this international concern or to subject themselves to international controls. And the governments which submit to such controls are often the ones that are least likely to engage in serious violations of human rights, and vice versa. These are phenomena that should surprise no one.

But international institutions for the protection of human rights are beginning to be established and at times acquire considerable political leverage that even unsympathetic governments do not always find easy to disregard. The reasons are obvious. Governments are subject to many conflicting pressures. In today's world no government is immune to change nor free of the restraints that domestic and international political and economic realities impose. Specific governmental conduct is determined by the interaction of divergent policy considerations and by attempts, both conscious and unconscious, to reconcile conflicting and changing but by no means always clearly understood military, political and economic as well as personal interests and needs. The resultant unpredictability of modern international relations plays havoc with the ability of governments to adhere with any degree of consistency to the policies they set for themselves. It is therefore not uncommon for governments to find themselves compelled to adopt a policy on a specific issue that they would like to oppose but are forced to follow in order to achieve some other or new objective. Since international protection of human rights is rapidly emerging as a political issue of enormous moral force, many governments opposed to the whole idea may for a variety of foreign policy reasons feel compelled to go along with it. The interaction of forces that brought about the adoption of UN procedures for dealing with gross violations of human rights illustrates this point.

The process by which the international community develops international norms and institutions has always been slow and cumbersome. To expect that governments will overnight agree to the establishment of effective international institutions for the protection of human rights is unrealistic. All government fears and opposes restraints on its freedom of action, whether it be internal or external. A typical local example is provided in the by no means successful efforts to establish civilian police review boards in various U.S. cities. All one can hope for and expect is a process which starts with the establishment of basic norms and institutions that are gradually refined and strengthened. The importance of the existence of the European Convention of Human Rights and of the inter-American systems therefore trancends their geographic reach. Their existence legitimates the principle of international human rights controls and makes it easier to promote the establishment of comparable institutions in other geographic regions and other international organizations.

It would be a mistake to assume, however, that even the most sophisticated international controls can put an end to all violations of human rights. Many of the most serious violations of human rights have their roots in political, economic and social problems that cannot be legislated away. They can be resolved, if at all, through national and international efforts that will require

substantial economic resources, a great deal of patience and understanding, as well as wise and imaginative statesmanship. Americans familiar with the problems being encountered in the implementation of the school desegregation decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education should not find it difficult to understand that legislation and judicial decrees are often only the first steps on a long and arduous road towards the peaceful resolution of complex societal problems.

Chapter Four: FOOTNOTES

1. The ILO has developed a complex human rights system involving judicial, quasijudicial and conciliation techniques. Space limitations prevent us from dealing with this subject. The reader may accordingly want to consult the authorities dealing with this subject; they are cited in Chapter III, footnote 25.

2. The Yearbooks are edited by the Directorate of Human Rights of the Council of Europe and published by Martinus Nijhoff, Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands.

3. On the Council of Europe generally, see A.H. Robertson, The Council of Europe (Manchester Univ. Press 2d ed. 1961); A.H. Robertson, European Institutions: Co-Operation, Integration, Unification (London: Stevens & Sons, 3d. ed. 1973).

4.

Two most recent books in English on the European Convention are: F. Castberg, The European Convention on Human Rights, (ed. by T. Opshal & T. Ouchterlony) (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1974); F. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

5.

For these texts, see L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights, p. 125 (1973).

6.

For a report of one such case, which resulted in a judgment in favor of a U.S. serviceman stationed in Germany, see L. Sohn & T. Buergenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, p. 1259 (1973).

7.

The size of the Court is equal to the number of states that are members of the Council of Europe.

8. For a useful survey of the activities of the Convention Institutions, see the periodic reports published by the Council of Europe, entitled Stock-Taking on the European Convention on Human Rights: A Periodic Note on the Concrete Results Achieved under the Convention. Up-to-date versions of this note are available free of charge from the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France. See also A.H. Robertson, Human Rights in the World, pp. 51-79 (1972). Many of the decisions of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights as well as important judgments of national courts dealing with the Convention are reproduced in Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 6, at pp. 999-1265.

