citizens in the "safe" States have, on the average, votes which amount to about three times as great a voice in the presidential elections as individual votes in the larger States, and this imbalance is now compensated for in a rough but, I think, effective way by the unit rule.

The porportional division of electoral votes would eliminate this compensating factor and the relative importance of the safe States would become even greater. This was pointed out some years ago by Senator Taft who made a thorough study of it, and he concluded, I think correctly, that the proportional division of electoral votes of each State would only strengthen the grip of the predominant party in the same States and encourage restrictions rather than liberalization of the right to vote, and it would encourage, I think, the formation of splinter groups as I point out at some greater length in my statement.

In the district electoral plan which is proposed by Senator Mundt and others I think the effect of the proportional distribution becomes even more glaring. This scheme would retain the electoral system but would provide for electors in the same number and from comparable districts as Members of the House of Representatives with two additional electors corresponding to the two Senators from each State elected on a statewide basis.

A variation of this proposal was offered in 1955, and that proposal would have given each State legislature the chance or opportunity to choose either its district method or proportional distribution of the votes within each State. The then Senator Kennedy pointed out, and I agree with him and agreed with him then, that lumping together of two contradictory, incompatible schemes for counting electoral votes would enable the party in control of each State legislature to select every 4 years, which device would most benefit their party.

It is difficult, I think, to look on such schemes as anything but a wide-open scheme for gerrymandering and all that it connotes.

I recognize in the language most recently suggested by Senator Mundt and his cosponsors that there are words to attempt to take care of this. I think it would be largely unenforceable, and I don't think that it would be effective, frankly, for that purpose. I think it would freeze present inequities, and would constitute a real threat to our two-party system.

My provision, as I said, would provide for the votes of the States to be cast in a bloc, in each case for the candidate receiving the greatest number of popular votes in that State.

I would make this further change, that if neither of the major candidates received at least 35 percent of the whole number of electoral votes, it would be thrown into the House of Representatives as

it is now, with this difference, that, instead of one State, one vote, each Member would have a vote.

I think that the inequity of the present system needs no developing; it is so clear.

Senator KEFAUVER. Each Member of the House or each Member of the Congress?

Senator CASE. Each Member of the House, I think, Mr. Chairman. At least this seems to me to be a bit sounder and more representative of the country as a whole. And if you include the extra two votes of the Senators, it gives an added weighting, I think, to the smaller States which is not necessary for the election of a President of the whole United States, and is not desirable.

I filed a minority report that I mentioned earlier in regard to the Lodge-Gosset amendment in 1951, and I am grateful to the chairman for allowing me to include that report following my remarks in the record.

Five years ago that again came before the Congress, and I joined with the then Senator Kennedy in the defeat of it and the variations of it which were then proposed. The grounds for our opposition are as valid today as they were then.

Amending the Constitution is always a serious business, and very few of us are wise enough to see all the circumstances in which the amendment might have a significant effect. The changes that I propose are moderate, but I put them forward in confidence that they would strengthen the present system and would not run the risk of great permanent injury to our society and our form of government. This risk, I think, is involved possibly in the more radical proposals which the subcommittee is also considering.

Then there is this further matter, Mr. Chairman: I do think we ought to do something about this. I think it is terribly important we should. And I think that, in order to accomplish the really important objectives, we ought to make our proposals to the Congress, those which have a good chance of acceptance, and I think in my discussions with Members of the Congress over the years, with people concerned about this problem in the field of political science, and with just plain people, the changes I have proposed would meet with general acceptance, and that we could accomplish their incorporation in the Constitution quite readily.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Case, as I understand the summary, you would abolish the electoral college but have each State entitled to the same number of electoral votes as it is now entitled to.

Senator CASE. That is right; computed in the same way.

Senator KEFAUVER. Computed in the same way. Then, you have a 35 percent requirement.

Senator CASE. For election of President, 35 percent of the electoral votes would have to be received. That is right. There are certain. other refinements, of course.

If the number of popular votes in the State happen to be the same, it would be divided equally between the two candidates.

Senator KEFAUVER. If no one has 35 percent, then it would be thrown into the House of Representatives, and then every Member of the House would have a vote rather than on the unit basis?

Senator CASE. That is right.

Senator KEFAUVER. We thank you very much, Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I know of your long interest in this, and I know the matter is in good hands in your committee.

(The document submitted by Senator Case of New Jersey follows:)

[H. Rept. 1199, 82d Cong., 1st sess.]

MINORITY VIEWS

The pending resolution (H.J. Res. 19) and its identical counterpart in the Senate (S.J. Res. 52), commonly known as the Lodge-Gossett resolution, proposes several changes in the provisions of the Constitution relating to the election of the President and Vice President of the United States.

With full recognition of the sincerity of its sponsors, it is submitted that the adoption of the resolution in its present form would be a most grievous error. The resolution would make three relatively minor changes and one major change in our present electoral system. Two of the minor changes are desirable, the third is undesirable in its present form. The major change would have far-reaching and, quite likely, disastrous effects.

THE RELATIVELY MINOR CHANGES

1. The electoral college and the selection of individuals as electors would be abolished, but the assignment of electoral votes to the States on the present basis would be retained.1 This is wholly desirable.

2. The people would be given, by constitutional right, a direct vote for presidential and vice presidential candidates. This also is wholly desirable.

3. The President and Vice President would be chosen by a simple plurality of electoral votes in place of the present majority requirement, and the present provision for election by the House of Representatives in the absence of an electoral majority would be eliminated.

This change has the desirable objective of avoiding the danger of an election being thrown into the House of Representatives under the present unit-vote rule by which each State has but one vote. But it presents another danger, though one somewhat more remote. If there should be a large field of candidates, persons might be elected President and Vice President who received a very small percentage, though a plurality, of the total electoral votes and only a minor fraction of the total popular votes.

This danger could be obviated by providing that if no candidate for President or Vice President should receive a substantial percentage, say 35 percent, of the total electoral votes the election would go into the House of Representatives, but with one vote for each Member of the House, rather than one vote for each State. An amendment embodying this suggestion will be offered.

THE MAJOR CHANGE

Under the Lodge-Gossett resolution the electoral votes of each State, which now, by State law or custom, are generally given in a block to the candidates receiving the greatest number of popular votes in that State, would be divided among all the candidates-in proportion to their popular votes within the State.

The major arguments urged in support of this change are

1. That it would increase participation by the people generally in presidential elections, particularly in the "solid" States, and would encourage the effective extension to such States of the two-party system.

2. That it would eliminate the allegedly disproportionate power of minority groups in the so-called pivotal States.

3. That it would reduce the chances for the election as President and Vice President of candidates receiving a smaller number of popular votes than their opponents.

1 Each State has a number of electoral votes equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the State is entitled in the Congress.