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of any improbable, or even very extraordinary events, give a new face to the present political system. It was reserved for the Spanish monarch, to attract this year the general attention. The vast preparations he made for chastizing the states of Barbary, seemed so much beyond their object, that the tribe of politicians, who are generally apt to refine upon the simplest things, and to suspect some mystery in the most obvious, predicted danger to more than one of his neighbours. Indeed these preparations were so mighty, that they might well alarm any of those who supposed themselves liable to be their object; and it is not improbable that some apprehensions were raised, which were only removed when their ultimate destination was ascertained by the event.

The state of Algiers, however, expected and prepared for this attack. Their present Dey is a man of abilility; and has taken certain measures which render it suspected, that he has formed a design of perpetuating that government in his family. He left nothing undone to render the place secure; and procured some Christian engineers to construct new batteries, and strengthen the old works. Though the fortifications are considerable, and covered by an enormous artillery, an enemy has still greater obstacles to encounter in the nature of the climate, and of the adjoining country; the heat of the weather, with the scarcity of water, and the lightness and sandiness of the soil, rendering the subsistence and operations of an ariny extremely difficult. To these obstructions may be added a still greater in the dangerous nature of a most turbulent

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sea, and of an open inhospitalie coast, which for a long extent affords no shelter to the fleet, which must indispensably cover and support an army in such an enterprise, The Algerines are not, however, destitute of a bold and daring militia; but have a still much greater resource, in the courage and numbers of the native Moors, and numerous tribes of Arabs, who overspread their extensive territories; and who, however they may stand affected to the state of Algiers, are always ready, from the mortal avet-` sion they bear the Spaniards, to engage in any opposition or enterprize against them

The former have at all times been peculiarly unfortunate in their attempts upon Africa. It would seem as if Providence intended, upon those occasions, to punish them, for the cruelty and injustice which they practised upon the Moors in Spain. The fatal expedition of Charles the Vth to Algiers, in which he lost the finest army, and ruined the most power ful navy then in Europe, is wel known. Neither have the attempts of other European powers upon that city been attended with much honour or advantage. These circumstances, however, were not sufficient to deter the present king of Spain, from going to an immense expence, and fitting out a prodigious armament by sea and land for the destruction of that piratical city and state.

The siege of Melille, was unsuccessfully continued by the Emperor of Morocco till the middle of March, and then disgracefully abandoned; his troops being so much dispirited by their continual losses, and the bravery and perseverance

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of the garrison, that he did not venture to make use of the scaling ladders, and other materials which he had prepared for a general assault. His attempts upon Penon de Velez were equally fruitless. In a werd, no prince ever entered into a war more wantonly, or conducted it more shamefully. Yet in these circumstances, and under the terrors of a Spanish invasion, he refused all proposals of accommodation with the Dutch; with whom he persisted in carrying on a war, which was as ill-founded, and as ineffectually supported as the former. So wild and unaccountable are the politics of ignorant and despotic princes.

In the mean time, all Spain seemed to be in motion. The ports were all crowded and in action; transports of all nations collected; great bodies of troops arriving every day in the borders of the Mediterranean; and every kind of military machine for defence or destruction, were plentifully stored on board the different fleets at 'Carthagena, Cadiz, and Barcelona. The transports were ballasted with bricks, which evidenced an intention of constructing fortifications and works; and a number of carpenters, smiths, bricklayers, and artificers necessary for such a purpose, were accordingly shipped.

The whole force assembled at length at Carthagena, and is said to have consisted of 7 sail of the line, of 74 guns each; 8 of 40 guns; 32 frigates from 20 to 36 guns; and about 20 smaller armed vessels of different constructions; with 400 transports, and 19,000 seamen and marines, On board this navy was an infantry of 22,000 men, and 4000 cavalry, all composed of the most distinguished

regiments and best troops in Spain, with a prodigious artillery, said to amount in the whole, for the field and for battery, to 400 pieces, and 2000 men belonging to the train. This formidable force was provided with such immense quantities of stores, provisions, and necessaries, as seemed calculated for the establishment and support of a great and numerous colony. Several men of war were also equipped and in readiness in different ports, to sup port this armament in any emer gency. The marine was commanded by Don Pedro Castejon, and the land forces by Count O'Reily, who had for some time stood very high in estimation in the Spanish service. Such a force, in its modern state of barbarism and imbecility, seemed sufficient to overwhelm all Africa.

