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as to the protection of inventions (patent law) within the jurisdiction of the Confederation.

There have been many important measures rendered necessary by the revision of 1874, and also the assumption of the greater part of the discretionary powers given the general Government. Among these may be mentioned laws in reference to military service and the tax for exemption, pensions, labor in factories, regulating professions of medicine and dentistry, railroad construction and management, civil capacity and obligations, protection of literary and artistic property, reg ulating fishing and hunting; forestry, dikes, and water-courses in the mountain sections, uniform law in election of Federal Assembly, citizenship and expatriation, method of taking the referendum, banking law, telephone made part of telegraph monopoly, spirit monopoly, general bankrupt and patent law (pending); a very full law concerning the social state (état civil), making civil marriages obligatory, regulating divorce, and withdrawing from the clergy the keeping of the register of births and deaths and conferring it upon the civil authorities of the Confederation, and a carefully considered reorganization of the federal judiciary in harmony with the provisions of the constitution. The leading features of the last measure are: Fixing the number of the federal tribunal at nine; term, six years; the three national languages to be represented; salary, 10,000 francs per annum; kinsmen in direct line indefinitely and in line collateral to the degree of cousin-german not to be members or officers of the tribunal at the same time; a presi dent and vice-president of the tribunal, to be chosen every two years by the Federal Assembly; vacations not to exceed the aggregate of four weeks during the year; mode of impaneling the jury; formation of the assizes; defining more particularly the jurisdiction within the constitution and federal legislation, and fixing 3,000 francs as the minimum amount for jurisdiction, in so far as necessary to carry out the consti tutional demand on limitation; the division of the tribunal for penal cases into three sections, the chamber of accusation, the jury depart ment, and the council of appeal; locating the seat of the tribunal at Lausanne. In this connection it may be said that the constitution does not establish any accurate division between the executive and the judicial departments, the former exercising, under the name of "administrative law," many functions of a judicial character, especially in reference to religious bodies. The Federal Assembly (Congress) is the final arbiter as to disputed jurisdiction between the executive and the federal court. The court is greatly occupied with questions of public law, and some of the ablest Swiss statesmen do not hesitate to doubt the propriety of the court possessing any jurisdiction in matters of private law. The court can not even execute its own judgments and must depend for their execution on the Federal Council and the executive councils of the cantons. The acts of the Federal Assembly must be treated by the court as constitutional. It is thought that the constitution itself almost precludes the possibility of any encroachment upon it by the legislative department. Then when the sovereign, as in Switzerland, can so easily enforce its will, it may trust to its own action for maintaining its rights; when, as in the United States, the same sovereign acts so rarely and with such difficulty, the courts naturally become the guardians of the sovereign will as expressed in the constitution. Following the minute detail method of the constitution, a striking instance may be cited in the federal law as to "civil capacity and obligations." It consists of upwards of nine hundred articles, and deals with every imaginable kind of contracts except those relating to the acquisition

and transfer of the ownership of land, which forms part of the independent legislation of the several cantons. Twenty-five articles, however, relate to the lease of farms. There was much opposition to it at the time of its passage as contravening the article of the constitution prohibiting federal interference in the ownership of soil, but it was successfully contended on the other hand that it merely had to do with the rights of persons. To an impartial observer it must appear as a very doubtful exercise of the power granted.

The constitution is conspicuous for the entire absence of any provisions touching those personal rights and ancient muniments of liberty, embracing what is known as the bill of rights contained in the first ten amendments of our Constitution. They may have been omitted for the same reason that they were omitted from the original Constitution of the United States, as being sufficiently implied and understood in any system of free government. These cardinal rights are said to be expressly provided for in the cantonal constitutions, with the exception of trial by jury, which even for felonies does not universally exist, but instead of the unitary system of judge, they have a tribunal, a judicial body almost tantamount to a jury. Again it is held that all natural and inherent rights are guarantied by the article of the constitution requiring that the organic laws of the cantons must "assure the exercise of rights after republican forms." It is astonishing the repeated references in the Swiss constitution to matters of religion and church; it is evident the framers were determined to be secure from any recurrence of the religious intolerance that marked a period in the early history of the country. Whilst the Constitution of the United States makes only two allusions to religion, one in Article VI:

