as a matter of privilege. The Senate then could determine which committee had the jurisdiction. Senator BUSH. I agree. I have seen that happen just in my brief experience here, where there seemed to be a conflict as to who really had the jurisdiction, and I should think-I don't know; you gentlemen have had much more experience with the Senate rules than I have-the committee, if it felt aggrieved that another committee was invading its jurisdiction, could take that matter to the Senate floor right now. If such a situation exists, can't the aggrieved committee take that matter to the Senate floor right now? Senator HAYDEN. It can; but not as a matter of privilege. The CHAIRMAN. On that point, we have Senate Resolution 146 before us, that deals with that very subject; and, of course, before we conclude these hearings, I think we will have extensive testimony on it. Senator HAYDEN. Yes. I just wanted to bring the Senator's attention to it. Senator BUSH. Yes; as I say, I didn't connect that thought with this problem. Therefore, I have no testimony on it that is worth hearing. Senator HAYDEN. All right. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Berkovitch, who is sitting to my right, is our counsel for this hearing. Mr. Berkovitch, do you have any questions at this time? Mr. BERKOVITCH. Just one question, Senator. You have made reference to other rules that a committee may have. Is this Resolution 253 intended to be comprehensive or are committees to be permitted to have other subsidiary rules? What is your intention in that respect? Senator BUSH. My intention was that these rules would apply to all committees; but there is stated in these rules, at various points, flexible language, such as "unless otherwise provided by the committee," and that type of language, which gives the committee a good deal of leeway to make such provisions as it may think necessary. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bush, Mr. Morris Senator BUSH. May I just quote, under section 4, subsection 5, on page 2 of the bill: The rules of the committees shall be the rules of the subcommittees so far as applicable. Committees and subcommittees may adopt additional rules not inconsistent with the rules of the Senate. That is the escape clause, so to speak. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Bush, Judge Morris is on his judicial holiday. Senator BUSH. I am glad he is getting one so quick. The CHAIRMAN. He has had a vast experience in congressional hearings, and was with our Internal Security Subcommittee for a long time as chief counsel. He has been kind enough to come down here and assist us in this hearing, in an advisory capacity. This is sort of a busman's holiday for him, and I wonder if you would have any objection if he would ask you some questions. Senator BUSH. I certainly would have no objection. I am delighted that Judge Morris is able to get here and assist the committee in connection with this matter. Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Senator. Senator, there is one point that occurred to me in the course of reading your statement and listening to your testimony: Suppose you have a witness who comes in and gives executive-session testimony, that is, testimony in secret session, and the committee feels that this man's testimony is tinged with irresponsibility, that there are statements in there that just don't appear to be right and square with other evidence that the subcommittee has, and he should insist on having a public hearing. Does your bill envisage a situation where that man would have the right, if he insisted, to have a public hearing and air publicly the statements that the committee has not been able to look into properly? Senator BUSH. That inference is correct. The resolution does provide that he may insist on a public hearing. Mr. MORRIS. The thing that occurred Senator BUSH. If he is to be heard. Of course, the committee has the alternative of not hearing him. Mr. MORRIS. With respect to the Internal Security Subcommittee and in connection with some of the other legislative work that I have particularly done, one of the problems that the committees encounter is the idea of the irresponsible witness and how to keep him from making a record that is going to damage somebody, and very often the committee will go to such extremes as to refuse to even hear him in executive session, because if he testifies in executive session he is given a certain amount of immunity and he can go around saying he testified in this fashion before a committee and in that way can damage somebody. Now, if, in addition, you give him not only the right to testify in executive session, but then also to testify in public session, you might be a party to some irresponsible statements. So, for that reason, the Internal Security Subcommittee, for one, was always very, very careful to bring into the public record only those matters which were, in fact, corroborated and which did square with other evidence. That is one difficulty that occurred to me, as I listened to you testify, Senator. Senator BUSH. Of course, in insisting on a public hearing against the wishes of the committee, he takes all the responsibility then for what that is, and the committee would undoubtedly make that clear. Whether that is a proper answer to your question or meets the issue