mentioned in a derogatory way by Mr. Lattimore came in and insisted on being heard as witnesses under oath, and thereby raised a possibility of themselves mentioning other witnesses adversely, that the committee decided it had to make some kind of a practical decision?

Mr. SOURWINE. Oh, yes. That was considered by the committee, and a possibility of a chain reaction in such instances, of course, is always present.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, are you in a position to give this committee any testimony as to why the Internal Security Subcommittee allowed televised hearings during one session of Congress and then denied it during the succeeding session of the same committee?

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I don't know that I have any inside information on that subject. It was Senator McCarran's view, stated at the outset, and concurred in by the committee, so far as I know, during his tenure as chairman, that the committee hearings should not be televised or recorded, that there should be no lights and no cameras, and that the picture of a witness should be taken in the committee room only with his permission and should not be taken during the actual hearing.

After the control of the Congress changed and there was a new chairmanship, the policy of the new chairman was otherwise; and I am not aware that his committee took issue with the new chairman's policy.

Mr. MORRIS. In other words, from your own experience, Mr. Sourwine, do you feel that a decision like that, rather than be set down as a perpetual rule, should be made by the successive committees as the Senate changes from one session to the other?

Mr. SOURWINE. Are you asking me solely for my own opinion? Mr. MORRIS. For your own opinion, based on your experience. Mr. SOURWINE. My own opinion is that committee hearings should not be televised or otherwise recorded.

Mr. MORRIS. Otherwise recorded? You mean other than by a stenotype reporter?

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right. I mean I do not believe that committee hearings should be photographed for the movies or should be photographed for television or should be televised live or should be recorded for subsequent transmission by radio or for subsequent playback.

Mr. MORRIS. And are there any elements in your decision that this committee could have to use for its deliberations?

Mr. SOURWINE. My decision is partly emotional and is based partly upon my conception of the objective of a committee as primarily factfinding.

It is a very valuable thing, I think, that committees of the Congress procure information which is then made available through them to the people of the country; but a committee hearing should never be a circus. It should never be a show. It should never be a spectacle.

It is not the fault of modern methods of communication, but it is a fact that application of all of those methods to a committee hearing for instantaneous transmission cannot fail to make it a spectacle. Mr. BERKOVITCH. Mr. Sourwine, you just made the point that fact finding is the primary function of a congressional committee. Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. In that connection, and keeping in mind also that a number of witnesses, including Senator McCarran, made the further

point that a committee hearing is not a trial, would you comment on this-and it has been presented to the committee-and that is where the reputation of an individual, either a witness or a person mentioned by a witness, is brought out into the open and, in effect, is the subject of a trial in the press or before the public, would you recommend that any rule that might be related to the rules that are applied in the courts should be adopted and enforced in such instances-that is, where an individual, either a witness or one about whom a witness has testified, has had his reputation attacked, brought out in the open and, in effect, although not technically, is the subject of a trial?

Now, I have been asking you some long and involved questions, but I think you understand what I mean, and we would appreciate hearing from you with respect to that.

Mr. SOURWINE. I am sorry. I was unable to follow you. Please repeat the question.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. I would be very glad to do that, Mr. Sourwine. The question is that where the reputation of a witness or a person mentioned by a witness is brought into question as a result of a hearing, should there be a rule which would enable that person to bring to the attention of the committee and of the public, facts and evidence that would enable him to defend himself, to rebut the adverse material that has been presented against him?

Now, does that clarify the question?

Mr. SOURWINE. That question I can answer.

There is no need for such a rule. There is nothing now which prevents a person who is mentioned at a hearing, if he desires to do so, from providing a statement to the committee or from offering an affidavit for the committee record or from otherwise giving to the public any statement that he may desire to give.

I would not favor a specific rule on the subject because I do not believe it is possible to draft a rule which will adequately protect those who might desire to make a statement in good faith and at the same time not be susceptible of being used by those such as the Communists, who would desire to use it to delay, if not break up, committee procedure.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Sourwine, do you feel that in the course of a hearing, if the committee taking the testimony of a particular witness foresees or knows from its executive session that there will be an adverse reference to a particular person, the committee should try to have present, in order to make a refutation, such person adversely affected?