No religious test shall ever be required as qualification to any office or public trust under the United States;

and the other in the first amendment,

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof

that of Switzerland contains no less than a dozen, viz: Primary instruc tion in the cantons must be exclusively under the civil authority, must be open to attendance by adherents of all religious confessions, without suffering in liberty of conscience or belief-liberty of conscience and faith must be inviolable. No one can be constrained to form a part of a religious association, or to perform a religious act, or to incur penalties of whatever nature they may be for the sake of religious opinion; persons exercising paternal or tutelary authority have the right to dispose of the religious education of children up to the age of sixteen years; the exercise of civil and political rights can not be restrained by prescriptions or conditions of an ecclesiastical or religious nature, whatever they may be; no one can for the sake of religious opinion exempt himself from the performance of a civic duty; no one shall be obliged to pay taxes for the support of the worship of a religious community to which he does not belong; the free exercise of worship is guarantied within the limits compatible with public order and good morals; Confederation may take necessary measures for the maintenance of public order and peace among the members of different religious communities; it may provide against encroachments of ecclesiastical authorities on the rights of citizens and of the state; disputes of public or private right to which the creation of religious communities give rise may be carried by way of appeal before the competent federal authorities; bishoprics can not be set up without the approval of the Confederation; the order

of Jesuits is forbidden, and all action in the church and in the school prohibited to their members-this prohibition may be extended to other religious orders the action of which is dangerous to the state or disturbs the peace between the denominations; it is forbidden to found new convents or religious orders or to re-establish those which have been suppressed; civil state and the keeping of the registers relating thereto is of the jurisdiction of the civil authorities (taking them away from the clergy); the right to dispose of places of sepulture belongs to the civil authorities, and they shall provide that every deceased person be decently interred (aimed at denial of burial by church); no hindrance to marriage can be founded on denominational reasons; no one to be deprived of his natural judge (against church courts, etc.); ecclesiastical jurisdiction is abolished; and every lay citizen having the right to vote is eligible to the National Council. These provisions, as fully stated in the constitution, are almost equal to the complete text of that of the United States, and produce no small part of the subject-matter brought before the Federal Assembly and the federal tribunal.

The Swiss constitution provides no executive power in the sense of that of the President of the United States; there is practically no such functionary; but the executive authority is deputed to a council of seven, as explained in my No. 176, and the authority of the Swiss legislative department (see my No. 169), whilst it nominally exceeds that of Congress, in reality is weaker, for every ordinary law duly passed by the Swiss Federal Assembly may be legally annulled by a popular vote (referendum). While it is true in each case there lies in the background a legislative sovereign capable of controlling the action of the ordinary, the sovereign power is far more easily brought into play in Switzerland than in the United States. There is no qualification for any federal office higher than that for any member of the lower branch of the Assembly; this is simply to be a Swiss citizen twenty years old and having the right to vote. So one twenty years of age may be eligible to the Presidency or seat on the supreme bench. The referendum is one of the most characteristic of Swiss institutions, having existed for many years previous to its incorporation in the constitution of 1874 in several of the cantonal constitutions, and its adoption by the Government was feared by some of the most experienced members of the convention to invite interference with a prudent and independent direction of public affairs on the part of the populace. They now concede that it has proven neither ineffective nor unduly obstructive. The article relating to the referendum is brief; it reads:

Federal laws are submitted to the adoption or regulation of the people when the demand therefor is made by 30,000 active citizens or by eight cantons. The same is the case with federal decrees which are of general scope and which are not urgent in character.

Under further authority given for the forms and delays to be observed in this popular voting or plebiscite to be regulated by federal legislation, the time within which the referendum must be taken has been fixed at ninety days from the date of the publication of the law. The official publication of the law expressly calls attention to its date and the "date of opposition," as it is termed, or when the period for referendum expires.

The vote is "Yes" or "No," and a simple majority of those voting is decisive. Since 1874 among the laws passed by the Federal Assembly and vetoed by the popular vote under the referendum has been a law creating a department (federal) of education; creating a department of justice; an electoral law; a law on currency; a law increasing the

salary of the minister at Washington; and a law permitting a change of venue to the federal court when there is reason to suspect the fairness of a cantonal tribunal. It seems remarkable that under a referendum upon a cantonal law a progressive income tax was negatived with respect to the subsidies the Government has the power to grant to works of public interest. It has never been exercised, only in some very insignificant sums, except in the case of the St. Gothard Railroad, which pierced the Alps with a tunnel of 9 miles in length, and of incalculable value to the whole of Switzerland. Even in the smaller subsidies the Government never gives beyond 50 per cent. of the cost of the work, and only to be paid when the work is completed and approved, the canton obliging itself to keep it in good order and repair. The right to subsidize other institutions for higher instruction besides the Polytechnic, specifically given in another article, has not been exercised, the appropriation for the Polytechnic Institute at Zurich having been made before the adoption of the present constitution.

