It is believed in some quarters-I dare say wrongly-that at the present phase of the war Germany would be ready to make peace with the Allies on some terms of limited restitution and reparation (such as withdrawal from the countries of her enemies which she now occupies, a small indemnity to Belgium, and perhaps some satisfaction regarding Alsace and Lorraine to France) if she were to have her overseas colonies restored to her.

Many people are asking themselves, more especially in Russia (as the presence of Germany in Africa and Arabia has little bearing on Russian concerns), whether we of the British Empire should not concede this point of the restoration of the great German Colonial Empire. Personally, I believe that neither Japan nor China, Australia nor New Zealand would for one moment consent to give back to Germany her former leaseholds in Eastern China or her "colonies" of Papua, Micronesia, and Samoa, and I question whether there would be any backing in public opinion in the United States or the British Empire which would constrain by force Japan, China, Australia, and New Zealand to withdraw their opposition. Therefore let us dismiss Germany's so-called colonies in the Far East from the scope of discussion. There remain for consideration the German sphere of influence in the Turkish Empire and the German possessions in Africa. Should the British, French, and Belgians evacuate what was formerly German Africa and reinduct her as a ruling Power into the African continent?

To this I say, if any reader cares about my personal opinion, who have LIVING AGE, VOL. VII, No. 356.

spent so much of my life in AfricaI say "No." First of all, we must

remember that German Ministers still in office have stated-indirectly, it may be, and yet plainly to those who understand that when they are back again in control of Tropical Africa they intend to weld it into a huge slave State in which the millions of black men shall simply be trained as the well-cared-for helots of the white man, drilled to form unconquerable armies, untiring workers, innumerable automata destined to make Germany mistress of the resources of the Dark Continent. We have been reminded of what an excellent basis German East Africa would be for attacks on the British Empire in the Indian Ocean. And the British Empire would indeed be guided by fools, ignorant of geography, ignorant of ethnology and history, if it willingly consented to placing the germs of such power once again in Prussian hands.

To the readers of this paper, however, such an argument may not appeal so strongly as the second one -Is it fair to give back "German" Africa to Germany when the millions of its native inhabitants (for all told and including that nearest approach to a colony, Southwest Africa, there were only some 10,000 German colonists, exclusive of a few thousand soldiers, in the whole of German Africa when war broke out) are vehemently opposed to such a course, have said in no uncertain voice that they never voluntarily or knowingly gave their countries to Germany? Very few, indeed, were the more or less faked treaties on which she based her occupation. Africans have not been well or fairly treated by Germany since she entered into possession, and

they would far sooner see their territories placed and their nationhood grow up under other flags if they must have the white man as master of all. Surely if we are to consult the feelings of the Poles about Poland and the Finns about Finland, of the Alsatians about Alsace, the Southern Slavs about the Balkan States, we are in duty bound to consult the opinions of the natives of Togoland about the future status of Togoland, of the Cameroons as to the disposal of the Cameroons and the adjacent Congo territories, the Africanders of the Cape, the Hottentots, the Damara, and the Ovambo about Southwest Africa, and the ten millions of Bantu and Nilotic negroes as to the future status of German East Africa?

Here some critic-for our wellfounded admiration of Germany dies a slow death in many minds-may interpose: "But how is it that, relying mainly on a native fighting force, Germany has defied our efforts to conquer German East Africa for nearly three years? If German rule was so intolerable as you make out, how is it that though there only remain about 1,500 white Germans in German East Africa they are still the officers and non-commissioned officers of a native army which perhaps numbers 10,000 or 12,000?" Because there are bad and rapacious yellow and black men just as there are enslaving white men. A certain type of negro greatly admires efficiency, and especially efficiency in

Into

tirely bound up with the slave trade and with the establishment of slavery for the negro as a great ruling principle in East Africa. They were organizing a huge slave State. the fray that great-minded German Von Wissmann flung himself with all the enthusiasm of a Livingstone combined with the genius of a great military commander. He had previously seen enough of Livingstone's Africa to be as horrified at the slave trade and slave raids as ever Livingstone had been, and he conceived it to be the great purpose of Germany to finish Livingstone's work. Therefore he smote the Arab's hip and thigh, he marched incredible distances in an incredibly short space of time. We were comrades side by side fighting this evil simultaneously. So completely did he enlist the German Government on his side that when it was my turn to attack the Arabs I used German steamers and German guns, and even at one time a small German contingent of British Sudanese under German officers. All of this help was lent me by the German Government, so that the common enemy might be quickly and thoroughly crushed.