The fleet being detained near a month by contrary winds, did not arrive in the bay of Algiers till the beginning of July, where the commanders found every appearance of a resolute and vigorous defence. They seem to have been undeter mined for some sime, in, what manner to effect a debarkation; at length, a part of the fleet was employed to divert the attention of the eneiny by a false attack upon sonic forts near the town, while the remainder were drawn off to cover the troops in their landing. The ships that attacked the forts seem to have conducted their business very badly, and suffered accordingly; but more through misconduct, than any design of approaching too closely to the enemy. In the mean time, the first debarkation of the troops were successfully ef fected; about 8000 men being landed by 4 o'clock in the morning, and the remainder following with

great

great expedition. The false attacks had not deceived the Algerines, and the Spaniards found all the neighbouring hills covered with great bodies of Moors, who, though not drawn up in much military order, shewed the greatest eagerness to engage them.

The general's intention was to take possession of a hill which commanded the landing-place, and im mediately to throw up such works as would have rendered it a secure place of arms. By this means a safe communication would have been established with the fleet, their artillery would have kept the enemy at a proper distance, and the preparations for the siege would have been conducted with due leisure, and the arrangements accord ingly properly laid. To insure success to his design, the general had ordered the troops of the first division to form immediately upon the beach, and strictly forbid their advancing upon the enemy until the second debarkation was effected, and the whole army supported by its artillery, drawn up in order of battle. This scheme, however well laid, was overthrown by that inhcrent aversion which subsists between the Spaniards and Moors; an aversion in its effects that seems to equal that natural antipathy, which is supposed to render certain animals incapable of enduring each other's sight, without instantaneous efforts of mutual destruction.

The first division, with a temes rity and contempt of command that disgraced all discipline, and in which the commanders were equally culpable, and much more to be condemned than the soldiers, quitted the security which their station under the guns of the fleet afVOL. XVIII. 1775.

forded, and disdaining to wait for their fellows, rushed on to the attack, and found themselves in a few minutes most desperately engaged with the Moors, who equally eager for the encounter, gave them a reception which they little expected. The consequences of this unfortunate act could not be retrieved. The succeeding troops, as fast as they landed, ran of neces sity to the succour of their friends; who they saw overborne, by the superior numbers and desperate courage of the enemy; and were them selves soon involved in similar cir cumstances, and equally in want of support. The engagement lasted with the greatest fury on both sides for 13 hours, when the Spaniards were at length obliged to retire with great loss under the cover of their ships; and notwithstanding the excessive fatigues they had undergone in the course of the day, found it necessary to take the im mediate advantage of the night for a re-embarkation.

It must seem astonishing, according to the ideas which we generally form of the nature, discipline, and arms of Moorish troops, that almost any superiority in number which we can well suppose, should enable them for so long a time to withstand and repel the assaults of so regular, powerful and well appointed a force; for though the Spaniards, through their rashness and intemperance, gave up some of those advantages which they des rived from military skill, arms, and discipline, they still retained so many others, as, it would seem, might have more than counterbalanced that difference. It is reported, that the national pride was much wounded, and jealousy ex[*K]

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cited, by the appointment of a foreigner to the suprente command, in an expedition of such importance, and from which so much glory was expected; and that they particularly thought, as the contest was purely Spanish, and a point of rivalship with their hereditary enemies, Spaniards alone should bear the palm of victory. The same counts say, that the general met with a violent opposition in the final council of war, and that his opponents there were among the foremost of those, who by their rashness and disobedience counteracted his designs.

