(2) the United States negotiators in Geneva should take concrete steps to initiate proposals regarding the composition of the verification regime for such an agreement that will meet the legitimate concerns of other parties while addressing the security concerns of the United States.

SEC. 1014. UNITED STATES PROGRAM FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS UNDER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

(a) FINDINGS CONCERNING ON-SITE INSPECTION PERSONNEL.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States is currently engaged in multilateral and bilateral negotiations seeking to achieve treaties or agreements to reduce or eliminate various types of military weapons and to make certain reductions in military personnel levels. These negotiations include negotiations for (A) reductions in strategic forces, conventional armaments, and military personnel levels, (B) regimes for monitoring nuclear testing, and (C) the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

(2) Requirements for monitoring these possible treaties or agreements will be extensive and will place severe stress on the monitoring capabilities of United States national technical

means.

(3) In the case of the INF Treaty the United States and the Soviet Union negotiated, and are currently using, on-site inspection procedures to complement and support monitoring by national technical means. Similar on-site inspection procedures are being negotiated for inclusion in possible future treaties and agreements referred to in paragraph (1).

(4) During initial implementation of the provisions of the INF Treaty, the United States was not fully prepared for the personnel requirements for the conduct of on-site inspections. The Director of Central Intelligence has stated that on-site inspection requirements for any strategic arms reduction treaty or agreement will be far more extensive than those for the INF Treaty. The number of locations within the Soviet Union that would possibly be subject to on-site inspections under a START agreement have been estimated to be approximately 2,500 (compared to 120 for the INF Treaty).

(5) On-site inspection procedures are likely to be an integral part of any future arms control treaty or agreement.

(6) Personnel requirements will be extensive for such on-site inspection procedures, both in terms of numbers of personnel and technical and linguistic skills. Since verification requirements for the INF Treaty are already placing severe stress on current personnel resources, the requirements for verification under START and other possible future treaties and agreements may quickly exceed the current number of verification personnel having necessary technical and language skills.

(7) There is a clear need for a database of the names of individuals who are members of the Armed Forces or civilian employees of the United States Government, or of other citizens and nationals of the United States, who are qualified (by reason of technical or language skills) to participate in on-site inspections under an arms control treaty or agreement.

(8) The organization best suited to establish such a database is the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) of the Department of Defense, which was created by the President to implement (for the United States) the on-site inspection provisions of the INF Treaty.

(b) STATUS OF THE OSIA. (1) Congress finds that

(A) the Director of the OSIA (currently a brigadier general of the Army) is appointed by the Secretary of Defense with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and the approval of the President;

(B) the Secretary of Defense provides to the Director appropriate policy guidance formulated by the interagency arms control mechanism established by the President;

(C) most of the personnel of the OSIA are members of the Armed Forces (who are trained and paid by the military departments within the Department of Defense) and include linguists, weapons specialists, and foreign area specialists;

(D) the Department of Defense provides the OSIA with substantially all of its administrative and logistic support (including military air transportation for inspections in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe); and

(E) the facilities in Europe and the United States at which OSIA personnel escort personnel of the Soviet Union conducting inspections under the on-site inspection terms of the INF Treaty are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense (or under the jurisdiction of entities that are contractors with the Department of Defense).

(2) In light of the findings in paragraph (1) and the report submitted pursuant to section 909 of Public Law 100-456 entitled "Report to the Congress on U.S. Monitoring and Verification Activities Related to the INF Treaty" (submitted on July 27, 1989), Congress hereby determines that by locating the On-Site Inspection Agency within the Department of Defense for the purposes of administrative and logistic support and operational guidance, and integrating on-site inspection responsibilities under the INF Treaty with existing organizational activities of that Department, the President has been able to ensure that sensitive national security assets are protected and that obligations of the United States under that treaty are fulfilled in an efficient and cost-effective

manner.

(c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSONNEL DatabaSE.—(1) In light of the findings in subsection (a), the Director of the On-Site Inspection Agency shall establish a database consisting of the names of individuals who could be assigned or detailed (in the case of Government personnel) or employed (in the case of non-Government personnel) to participate in the conduct of on-site inspections under any future arms control treaty or agreement that includes provisions for such inspections.

(2) The database should be composed of the names of individuals with skills (including linguistic and technical skills) necessary for the conduct of on-site inspections.

(d) INF TREATY DEFINED.-For purposes of this section, the term "INF Treaty" means the Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their

Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed in Washington, DC, on December 8, 1987.

d. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989

Partial text of Public Law 100-456 [H.R. 4481], 102 Stat. 1918, approved September 29, 1988

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1989 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE IX-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

SEC. 901. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Approximately two years have passed since the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adjourned in Stockholm following the adoption of measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe.

(2) To date, there have been seven formal observations and challenge inspections which have been conducted in accordance with the Stockholm agreements.

(3) The military leaders of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have concluded that the Stockholm observations and inspections have positively contributed to an improved understanding of Warsaw Pact forces and capabilities.

(4) The Conventional Stability Talks (CST), which may begin before the end of 1988, will likely require careful and potentially prolonged negotiation.

(5) New negotiations will also begin under the auspices of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a follow-on to the Stockholm conference.

(6) The confidence-building measures established at Stockholm could, if expanded, contribute significantly to the success of the CDE follow-on conference and also to the establishment of a procedural framework for verifying a future CST agreement.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the President should give high priority to developing, in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies of the United States, stabilizing and verifiable proposals for expanding the regime of confidence-building measures in conjunction with the follow-on to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) and the new Conventional Stability Talks (CST).

SEC. 902.1 SENSE OF CONGRESS ON START TALKS

It is the sense of Congress that any agreement negotiated by the President to achieve a reduction and limitation on strategic arms (through the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva or otherwise)

(1) should not prevent the United States from deploying a force structure under the agreement which emphasizes survivable strategic systems and, in particular, should not in any way compromise the security of the United States ballistic-missile carrying submarine force, and

(2) should not prohibit or limit the deployment of non-nuclear cruise missiles.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING ROLE OF CONGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENSE POLICIES

It is the sense of Congress

(1) that Congress, in exercising its authority under the Constitution "to raise and support Armies" and "provide and maintain Navies" and, in the case of the Senate, to advise and consent to the ratification of treaties, has a role to play in formulating arms control and defense policies of the United States, but

(2) that Congress, in exercising that authority, should not usurp, undermine, or interfere with the authority of the President under the Constitution to negotiate and implement treaties, especially in the case of treaties which affect arms control and defense policies of the United States.

SEC. 904. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE FIVE-YEAR ABM TREATY REVIEW (a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, With Associated Protocol (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "ABM Treaty" or the "Treaty") in Article XIV, Paragraph 2, reads as follows: "Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.".

(2) Such Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, and the third five-year anniversary date specified for the conduct of the review contemplated in the Treaty, therefore, was October 3, 1987.

(3) As a fundamental principle of the canons of legal construction, a specified number of years after a specific and determinable date means the specified anniversary of such date and therefore the third five-year review of the ABM Treaty should have begun on or about October 3, 1987.

(4) The Parties to the Treaty have not met as required by the Treaty because the United States refused to meet on the date specified in the Treaty for such meeting (October 3, 1987) and has refused since such date to propose a date for the meeting.

'Sec. 1003 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-189; 103 Stat. 1541), reaffirmed this sense of the Congress.