Von Wissmann was succeeded by several German governors inclining to a like purpose of complete freedom for the negro. But at the opening of the twentieth century Germany, like France, and to a certain extent like colonial Britain, became infected with the Leopoldian virus. German rulers in East Africa appreciated the better side of the Arab, for the Arab with all his faults is a white man. They realized that he had done a vast deal to educate savage and intractable negroes, to improve agriculture, and what not else. He became useful to them in that climate as a middleman, as an overseer, as a director of labor, and gradually they

slid into a position diametrically opposed to that of Von Wissmann. The negro was to be educated to be a well-trained serf and nothing more.

But in the course of pursuing this new policy they won over the Arabs of East Central Africa as their friends, and not only the Arabs but several tribes or congeries of Mohammedanized negroes who had previously been the allies of the Arabs in their slave raids. And it is this force mainly which still fights under the German flag, still hopes to see a German East Africa restored to the rule of the Teuton and the Arab conjoined.

In

Of course there are inconsistencies and deviations from this policy. some directions the Germans have feared the Arabs or have thought that Zanzibar and Indian influence made them too pro-British. They have also been scared at times by the spread of Mohammedanism as likely eventually to wrest all Central Africa from any European domination at all. Still, I have given the true explanation of why Germany still holds out in the east-central part of German East Africa. Shall we give in and allow her to resume possession everywhere where she has been before? Again I say "No," no matter how long America and Western Europe have to fight to

The Manchester Guardian.

secure peace on other terms. And I say this "No" with the greater vehemence in that I am convinced from the correspondence that has passed between educated spokesmen of the native races and myself that I am voicing the feelings, the deepseated feelings, of something like fifteen millions of Africans who have had every reason to loathe German rule.

But in abstracting all Africa from coming again under the German flag I would not go to the opposite extreme, after peace is made, of shutting out German commerce from what had hitherto been German Africa (or, for the matter of that, German Asia or Oceania). I think some arrangement should be made by which in what were her former colonial possessions Germany should be allowed to trade on the same footing as all other nations.

Do I agree with the internationalization of Central Africa? Emphatically not, for reasons I have no room to give here. I believe in the eventual creation under the protection of European flags of a number of self-dependent and independent negro nationalities ruling themselves on civilized principles. I believe in nationality as I believe in the great value of individuality.

The appointment of the Northcliffe Committee to investigate the question of aerial development for civil and commercial purposes is a great step forward in practical aviation. It is to be composed of representatives of the Board of Trade, Post Office, Colonial Office, Customs, Treasury, and the Overseas Dominions. And, briefly, they are expected to determine:

1. The steps which should be taken with a view to developing and regulating after the war aviation for civil and military purposes from the domestic, Imperial, and international standpoint; and

2. The extent to which it will be possible to utilize to the best advantage the trained personnel and the aircraft which the conclusion of peace may

leave surplus to the requirements of the naval and military air services of the United Kingdom and the Overseas Dominions.

It is no novel idea, the adaptation of aviation to commercial purposes. Previous to the war it had been attempted successfully in Germany with a service of passenger-bearing Zeppelins. Commander Usborne, R.N. -since killed in carrying out an extremely difficult and plucky experiment in the air-had under consideration a scheme for a passenger service over Great Britain. This scheme had a financial backing of over £11,000,000! The commander estimated that the average cost of travel-allowing for all expenses-would be 11⁄2d., and when further developed would be reduced to 34d. per mile.

But airfare the word, we believe, is original of the future will depend on many widely conflicting factors. There is the geographical position of these islands to be considered. Westward lies the Atlantic Ocean; that will require many years of experimenting to span, at least in peace and comfort. On the Northeast coasts the position is similar. There is a wide stretch of sea water to be traversed before touching the nearest point of land. This would indicate that when the first commercial system is established it will develop in a south and southeasterly direction. On the mainland of the Continent the craft will turn to left or right at will.

Climatic conditions will play no unimportant part. Of these elements wind affects flying most. It is a matter of the speed of the craft over the surface of the earth. The speedometer may register, let us say, eighty miles an hour maximum, but is influenced solely by the speed of the engine. Really, the speed of that machine might be ten miles over the ground-that is, it might be flying

ten miles in a backward direction, because the head wind happened to be of a velocity of ninety miles, or ten more than the speed of the craft.