Mr. SOURWINE. I think that is a good policy. I think it is a practice usually followed. Certainly it has usually been followed by the Internal Security Subcommittee.

I would not say in every case that it is a practice which should be inflexibly followed.

The reductio ad absurdum on that is the case of Captain Khokhlov, who gave testimony certainly detrimental to former Ambassador Panyushkin. I don't think in advance we should have given Panyushkin notice and tried to get him here to rebut it.

Mr. MORRIS. Panyushkin wasn't in the Soviet Union at that time, was he?

Mr. SOURWINE. He was in the Soviet Union.
Mr. MORRIS. In the Soviet Union?

Mr. SOURWINE. Yes.

Mr. MORRIS. Is there any way, Mr. Sourwine, that a committee, a congressional committee, can limit itself with respect to receiving testimony that is irrelevant?

Mr. SOURWINE. No congressional committee has to receive testimony that is irrelevant.

I think it is the duty of a committee chairman to try to keep all testimony within the bounds of relevancy.

Necessarily there is a wide latitude which must be allowed.

Committee chairmen, by and large, are pretty reasonably expert in recognizing the areas of possible connection and usually quite liberal in granting witnesses the right to go somewhat afield, more so, I think, than judges, and that is as it should be.

A member of a committee can always express his opinion on the subject and the Chair usually will listen.

I don't think there is any real problem involved there, except the problem which would be created if you tried to write a rigid rule. Such a rule would be either too strong or too weak. It would necessarily lean too far one way or it would lean too far the other. Does that begin to answer the question?

Mr. MORRIS. Yes; that does answer the question, Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Sourwine, I have one final question: Could the facts that have been unearthed by the various investigatory committees with which you have been associated have been brought to the attention of Congress by the executive branch of the Government?

Mr. SOURWINE. I think in some instances yes, but in many in

stances no.

Mr. MORRIS. As a practical matter, let's take the case of Alger Hiss. Are you acquainted with the background of the Alger Hiss case, Mr. Sourwine?

Mr. SOURWINE. I have some acquaintance with it; yes, sir.

Mr. MORRIS. I wondered, based on your own experience with congressional committees, if you would discuss the Alger Hiss case with respect to the need for Congress going into such individual cases, such as the Alger Hiss case.

Mr. SOURWINE. Well, I see your point.

Mr. MORRIS. The point there being, Mr. Sourwine, that the Alger Hiss case was an individual case.

Mr. SOURWINE. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. Inasmuch as it related to an individual, presumably it is something that should be handled only by the prosecuting agency of the Government.

Mr. SOURWINE. Your first question was whether the facts could have been brought to attention by the executive branch, and in the Alger Hiss case they could have been brought to the attention of the Congress by the executive branch; but they weren't.

Mr. MORRIS. The fact is they weren't?

Mr. SOURWINE. They weren't, and I don't think they would ever have been brought out if the legislative branch hadn't gone to what were considerable extremes to ferret them out against the opposition of some of those in the executive branch; but there were those in the executive branch who knew the facts or had been told the facts, or enough of them, that they would have been able, yes, to have brought it to attention.

49144-54-pt. 8- 4

I don't think the proper point on which to turn the discussion of this question is whether it could have been. I think a much more likely point is whether it would have been or whether it is probable that it will be, and in that regard, as long as you have a Congress with committees which have the power to inquire and which retain or can secure the power to get information from the executive, you have a much better chance that evidence of activity detrimental to the welfare of the country will be turned up by the executive, and that when such evidence is brought to the attention of those in the executive they will do something about it.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. Mr. Sourwine, from time to time witnesses have been abusive or highly discourteous to the committees, or to members of committee staffs, and that isn't always confined to Communists. Would you comment as to what procedure might be adopted by congressional committees to deal with witnesses of that kind who behaved in that manner?

Mr. SOURWINE. I doubt very much, sir, if you can adequately deal with that situation by rules. The ability to control a hearing; the ability to control a witness may be born. It may come by experience. Some men have it, and some men don't.