fully, I don't know. Of course, I don't feel the competence, don't have the background in this whole matter that the members of this committee do, and Judge Morris. Mr. MORRIS. And then, Senator, may I ask one other question in connection with item No. 3: That is, witnesses and other persons threatened with loss of reputation are given an elaborate set of safeguards, including the privilege to question, through written interrogatory, their accusers, or the right to submit a written statement in their defense. Now, during the course of some of the hearings of the Internal Security Subcommittee, the subcommittee evolved the procedure of allowing anybody who was mentioned in the course of testimony in a derogatory way the right to come in and to defend himself fully in the public record. At the end the committee had evolved the rule that no one would be mentioned in open testimony unless the person were first brought in for executive-session testimony and asked whether or not this particular testimony were true and accurate. Now, in the case of the Lattimore hearings, Owen Lattimore was mentioned in the course of testimony in a derogatory way by quite a few witnesses. Lattimore was given the right by the Internal Security Subcommittee to come forth and testify. He came in with a 55-page statement. In the course of that 55-page statement, he made derogatory remarks about still other people-Alfred Kohlberg, Senator Knowland, and a whole list of people. Now, would your bill give to those people who were adversely mentioned by a defending witness the right to bring in their own witnesses and, in turn, to interrogate Owen Lattimore and then, of course, to carry it on further, Senator, suppose, in turn, the people Alfred Kohlberg mentioned would also themselves come in and say, "We have been mentioned in a derogatory way; we, too, would like to assert our rights given by this bill to cross-examine the witnesses," and bring in their own witnesses. Senator BUSH. My language in here-I will call your attention. to page 4, section 19-says this: Whenever the committee determines that evidence relating to a question under inquiry may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate persons called as witnesses therein, the committee shall observe the following additional procedures, so far as may be practicable and necessary for the protection of such persons. Now, that gives the committee a good escape hatch, it seems to me, to use its judgment, whether it is practical to get into this accordion play of yours. I think it leaves the committee some discretion as to whether they are going to start a chain letter, so to speak. Mr. MORRIS. And that situation actually came up, Senator, because Alfred Kohlberg insisted he, in turn, had the right to come in and answer the statements made about him by Owen Lattimore. Senator BUSH. That language, it seems to me, would give the committee the power to decide whether it is practicable or not to get into that kind of play. Mr. MORRIS. Thank you, Senator. Senator CARLSON. I think it might be well to put into the record at this point certain sections from the document entitled "A Compilation of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946," and I would suggest the record contain sections 133, 134, 136, and 137, from the rulemaking provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, because they apply to committee procedures. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, they may go into our record. (The sections of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 referred to are as follows:) COMMITTEE PROCEDURE SEC. 133. (a) Each standing committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives (except the Committees on Appropriations) shall fix regular weekly, biweekly, or monthly meeting days for the transaction of business before the committee, and additional meetings may be called by the chairman as he may deem necessary. (b) Each such committee shall keep a complete record of all committee action. Such record shall include a record of the votes on any question on which a record vote is demanded. (c) It shall be the duty of the chairman of each such committee to report or cause to be reported promptly to the Senate or House of Representatives, as the case may be, any measure approved by his committee and to take or cause to be taken necessary steps to bring the matter to a vote. (d) No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any such committee unless a majority of the committee were actually present. (e) Each such standing committee shall, so far as practicable, require all witnesses appearing before it to file in advance written statements of their proposed testimony, and to limit their oral presentations to brief summaries of their argument. The staff of each committee shall prepare digests of such statements for the use of committee members. (f) All hearings conducted by standing committees or their subcommittees shall be open to the public, except executive sessions for marking up bills or for voting or where the committee by a majority vote orders an executive session. COMMITTEE POWERS SEC. 134. (a) Each standing committee of the Senate, including any subcommittee of any such committee, is authorized to hold such hearings, to sit and act at such times and places