ceeds of the taxes are not sufficient for the administration, the extras (as we call them) are paid through the fear of this law. What then can prevent the whole government being overturned, when the income of the taxes is not sufficient for the administration, but there is a large deficit, which cannot be made up till towards the close of the year, and the council and the courts are not authorized to send to prison those who make default in the extras, but they put in bail till the ninth presidency? What shall we do during the eight presidencies ? Tell us, Timocrates. Shall we cease to meet and deliberate in case of need? Then shall we still be living under a free government? Shall the courts civil and criminal not sit? And what security will there be for people who suffer wrong? Shall the council not attend to transact their constitutional business? And what remains for us but dissolution of the government? But perhaps we are to do these things without pay. Would it not be monstrous that, through a law which you have been paid to propose, the assembly and the council and the courts should be unpaid? Surely, Timocrates, you ought to have inserted the clause which you did with respect to the farmers of taxes and their sureties, that the state dues should be recovered according to the existing laws, and, if in any other law or decree it is provided that the debts of any persons may be recovered in the same manner as those of the farmers of taxes, that the debts of such persons also should be recovered according to the existing laws. Now however, carefully avoiding the laws of the tax-farmers, because the decree of Euctemon has ordered that we may levy upon judgment-debtors according to those laws, for this reason he did not insert the clause which I refer to. And in such way, by abolishing the existing punishment of defaulters to the treasury, and not substituting another, he destroys everything, the popular assembly, the cavalry, the council, our sacred and our civil revenue: in return for which, if you are wise, men of Athens, you will inflict upon him such penalty as he deserves, and make him an example to others not to propose similar statutes.

Not only does he disable the courts to enforce their penal sentences; he goes further; he gives impunity to public offenders, he ruins our military enterprises, he overturns our financial system, he has by his law come to the rescue of

malefactors, persons who strike their fathers and desert the army; for he abolishes the punishments which by the laws now in force are imposed. The laws enacted by Solon, a legislator nothing like the defendant, declare that, if a man be convicted of theft and sentence of death be not passed, a cumulative penalty of imprisonment shall be imposed on him, and, if any one, having been convicted of ill-treating his parents, enter the market-place, he shall be imprisoned, and if a man has been fined for desertion, and assumes any of the privileges enjoyed by ordinary citizens, he also shall be imprisoned. Timocrates creates an impunity for all such persons; for by the putting in of bail he takes away imprisonment. It appears to me therefore-it may seem somewhat coarse, what I am about to say, yet I am resolved to speak it out he ought for this very reason to be sentenced to death, that he may pass his law for the wicked in Hades, and allow us who live upon earth to enjoy these righteous and holy laws.

Read these statutes.

The laws concerning theft:

The laws concerning ill-treatment of parents:

The laws concerning desertion:

And

"If a man has recovered the article which he has lost, the thief shall be condemned to pay the double value; if not, to pay tenfold, besides the cumulative penalty; and he shall be kept in the stocks five days and as many nights, if the Heliastic tribunal shall have imposed such sentence. any person who likes may propose the additional penalty, when the question of a penal sentence is before the court. And if any one is taken off in custody after conviction for ill-treatment of parents, or for desertion, or for entering where he has no business to enter after notice of exclusion from legal privileges, the Eleven shall put him in prison and shall bring him before the Heliastic tribunal; and any one that pleases, to whom such right belongs, may prosecute; and if the party accused be convicted, the Heliastic tribunal shall determine what penalty, corporal or pecuniary, he shall suffer; and if he be sentenced to a pecuniary penalty, he shall be imprisoned until he has paid."

Solon and Timocrates resemble each other as legislators,

don't they, men of Athens? The one improves both the living and the unborn. The other shows to people who have done evil a way to escape punishment, procures a license for knavery as well for the unborn as for the living, gives indemnity and security to the bad of every age. What punishment then can meet your case? what sentence can be severe enough, when I pass by other matters-you destroy the protectors of old age, who compel children to maintain their parents while they are alive, and secure to them the customary honours after death? How can one help regarding you as the vilest of mankind, when, you abominable fellow, it is shown that you set more value upon thieves and rogues and deserters than upon your country, and on this account propose laws to our prejudice?

I will now reckon up how I have performed what in the beginning of my speech I promised. I said that I would prove him to be in every way amenable to the indictment; first, as legislating in a manner forbidden by the laws; secondly, as having framed enactments repugnant to the existing laws; and thirdly, for framing such as are injurious to the state. Well. You heard the laws, and what they require a man proposing a new law to do; and again, I showed you that the defendant did not comply with any of their requisitions. Further, you heard the statutes, to which the defendant's is shown to be repugnant; and you know that he has passed this before repealing them. That his statute is not a desirable one, you have undoubtedly heard; for I have just concluded that part of the argument. In every way therefore it is plain that he has done wrong, in everything has he been reckless and unscrupulous. Indeed it seems to me that, had there been anything else prohibited by the existing laws, besides what I have mentioned, he would have done that likewise.

