posite thinking of the people of the United States; now, that doesn't necessarily mean that they should have left a book on the shelf by Author A and taken a book off the shelf by Author B, but it does mean, and you can ascertain this by calling the agency, that, in my opinion, the agency took a great many books off the shelves which in their best judgment, as people who were administering a program for the United States, belonged in the United States Information Service libraries abroad. They took them off the shelves only because they were afraid of the congressional repercussions as manifested by the investigating committee's attitude, and they just used the sword and cut them right off. Now, that is the book-burning episode, and I think if the committee is interested in going into that, they could get clear testimony to that effect from the United States Information Agency. Now, as to the ex post facto reports of the Foreign Service, I would like to see this committee call the high officials of the Foreign Service, now retired-Armour, Grew, Bliss, Phillips, and Shaw. These were the five who wrote the letter to the New York Times, published January 17, 1954. They point out the fact that the members of the Foreign Service were called up and ordered to account for what they said, say before the conquest by the Communists of the mainland of China, when this was their duty-it was their responsibility to do ityet their motives were impugned and it was intimated they were not patriotic members, and that it inhibited the members of the Foreign Service from doing the kind of job which we must have in our Foreign Service if we are going to defend this country against the most mortal Communist threat to its security; and I think there, too, it would be a splendid thing if this committee could call these five men and have them cite by book and by individual case the cases which gave them this view. I think the whole matter of the confirmation of Ambassador Bohlen by the Senate raised very seriously that kind of question. I think the whole controversy about Mr. Davies raises very seriously that same question. Now, these are the types of instances I had in mind when I made that statement. Mr. BERKOVITCH. Congressman, not to hold you too long, but Mr. BERKOVITCH. With respect to the remarks just concluded, I take it your criticism is directed more toward the area of these investigations than at the precise procedure. What you have cited here are instances where you have criticized the object of the investigation and the area of the investigation, rather than the precise procedures employed by the committee. If I am mistaken, I would like to have you clarify that. Mr. JAVITS. I think it is very important to point out that the procedures are wedded to the ambit of the investigation and the chairman of the investigation. Some of the points I made go to the jointcommittee idea, because I believe that will have the greatest prestige and weight behind it, and the greatest amount of concern for the total national interest and responsibility, rather than a particular search for a particular sensational case which will make the press of the country. As to the rules of procedure, I think that will definitely put the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively behind the fact they want these investigations conducted with dignity and with respect for the individual, as well as respect for the interests of the country, and will in that way inhibit reckless forays, which I think have resulted in real mischief to the national interest. Senator CARLSON. Congressman, we appreciate very much your statement here this morning. Mr. JAVITS. Thank you. Senator CARLSON. It has been very helpful. Mr. JAVITS. Thank you. Senator CARLSON. The next witness will be Mr. Emanuel Celler, a Representative from the State of New York. Representative Celler, do you object to being sworn? Mr. CELLER. Not at all. Senator CARLSON. Do you promise and swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. CELLER. I do. Senator CARLSON. Mr. Celler, you may proceed in any way you care to, and I wish to state we are very happy to have you, and I, personally, am because it was my privilege to serve 12 years with you over on the House side, and I am familiar with not only how hard you work, but how effectively you work. TESTIMONY OF HON. EMANUEL CELLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK Mr. CELLER. It is nice to have you say that, and I assure you those sentiments are reciprocated with reference not only to yourself, but my distinguished, not old colleague, young colleague, Carl Hayden. Gentlemen, the adoption by the Congress of a code of fair committee procedure has become a necessity. At stake is the investigative power of the Congress itself. During most of the discussions around the subject, the rights of witnesses have received the greatest emphasis. What has been lost sight of is the damage that is being done to this vital function of Congress itself by the absence of a uniform code of investigative procedure. As the respect for the findings of congressional investigating committes diminishes, to that degree the investigating function of Congress is vitiated. This, in turn, destroys the possibility of proper and effective legislation. It breeds indifference to congressional exposure of executive wrongdoing. The formulation of a code applicable to all committees is no more than the articulation of good commonsense. As statutory law defines moral behavior to which decent instincts subscribed long before it was written into the law, so a code sets forth standards known to and adopted by most of us long before the cry arose that the Congress itself place formal curbs about its investigating committees. There have been both justified and unjustified accusations of the abuse by committees of their investigating powers. Because the procedures have been loose and individualized, it has become most difficult for the people to understand the merits or otherwise of these accusations. It is in this that we find our greatest necessity for the adoption of standards. The investigative instrument is a delicate and complex one. It involves at times balance of powers among the three branches of Government. It enters at times, the as yet undefined areas of constitutional law. It invades the rights of witnesses unprotected by such boundaries as our courts have accorded every witness before them. Since the investigating committee, therefore, treads so sensitive a path, and since, for good reasons or bad, it is subjected to never-ceasing criticism, the investigating committee for both the protection of its own vital operations and the rights of people before it, should in all good sense welcome the adoption of a uniform code. It is not enough to say that this committee is good or bad, for the very vagueness of the accusations serve only to impede. A code of fair committee procedure would make the criticism detailed, concrete, and would hold the accuser and the accused accountable in unmistakable terms. It is time we got out of this morass of generalized, packaged criticism, which is choking the sense out of public appraisal of the investigating function of the Congress. We find now that investigating committees of Congress are either on the offensive or defensive. It is not my contention that the adoption of a code would put at rest all questions concerning the conduct of an investigation. It is, however, the first big step toward the clearing of the atmosphere. It cannot, of course, eliminate abuses; it can, however, curb them. For those who have so abused the powers accorded them by their position as committee chairmen or members, a code cannot give them the morality they lack; it can only give them the road blocks. Because the so-called Ten Commandments have been violated repeatedly is no reason to do away with the Ten Commandments. A code cannot inherently make a bad man a good man, nor can a code of fair procedure for committees convert a bad chairman to a good chairman, but the evil can be lessened, if not curbed. An incorrigible chairman might continue on his abusive way whether we have codes or not. We might have situations like the so-called Fisher case, the Moss case, the General Zwicker case. As the previous witness stated, the remedy must ultimately lie with the Members of the House and the Members of the Senate, themselves. They are the judges of the fitness of the qualifications of any of their Members. A code, however, that is cumbersome and unworkable would be far worse than none. A code of fair committee procedure should include, I think, the following: 1. It should safeguard against a one-man committee whenever there is a compelling of testimony by use of the subpena. 