Citizenship in Switzerland, as defined by the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof, is a very complex and involved affair. Under the Constitution of the United States "all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." It may be said there are no citizens of the United States except the citizens of the States and Territories.

The Swiss constitution reverses the order named in that of the United States, and says:

Every citizen of a canton is a Swiss citizen.

Thus making the local or cantonal citizenship the basis of Swiss citizenship. It further contains a similar provision to that of the United States, insuring that the citizens of each canton shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the several cantons. It is thus expressed:

All cantons are obliged to treat citizens of the other cantons as those of their own in the matter of legislation and in all that concerns judicial methods.

Then follows, however, a qualification of this right in another article, which says:

Every Swiss citizen has the right to establish his residence at any point in Swiss territory in consideration of the production of a certificate of origin or other similar document.

This refers to his communal citizenship, for every Swiss must have a communal citizenship, and this "right of township or origin," obtained by inheritance, gift, or purchase and by marriage to the wife, is a sacred and imprescriptable right, which the constitution places above the power of a canton to take away or impair. It is this principle so deeply imbedded in the Swiss system and idea of citizenship that has stubbornly blocked the way to all the efforts to negotiate a naturalization treaty between the United States and Switzerland. In fact no special right of Swiss citizenship exists. With natives communal citizenship takes the precedence; but with a foreigner seeking citizenship a difficult and tedious process is encountered. He first obtains from the federal council authorization to do so, and this body with a due regard to the serious task undertaken allows two years within which this permission may be used. The applicant then sets out to find communal citizenship; this is a matter of purchase; when acquired he must get cantonal citizenship, otherwise the other two steps taken are of no effect and void. The cantonal citizenship is the capstone and the most difficult

to secure. The permit from the federal council is pro forma as a rule' the communal citizenship purely a matter of bargain with some slight inquiry as to character, but the cantonal citizenship is only granted after a full investigation of the party's antecedents and all the conditions going to make up a desirable citizen. Communal and cantonal citizenship must be in the same canton.

The grant of a cantonal or communal naturalization without the previous approval of the federal council as indicated is also void. The right of Swiss citizenship ceases only with death, or by the voluntary renunciation, by the person who possesses it, of his cantonal and communal right of citizenship and by the release which the competent au thority of the canton gives him; and this firm tie which binds him to his country is not even then loosed until he submits satisfactory proof that he has acquired citizenship in a foreign country and is in full enjoyment of all its civil rights.

It will be seen that entrance and exit to Swiss citizenship is a very formidable undertaking, and the law recognizes the very common dual citizenship resulting from its peculiar provisions, and declares that— Persons who in addition to Swiss citizenship are citizens of a foreign country are not entitled to the privileges and the protection accorded to Swiss citizens during their residence in such foreign state.

The constitution secures to every citizen above twenty years of age the right to vote in federal affairs wherever he may be domiciled at the time of the voting, without regard to the time he has been domiciled, by simply establishing his qualifications as an elector, and in cantonal affairs after a residence of three months, and communal affairs after a residence of six months; the latter does not extend to affairs relating to communal and corporation private rights and property. Nearly all of the cantons have adopted the age fixed for federal electors, and their citizens are politically of age when twenty years old; there are a few exceptions, notably in the canton of Graubünden, where the age is sev

enteen.

Then in some cantons a difference is made between political and civil majority; for instance, in the canton of Zurich the former is 20 and the latter 24. The various cantonal restrictions present a wide field, there being a general concurrence in excluding from suffrage bankrupts, persons committed for felonies or under trial for the same, those legally declared paupers, and, in many cantons, confirmed inebriates.

The constitution, as heretofore stated, presents no well-defined divis ion of the powers of the general government and the cantons, and with the exception of the customs post and telegraph, which are under federal law and executed by federal officers, the federal laws are executed by the cantons and communes, producing many shades of difference in construction and enforcement. Whilst each canton is independent and sovereign, except in so far as it is bound by the limitations of the federal constitution, or by resolutions of the federal assembly in fulfillment of and in conformity with the constitution, there is presented the same great political problem upon which all republican forms of government have been and are still working, how to insure peaceful and healthy concerted action throughout the whole without infringing upon proper local and individual freedom in the parts. Previous to 1798 the cantons of Switzerland were all practically founded upon privilege, many in the condition of a great feudal lord, with an aggregate of many separate seignioral properties, acquired partly by conquest, partly by purchase. The masses of the people were largely excluded from political power, and it was not until the successful movement of 1830 that a recognition of the sover

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