That he framed this statute with evil design, that he committed this offence deliberately and not by error of judgment, is evident in many ways, and especially from his law being of the same character from the beginning to the end; for not even against his will did he propose anything good or likely to benefit you. Can it be otherwise than proper then to detest and punish a man, who cared not for the wrongs of the people, but proposed laws in favour of men who had

done the wrong and intend to do it again? I am astonished at his impudence, men of the jury, on this account; that, when he himself held office with Androtion, he never felt this compassion for the many, who were exhausted in paying taxes out of their property, but when Androtion had to pay the money which he had long ago filched from the state, as well the sacred as the public money, then he proposed his law to deprive you both of the public and the sacred fund, the double in the one case, the decuple in the other. And thus has a man behaved himself to the mass of the people, who will presently say that he proposed this law on the people's behalf. It seems to me, there is no punishment too severe for one, who considers that, if an overseer of the market or an overseer of the streets or a district judge1 has been convicted of peculation at his audit—a man in humble circumstances, unacquainted with public business, of little experience, who has served an office to which he was chosen by lot-he ought to pay tenfold; and who proposes no law for the relief of such persons; but if wealthy men, chosen as ambassadors by the popular assembly, have embezzled large sums of money, both public and sacred, and kept them for a long time in their hands, studiously contrives that they shall escape every punishment which either laws or decrees ordain. Timocrates himself will hardly say that he is as good a legislator as Solon. Now Solon, men of the jury, did not contrive that people of this kind should play their tricks with impunity, but that they should either abstain from

1 The 'Ayopavóuoi, Overseers of the Market, were ten in number, one being chosen by lot from each tribe. Five served in the city, five in the Piræus. Their duties were to keep the market-place in order and repair, to attend it during the hours of business, to inspect the goods offered for sale (except corn, which was under the care of the ZITOpúλakes), to see that the regulations in regard to prices, weights and measures, &c. were duly observed, and to prevent cheating and unfair dealing. For any breach of the market laws, they had power to inflict punishment instanter, by fining a citizen, or by stripes in the case of a foreigner or a slave. They carried a whip as a badge of their authority. They received the toll (čevikov Téλos) which foreigners had to pay for the use of the market.

The 'AσTUvóμo, Overseers of the Streets, were also ten in number, and elected in the same manner as the 'Ayopavóμol. Their business was to keep the streets clean and safe, and to prevent disorder and disturbance. As to the District Judges, see Appendix I. to this volume.

doing wrong or suffer condign punishment and he introduced a law, that, if a man stole anything in the daytime of greater value than fifty drachms, he might be taken off to the Eleven, and, if he stole anything by night, it should be lawful to kill or wound him in pursuit or take him off to the Eleven, at the option of the party. And a person convicted of crimes for which arrest was allowed could not give bail and refund his thefts, but was to suffer capital punishment. And if a man filched a cloak or an oil-cruet or the most trifling article from the Lyceum or the Academy or Cynosarges, or any of the utensils from the gymnasia or the ports, above the value of ten drachms, he enacted that such person should be punished with death; and that, if any one were convicted of theft in a private action, he might pay double the assessed value, but it should be lawful for the court, in addition to the pecuniary damages, to inflict on the thief the penalty of imprisonment for five days and as many nights, so that all men might see him in custody. (You heard those laws just now.) For Solon's opinion was, that a person guilty of such turpitude ought not to be let off upon payment simply of what he had stolen; because thieves would be very numerous, if they could keep their plunder when not found out, and being found out had only to refund it; and therefore he thought that a thief should pay double the value of the thing stolen, and, in addition to that penalty, should be imprisoned and live in disgrace for the rest of his life. Such was not the view of Timocrates however. He contrived that people should pay the simple sum where they ought to pay the double, and that there should be no penalty in addition. And he was not content with doing this injustice in respect to the future, but he even discharged persons who had been already sentenced for their misdeeds. I always imagined that a legislator was to make provision for the future, with respect to the conduct of people and the regulation of affairs. and the ordinances of the penal code. This is the way to pass laws applying impartially to all citizens: to frame statutes. about past events, is not to legislate, but to save the criminals. Mark how I prove the truth of my statement. If Euctemon had been convicted upon the indictment for an illegal decree, Timocrates would not have proposed this law, nor would the state have required this law, but they would have been con