2. The issuance of subpenas should be made only with the consent of the majority of the committee. 3. The right of witnesses to effective counsel should be guaranteed, including the right of counsel to address the committee. 4. Majority consent to the revealing of testimony taken in executive session. Portions of the testimony should not be given out of context. I have presided over numerous committees and I have never yet issued a subpena without the consent of my full committee. I admit it is very difficult to keep secret that which occurs in executive session. I am reminded of the story about the old lady who says, "You know, I can keep a secret, but the people I tell it to can't." We always have that difficulty in executive sessions, whether we have it in connection with investigating committees or the standing committees. You will always have that difficulty, but a code might modify and minimize the abuse that we know is prevalent down here of divulging what happens in committee. 5. No witness shall be forced to testify before television or broadcasting apparatus. I say "forced to testify." 6. A witness should be advised within a reasonable time of the nature of the evidence he will be called upon to give. 7. A witness who has been adversely affected by testimony given before a congressional investigating committeee should be given the opportunity to be heard. 8. No hearing shall be held away from Washington without majority consent of the committee. Now, I want to say, in that connection, a committee now functioning held three committee hearings, particularly in districts where the oneman chairman of the subcommittee of that committee was conducting his own campaign for reelection. If there had been an attempt to get the views of the full membership, I think those hearings would not have been held in those particular districts, which were for the personal aggrandizement of particular members. I submit, however, that the enactment of a code of fair committee procedure in and of itself would not suffice in the one area which has given rise to the greatest amount of criticism, and that is in the area of the investigations of subversive activities in the United States. In May 1953 I introduced a joint resolution to establish a joint committee on subversive activities. I am pleased to see that before you is a similar bill, Senate Joint Resolution 157, introduced by Senator Hendrickson. I emphasize now, a year later, the reasons for the introduction of this legislation. We are dealing, when we investigate subversive activities, with material that carries within itself the impetus toward sensationalism. It is headline stuff, whether the members will it so or not. It is within this area that we need most a sense of proportion as well as a centralized, concentrated, and rational approach. In the area of the investigation of subversive activities, we see not only duplications of staff, moneys appropriated for the same purpose to a variety of committees, a rivalry among committees working in this area, but also the use and reuse of identical witnesses, the appearance and reappearance of the same names. It is an unhealthy waste of money, motion, and energy, a retracing of steps gone over so many times and a dissipation of the results of such mighty laboring. We have seen a process of one committee nibbling at one facet and another nibbling at another facet, and often committees nibbling at the same tidbit together. This is to minimize the importance of the work to be done in this area, and this is to deprive it of vigor and thoughtfulness. A joint committee on subversive activities can best see the picture and see it whole. It is, gentlemen, the shortest distance between two points the direct line from inquiry to effective action. The present existence of multiple committees with presumably the same objective finds us running around in circles. If this is a serious question, then most certainly it merits the most serious of treatments. We have established, as was indicated by Congressman Javits, my distinguished colleague from New York, a joint committee with reference to atomic energy matters. We have done so with respect to economic policy. Since this is the area, subversive activities, which has proved most controversial in domestic quarters, we must approach it sensibly and responsibly, directly, and rationally. Factually, it is in this area we find that the investigative power of Congress has been brought into question and subjected Congress to ridicule. One of my constituents has told me that in watching the activities of the various committees investigating subversive activities, he has felt like a spectator at a ping-pong game. Incidentally, the prominence, naturally, given, shall I say, the circus and hippodrome performances of some committees has distorted out of all proportion the importance of those committees. For example, when I was in India last fall, I heard on several occasions this statement: "I understand, Congressman, you have three branches of Government of the United States." I said, "Yes." He said, "I understand you have the executive; you have the judicial, and you have the investigative." That gives you some idea of what is happening, the misshapen notion that foreign people are getting of what is happening here in Washington. In establishing such a joint committee on subversive activities, giving it exclusive jurisdiction insofar as the Congress is concerned, to make investigations of all subversive activities, we would at last make much sense in an area that heretofore has created greater disunity, aroused more passions, brought forth more confusion and bitterness, than any other one single topic you can name, including taxes, Korea, and China. Were it a subject of passing interest, we could perhaps hope that time itself would bring it into proportion and clarity. Since, in the state of the world as it is today, it is a continuing subject, we need to invest it with the greatest care and thoroughness we can give it within the framework of our Congress. I ask you to consider this proposal most thoroughly. The adoption of this proposal, together with a code of fair committee procedure, would I submit, in the end strengthen the work of the Congress, preserve its investigating powers, and keep the Congress master of its own house. Senator CARLSON. Congressman, we appreciate very much your statement this morning. Senator Hayden. Senator HAYDEN. One can readily understand that, while we were engaged in war and had the Soviet Union as an ally, trust was placed in those people, and abusing this trust Communists infiltrated into our Government. Undoubtedly, the efforts made in the Congress to expose this type of subversive activities was highly important; but has the Congressman from New York considered that possibly the time has arrived for the control of subversive activities to be turned over to the executive branch and for Congress, for a time at least, to abandon this field which has resulted in so much discord among us? |