66 66 66 66 "[viz. nouns (either substantive, or adjective, or participles) of personal description respecting office, dignity, affinity, or connection, and attributes, properties, or qualities good or ill] if the article o, or any of its cases, precedes the first of the said nouns or participles, and "is not repeated before the second noun or participle, "the latter always relates to the same person that is expressed or described by the first noun or participle." It is admitted on all hands that this is a common usage of the Greek language; the only point is, whether the usage is so universal, that the nouns must, in such circumstances, refer to the same person.-I have already shown the degree of ambiguity which would arise from the neglect of this usage (see p. 141); and I must say that if instead of being common, the usage had been universal, I should have preferred the supposition that the Apostle had made a minute grammatical error, than that he contradicted himself, (compare p. 41). But if it not only can be shown that the usage is not universal, but that there was a propriety in the departure from it in the cases referred to, even the grammatical part of the argument must then be given up as futile. As to the latter point, see p. 142, note; with respect to the former, I shall subjoin a few remarks chiefly derived from Middleton, Blunt, and Winstanley. 1. The cases corresponding in construction to those of the Canon, but not included in it, show that there is nothing in the construction itself which requires the inference stated in the Canon. Ὁ λιθος και χρυσος, and την απειρίαν και απαιδευσίαν, have exactly the construction required by the Canon; but this construction does not identify the objects.* Names of different substances, and of different abstract qualities, are obviously inapplicable to the same substance or quality; and therefore the construction is of no force. 2. The exceptions admitted by Mr. Sharp to his Canon, also show that there is nothing in the construction itself which requires the inference. "There is no Middleton's Doctrine of the Greek Article, p. 83. « exception or instance of the like mode of expression " that I know of," says Mr. Sharp, "which necessarily "requires a construction different from what is here laid "down, except the nouns be proper names, or in the "plural number.” When we read τον Αλεξανδρον και Φιλιππον, we see at once that they must be names of different individuals, and therefore the construction is of no force. In like manner we readily perceive that TOUS τραγῳδους τε και κωμῳδους, do not refer to the same classes of men, and therefore the construction is of no force. It is well observed by Middleton,* (as the reason why the inference of identity is less general in the case of plural than of singular nouns,) that "though one “individual may act, and frequently does act in several "capacities, it is not likely that a multitude of indivi"duals should all of them act in the same several capa"cities, and that, "by the extreme improbability, that they should be represented as so acting, we may be "forbidden to understand the second plural attributive of "the persons designed in the article prefixed to the first, "however the usage in the singular might seem to "countenance the construction." I need not remind the reader how appropriate this remark is to the passage where Paul is supposed to call Jesus Christ the GREAT GOD. See p. 41. 140. 66 3. The exceptions added by Winstanley,† and by Middleton, (in connexion with those allowed by Sharp, fairly considered,) must be fatal to the inference deduced from the construction. (1) National appellations must be excepted; as, Ο Μωαβίτης και Αμανίτης. (2) The inference will not hold good where one of the nouns is plural; as, Συν τη μητρι και δουλοις. (3) Nor if one of them is a proper name; as, Οἱ πιστοι εικονα εχουσι του αρχοντος Θεου πατρος και Ιησου Χριστου. (4) Nor if the attributives" cannot be predicated of the same subject without the most evident and direct contradiction;" as, Του αρτίου και περιττου, του δικαιου και αδικου. Nor even if the signification of the personal words (5) ⚫ Middleton, p. 90. ↑ Vindication, p. 16. Middleton, p. 92. render any further mark of personal distinction unnecessary; as, Του πεπαιδευμενου και απαιδευτού, and Μεταξύ του ποιουντος τε και πασχοντος.—With the 4th class of exceptions I would rank one of the passages which Mr. Sharp regards as proofs of the Godhead of Jesus. I contend that no early convert who had been taught Christianity by Paul, or who had even only read his Epistles, could suppose that he meant the same person by THE GREAT GOD, and, OUR Saviour Jesus CHRIST. Allowing the Apostle to be his own interpreter, I feel no hesitation in saying, that he could not have called Jesus Christ the GREAT God, "without the most evident and direct contradiction." In like manner, I would rank the other passages adduced by Mr. Sharp, (see p. 138,) with the 5th class of exceptions. In the Apostle Paul's phraseology God, and, Christ, (or the Lord Jesus Christ,) were as perfectly distinct appellations, as Philip and Alexander in the phraseology of the Greek orators. 