Occasionally there is a witness who goes beyond all bounds, regardless of how well he may be handled. The existing authority of a committee and a committee chairman is adequate to deal with the case of such a witness, and I would venture the prediction that the more rules you write about how far a witness may go the more trouble you are going to have with your witnesses because the minute you have a rule you will have witnesses come in who will try to go to the limit of the rule and one jot beyond.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

I want to thank you, Mr. Sourwine, for appearing here today before this committee.

Mr. SOURWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. Mr. Chairman, with your consent, I would like to offer a number of statements that have been requested to be put in our record by, among others, Senator Douglas, the American Federation of Labor, Mr. J. Wesley McWilliams, who is president of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and by the National Lawyers' Guild.

I also request that two resolutions with explanatory letters submitted by Senator Bush subsequent to his testimony be received for the record, and that, in conformity with his wishes, they be inserted following his remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; the material referred to may go into the record and will become a part of the record. (The statements referred to are as follows:)

Hon. WILLIAM E. JENNER,

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,

Chairman, Committee on Rules and Administration,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

July 15, 1954.

DEAR SENATOR JENNER: While it has not been possible for me to appear in person, as I would have preferred, before the Subcommittee on Rules now holding hearings on proposals for rules to govern Senate investigating procedures, I am glad to submit herewith a written statement of my views on this important question.

I would be grateful if you would bring these views to the attention of the members of your subcommittee and make them a part of the record of the hearings. Sincerely,

STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL H. DOUGLAS

PAUL H. DOUGLAS.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration will report with a favorable recommendation a comprehensive resolution of senatorial investigating procedures, along the lines proposed in Senate Resolution 256, or in section 5 of my joint resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 137.

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

We need such procedures to make those investigations themselves more effective, to assure fair play for individuals in the true American tradition, to maintain a proper division of functions between the legislative and executive branches, and to restore the confidence of the people in the responsibility, wisdom, and justice of congressional investigations.

1953 PROPOSALS

I would first like to bring to the committee's attention and make a part of the record the brief address which I made in the Senate on July 16, 1953, on the subject of fair play in congressional investigations, together with a few editorial excerpts commenting on my proposals which revealed the general concern and interest in this matter at that time.

"FAIR PLAY IN CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS

"Speech of Hon. Paul H. Douglas of Illinois in the Senate of the United States Thursday, July 16, 1953

"Mr. DOUGLAS. Mr. President, I rise to discuss the question of proper procedures for congressional investigating committees, which I regard as one of the most important issues before Congress and the country.

"CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS CAN SERVE GOOD PURPOSE

"First, let me say that such committees have played and can play a very constructive part in American public life. Such investigations are required, in the first place, to disclose the need for legislation and the course it should take.

"Secondly, such inquiries are also important in checking on the way in which the laws are being administered and on whether the will of Congress is being followed or flouted. The administrative branch almost never investigates itself. "Virtually every great reform in this country has, in fact, been preceded and largely made possible by prior congressional investigations, and the social and political history of this country could not have been written without them. While the Committee on the Conduct of the War hampered Lincoln and the North in the Civil War, the corresponding Truman committee in World War II was of inestimable value in speeding the conduct of the war and saving billions of dollars. The Pujo investigations into the so-called money trust and the Pecora inquiry into the issue of securities made possible the Securities and Exchange Act. A myriad of other reforms have been effected by such committees, of which in recent years I need mention only the Fulbright committee in this body and the King committee in the House.

"INVESTIGATING COMMITTEES MUST NOT USURP JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

"I am, therefore, not proposing in any sense the abandonment of congressional investigating committees. But in view of their importance and the damage they can do to men's reputations-which are the most precious worldly possessions we have-it is important that we work out rules of fair procedure and adopt them without undue delay.

"These committees are, in fact, fast becoming legislative courts. At present the committees are, in effect, given a wide hunting license and allowed to cruise at large without any restraints as to rules of evidence, procedures, questioning, or the making of public statements, except for such rules as they impose upon themselves. The degree of fairness or lack of fairness which is followed therefore