Upon a medium of the Spanish accounts, (which are extremely defective) their loss appears to have been from six to 800 slain, and about 2000 wounded. Some foreign accounts state the loss at double that number, which, considering the length of the engagement, the fury of the combatants, and the number of officers of rank who were killed or wounded, does not appear improbable. These accounts recite many other particulars, on the veracity of which we have no authority to decide. They represent, that the Spaniards had landed their provisions, and many of their other stores, the loss of which occasioned the sudden and unexpected return of the fleet and army, without attempting any further service; this measure might however have been justified by the great number of sick and wounded, without recurring to any other cause. They likewise say, that the Spanish marine behaved very badly; that their dread of falling by any accident into the hands of the Moors, had so powerful an operation, as to render them too cautious in approaching the

shore, and that all the essential ser vice in that respect had been petformed by two Maltese men of war, who behaved with their usual bravery. As the character of the Spaniards has ever been clear in the point of valour, this account must. be received with caution and li mitation. However these matters may be, this expedition must be ranked amongst the most disgraceful in its event, as well as the most formidable in its preparations, of any in the present age.

The clamours of the people, in which they were supported by some of the great families, were outrageous against the general. They were desirous of offering him as a sacrifice to the national honour, and to the manes of their deceased friends. This is the usual ebullition of national vanity, which will ever seek some foreign object of resentment, on which, if possible, to heap its own dsgrace. The king, on the contrary, did not seem at all dissatisfied with the conduct of the general. He, however, complied so far with the opinions or prejudices of the people, as to remove him from the military department, and to afford him a very honourable retirement, in the important government of the province of Andalusia.

Other expeditions were threatened, and a continued, and expensive course of preparation was carried on during the year, which, as nothing was undertaken, cannot well be accounted for. The emperor of Morocco was so much alarmed by the late preparations, and dispirited by his ill success, that he solicited for peace with great earnestness; and at length obtained leave to send a minister for that purpose to Ma

drid. The Spanish court was very haughty in its demands, and insisted, besides other conditions, on the payment of four millions of dollars, for the expences of the war, the cession of a considerable territory round each of the Spanish fortresses in Africa; and that he should also cede to Spain the port of Tetuan, and the island of Mogador. This affair was in agitation at the time of the failure of the late expedition; an event, which possibly had some influence in directing the emperor's answer; though it is also probable, that a compliance with the payment of the great sum of money deanded, was much beyond his ability; and the cession of Tetuan and Mogador could only be expected, if a Spanish army was advancing to his capital. However it was, he totally rejected the proposed conditions. The war has been since confined to several severe engagements between the Barbary cruizers and the Spanish ships of war, in which the former always fought with great obstinacy, and were generally great sufferers.

The intrigues of the conclave were at length terminated by the election of a sovereign Feb. 14th. pontiff; who owed his

elevation more to the collusion, artifices, and refinement in finesse of the different parties, than to any weight of his own, or intention of theirs. The zealots are said to have carried the point by a fortunate stroke, and the exact timing of a critical opportunity; and the event is said, in the public papers, but we are not clear upon what authority, to have been so unexpected, that without any particular exception to the object of choice, the

astonishment of the people prevented their shewing the usual marks of joy upon the publication of the election.

John Angelo Braschi, the present popc, and who, upon his elec tion to the pontifical chair, assumed the name of Pius the VIth, was born at Cesena, near Ravenna, in the Romagna, on the 27th of December, 1717. He is of one of the most ancient and illustrious families in that province, and is said to have a fine person, with a great share of sense, vivacity, and knowledge. He was greatly esteemed by Benedict the XIVth, who employed him in transacting many affairs of importance, upon which occasions he was always distinguished by his disin terestedness, zeal, and ability. He was likewise in favour with the late pope, from whom in 1773 he obtained a cardinal's hat, and was soon after appointed treasurer of the apostolic chamber. Though possessed of only a moderate fortune, he is said to have managed it in such a manner, as to have given frequent and undoubted proofs, both of the generosity of his heart, and the magnificence of his dispositjon. In a word, if he really possesses the qualities which are as cribed to him, the electors could not, perhaps, have better disposed of their suffrages.

He easily found means, in the opening of his government, to acquire that popularity which seemed wanting at his accession. Among other measures for this purpose, he considerably lowered the price of butchers meat, and privately reimbursed the butchers the loss which they sustained. Such little stratagems, however trifling they appear, are equally laudable and necessary [*K] 2

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