4. In a very large proportion of the instances adduced, in which any inference can be drawn as to the identity of the object of the personal nouns, it is drawn not from the construction, but from the meaning of the words themselves, or from some adjunct which indicates the intention of the writer.* I believe it would not be too much to say that this is so generally the case, as (in connexion with the foregoing remarks) to justify the conclusion that the peculiarity of construction specified in Mr. Sharp's rule, was not in any way appropriate to the inference he has drawn from it. I shall adduce two or three instances in explanation of my meaning; with a full expectation that the critical reader will find the statement of very general application. In ὁ περιεργος και συκοφαντης Δημοσθενης, the last noun shows that the two former refer to the same person: and in τις ὁ τῇ πόλει λεγων και γραφων και πραττων και ἑαυτον δους, the τις shows that the following participles refer to the same person. In the following passage, quoted by Middleton • See some excellent remarks which suggested this, in Gregory Blunt, p. 59. from Philo, it appears evident that the insufficiency of the construction to decide the identity of object was felt by that writer; after saying, Εξέπεμπε προς τον της Ιουδαιας αρχιερέα και βασιλεα, he adds, ὁ γαρ αυτος ην. 5. But whatever objection may be made to the force of the foregoing remarks, it is sufficient to show the futility of Mr. Sharp's inference in reference to the deity of Christ, if we can produce one clear instance in which the construction has been preserved, while the nouns refer to different persons: if the inference be not a necessary one, it can weigh nothing against such evidence as we possess, that the Apostle Paul meant two persons by the appellations the Great God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ. Now several unexceptionable instances have been produced; and they completely destroy the authority of the Canon. The first I shall mention is from Dr. Middleton, p. 91. Herodotus, he says, (Ed. Steph. lib. iv. p. 154,) has these words: Twv παλλακέων τε μιην αποπνιξαντες θάπτουσι, και τον οινοχόον, και μαγειρον, και ἱπποκομον, και διηκονον, και αγγελιηφόρον, και ἵππους, και κ. τ. λ. A second is adduced by Gregory Blunt (p. 57), from Wordsworth's Letters, (p. 51), taken from Chrysostom's homily on 1 Tim. v. 21; "where that Father clearly understands the words ενωπιον του Θεου και κυρίου ἡμων Ιησου, of two different persons, the Father and the Son: and he is followed in that explanation, as usual, by Ecumenius and Theophylact." Mr. Winstanley has brought forward several others, all of which are appropriate, and two of them in every respect unexceptionable: Μεθ ̓ οὗ δοξα τῷ θεω και πατρι και άγιῳ πνευματι, Epist. Eccles. Smyrn. de Martyr. Polycarp.: Φόβου τον Θεον, υίε, και βασιλεα, και μηθ' ἑτερῳ αυτων απείθησης, Parcm. xxiv. 21; which passage from the Septuagint is thus quoted, says Winstanley, in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrnians, Τιμα, φησιν, υἱε, τον θεον και βασιλεα. The real state of the case is, that the construction specified in the Canon, (viz. with the article before the first of two or more nouns connected by xa,) usually, if not universally, marks a close connexion between the things or persons signified, or, their common dependence on what is denoted by the governing word; but it does nothing more: the nature of that connexion or dependence is a mere matter of inference. Even in the very limited class to which Mr. Sharp applies his Canon, it decides nothing respecting the identity of person, but merely their joint and common reference or dependence; as appears from the facts already adduced.* In the "Defence of the Preservative," p. 100-105, Mr. Veysie follows Granville Sharp, in his renderings of Tit. ii. 13, and Eph. v. 5; and he maintains that with the exception of the passages in dispute there is no instance in "which a different rendering was even thought of for words of the same kind, and in the same form." In fact the Canon is so limited by its numberless exceptions, that it is capable of application to very few others: and the error of the Canon consists in this, that it assumes itself to be the general principle, when it only respects one small class of words connected by a construction common to several classes; while the construction is founded on a more general principle comprehending all the classes, and explaining the phenomena in the class referred to, without any departure from the strictest rules of interpretation. Indeed Mr. Veysie himself perceived that general principle, though not the application of it. In his Dissertation on the Greek Prepostive Article, (Oxford 1810,) he says, "it is to be observed that proper names, (τον Αλεξανδρον και Φιλιππον,) and the common names "of substances, can then only be combined when there "is some common principle of union, on account of "which the things signified by these names may be "brought together, and as it were identified. Thus "Alexander and Philip, though two distinct persons, yet 66 66 considered as the enemy of the Athenian state, were "but as one." When before (p. 32) considering the passage from Eschines (contr. Ctes. §. 81), in which I cannot find any reference to the construction in Blomfield's Translation of Matthiæ's Greek Grammar, |