during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such correspondence, books, papers, and documents, to take such testimony and to make such expenditures (not in excess of $10,000 for each committee during any Congress) as it deems advisable. Each such committee may make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, may report such hearings as may be had by it, and may employ stenographic assistance at a cost not exceeding 25 cents per hundred words. The expenses of the committee shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman. (b) Every committee and subcommittee serving the Senate and House of Representatives shall report the name, profession, and total salary of each staff member employed by it, and shall make an accounting of funds appropriated to it and expended by it to the Secretary of the Senate and Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, at least once every six months, and such information shall be published periodically in the Congressional Directory when and as the same is issued and as Senate and House documents, respectively, every three months. (c) No standing committee of the Senate or the House, except the Committee on Rules of the House, shall sit, without special leave, while the Senate or the House, as the case may be, is in session. LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT BY STANDING COMMITTEES SEC. 136. To assist the Congress in appraising the administration of the laws and in developing such amendments or related legislation as it may deem necessary, each standing committee of the Senate and House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of such committee; and, for that purpose, shall study all pertinent reports and data submitted to the Congress by the agencies in the executive banch of the Government. DECISIONS ON QUESTIONS OF COMMITTEE JURISDICTION SEC. 137. In any case in which a controversy arises as to the jurisdiction of any standing committee of the Senate with respect to any proposed legislation, the question of jurisdiction shall be decided by the presiding officer of the Senate, without debate, in favor of that committee which has jurisdiction over the subject matter which predominates in such proposed legislation; but such decision shall be subject to an appeal. The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, Senator, we want to thank you for taking the time to come here to help us with this very difficult problem. Senator BUSH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for the privilege of being here today. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. (The following letters and resolutions submitted by Senator Bush were later received for the record:) Hon. WILLIAM E. JENNER, UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Rules, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR JENNER: I have just been informed that the Department of Connecticut, Jewish War Veterans of the United States of America, adopted a resolution at its convention in Moodus, Conn., on June 13, 1954, in support of Senate Resolution 253 in regard to fair investigating procedures for Senate committees. It is requested that a copy of this resolution, which is enclosed, be placed in the record of the hearings of the subcommittee on Senate Resolution 253 and other proposals for uniform investigating procedures. I would appreciate it if this resolution could follow my testimony in the record. With best wishes, I am, Sincerely yours, PRESCOTT BUSH, United States Senator. RESOLUTION Whereas present committee investigative procedures of our United States Congress have endangered the preservation and protection of individual rights and constitutional guaranties; and Whereas such procedure is destructive of the American principles of democratic and sound legal procedures; and Whereas the future safety of our Nation both in the national scene and throughout the world, depends on remedying this situation; and Whereas safeguards to protect these rights and liberties have been presented through legislation for the adoption of fair committee procedures in the Senate: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That the Department of Connecticut Jewish War Veterans of the United States in convention assembled at Moodus, Conn., on the 13th day of June 1954, hereby supports the adoption of Senate Resolution No. 253; and be it further Resolved, That a copy of this resolution be forwarded to Senator Prescott Bush and Senator William Purtell; and be it further Resolved, That the recommendations of the national policy committee of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States in establishing rules of fair play for congressional investigating committees be forwarded to Senator Bush for consideration with his Senate Resolution No. 253, and that all Connecticut Congressmen be requested to support similar legislation in the House of Representatives. Hon. WILLIAM E. JENNER, UNITED STATES SENATE, Chairman, Senate Rules and Administration Committee, MY DEAR SENATOR: Attached is a copy of resolutions adopted by the Bridgeport Bar Association with reference to the need for a uniform code for congressional investigations. It will be appreciated if you see that this is made a part of the record of the hearings being held on this subject. Sincerely yours, PRESCOTT BUSH, United States Senator. |