9. On this subject generally, M. Ball, "Issues for the Americas: Non-Intervention versus Human Rights and the Preservation of Democratic Institutions,” International Organizations, vol. 15, p. 21, (1961); see A.P. Schreiber, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970).

10. Eleven ratifications are needed to bring the American Convention on Human Rights into force. For a discussion of the reasons why it seems unlikely that the Convention will enter into force in the near future, see T. Buergenthal, "The American Convention on Human Rights: Illusions and Hopes," Buffalo Law Review, vol. 21, p. 121, (1971).

12.

See T. Buergenthal, "The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights," American Journal of International Law, vol. 69, p. 828, at pp. 835-36 (1975).

13.

The Commission's reports on its work in the Dominican Republic are reproduced in Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 6, at p. 1314.

14.

15.

Id. at p. 1339.

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Status of Human Rights in Chile, OAS Official Records, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.34, Doc. 21 (1974); extensive parts of the report are reproduced in International Legal Materials, vol. 14, p. 115 (1975). See also D. Binder, "Chile Accused of Torture by O.A.S. Investigators," New York Times, December 10, 1974, p. 8, col. 3.

16. See remarks on Chile by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Congressional Record, vol. 121, p. S13458 (July 23, 1975); D. Binder, "U.S. Aide Rebukes Chile for Barring U.N. Inquiry," New York Times, July 12, 1975, p. 7, col. 1.

17. See generally, Schreiber, supra note 9, at p. 51.

18.

Statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State William D. Rogers to OAS General Assembly reproduced in Congressional Record, vol. 121, pp. S9399-9400 (June 3, 1975). See also D. Binder, “"U.S. Prods Chile on Human Rights," New York Times, October 13, 1975, p. 9,

col. 1.

19. Article 68 of the UN Charter provides that the Economic and Social Council "shall set up commissions in economic and social fields and for the protection of human rights. . . ." (emphasis added). The functions and practice of the Commission and its subsidiary organs are described in UN Secretariat, United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, p. 137, (1974).

20.

21.

ECOSOC Resolution 9(II) of June 21, 1946.

Article 2(7) of the UN Charter specifies that the UN may not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." However, it neither defines nor enumerates these matters and thus leaves the ultimate decision on this question to the UN.

22. For a very valuable review of the human rights practice of UN organs and an analysis of the nature of the legal obligations that UN Member States have assumed under Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter, see E. Schwelb, "The International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the Charter," American Journal of International Law, vol. 66, p. 337 (1972). See generally J. Carey, UN Protection of Civil and Political Rights (1970).

23.

UN Secretary-General, Present Situation with Regard to Communications Concerning Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/165, pp. 3-8 (1949).

24.

UN General Assembly Res. 1514(XV) of December 14, 1960.

25. These are described and explained in UN Secretariat, United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, pp. 36-46, 201-212 (1974).

26. For the UN resolutions and debates on this subject, see Sohn & Buergenthal, supra note 6, at pp. 772-855.

27.

See UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Res. 1 (XXIV) of August 13, 1971; the text is reprinted in L. Sohn & Buergenthal, Basic Documents on International Protection of Human Rights, p. 114 (1973).

28.

K. Teltsch, "U.N. Unit Said to Report Greeks Violate Human Rights," New York Times, September 21, 1972, p. 18, col. 1.

29.

M. Berlin, "UN Urged to Probe Rights Violations by 6 Nations," New York Post, September 3, 1974, p. 62.

30.

Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Thirty-First Session, 3 February-7 March 1975, UN Doc. E/5635, E/CN.4/1179, pp. 73-74 (1975).

31. See "Selective Silence on Human Rights," London Times, February 27, 1975. See generally, "Review of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,” Hearings before the Subcomm.

on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).

32. For a graphic description of these problems, see the memorandum by Professor Frank C. Newman, the leading expert on these rules, entitled "The New U.N. Procedures for Human Rights Complaints: Reform, Status Quo, or Chamber of Horrors?" reproduced in International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy (Hearings before the Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.), p. 715 (1973).

33. Niall MacDermot, "Eight Complaints

and Signs of Possible Strength in Fragile

Investigation Procedure," London Times, May 21, 1974.

34.

F.C. Newman, "The Greek Case in the U.N.," International Protection of Human Rights, supra note 32, p. 723, at 727.