Fogs are dangerous. In a fog an airman loses all sense of direction and proportion. Earth, sky, and all landmarks are obliterated. Rain is blinding to the eyes and affects the "lift" of the machine. Snow covers the surface of the earth with a treacherous regularity and renders the landing of an aeroplane dangerous. The dangers of night flying are too numerous to be tabulated in this short article, while inclement weather renders flying impossible.

Which will be the most useful of the three types of craft, aeroplane, seaplane, or airship, it is a difficult matter to decide. Thus far one is inclined to say the airship. The latter craft possesses the greatest lifting power, and "lift" is the most important factor in flying. The lift of an aeroplane is mechanically created; that of an airship both mechanical and natural, and therefore double in strength.

The greater the lifting power, the more powerful may be the engine, the greater the supply of petrol aboard, and the greater the radius of activity. However, the aeroplane is more airworthy, less cumbersome, less expensive, and more easily housed.

Referring to the construction of the craft, Major Baird, in the course of his speech, remarked: "There are now 958 firms engaged with work for the Director of Aeronautical Supplies-301 as direct contractors and 657 as sub-contractors, with a possible output of sixteen inachines per month apiece." Taking this to be the average output, the yearly aggregate would be 57,792 machines. Also, taking into consideration the number of craft at present employed for military purposes-which number must be well in the tens of thousands-here

is a very fair nucleus for an after-thewar commercial fleet.

But to develop aircraft solely for either military or commercial purposes would be madness. We must develop for both in proportion.

Apropos of this matter, there is little doubt that warfare of the future will be instantaneous. Within twelve hours of entering the conflict it will be decided one way or the other. In the air there can be no preliminary skirmishing, no long drawn-out battles, no falling back on a second line of defense or a strong natural position. And three phases of aerial combat must be considered, aeroplane versus aeroplane, airship versus aeroplane, and airship versus airship. The last form has yet to be

seen.

As there have been different types of sea vessels for war and commerce in the past, so in the future there will be differing classes of aircraft. For a craft of war every frill is stripped away. She enters the combat like a battleship with her decks cleared. Every inch of space is required for powerful engines and spare petrol to give her the necessary speed and climbing power. The altitude at which she flies must be over twelve thousand feet, and great durative

powers are unnecessary.

On the other hand, the commercial aircraft will need greater powers of duration, a greater "lift," more space aboard, less climbing speed, and an altitude of between five and six thousand feet is only necessary.

It is impossible to construct an aeroplane possessing speed, duration, and The Saturday Review.

climbing power alike. For the first, as the last, a powerful engine is required. This requires weight. Weight reduces "lift," and, necessarily, space aboard. Loss of space requires cutting down the supply of petrol, and this means loss of duration. An altitude of over five thousand feet must be maintained in case of engine failure, to give the pilot time to recover himself and pick out a suitable landing ground.

It is probable that the future fleets of the air will be composed rather of a number of vessels of uniform size than of a few vessels of enormous bulk. However much aircraft will be developed, there is always the matter of "lift" to be contended with, and thus the personnel and war accoutrements abroad will be limited.

With regard to the commercial aspect, one might well conceive in the near future an aerial line from, say, London to Capetown, via Paris, Bordeaux, Gibraltar, Fez, Lagos, Loango, and Johannesburg. Allowing an average speed of 110 miles per hour, with a satisfactory wind, and half an hour for each landing, an aeroplane leaving London at eight o'clock on a Monday morning would make the following timetable: London, 8 A. M. Monday, Paris, 10 A.M.; Bordeaux, 1 P.M.; Gibraltar, 8 P.M.; Fez, 9 P.M.; Lagos, 5.30 P.M. Tuesday, Loango, 2 A.M. Wednesday, Johannesburg, 8 p.m.; and Capetown, 4 A.м. Thursday. Total, London-Capetown, 3 days 20 hours.

At first glance the scheme may appear ludicrous. Likewise did the original idea of the motor-car to our grandfathers and of the aeroplane to our fathers.

We have always tried, when discussing industrial problems, to distinguish between the temporary troubles arising from the abnormal

conditions of war and those more deeply rooted causes of unrest and industrial inefficiency which must be sought for and removed if we are to