large obviated, in my belief, if, as soon as the statement of an apparently derogatory nature was started to be made, the witness had been cut off promptly at that point, just as a court would.

I appear in court and if opposing counsel starts to ask a witness a line of questioning that seems to me quite irrelevant and improper for some other reason, I rise and object. The court makes a ruling on it. If the court thinks that I am right, he says, "Objection sustained. Counsel, you can't go any further with that line of questioning."

I see no reason why a committee chairman shouldn't exercise the same privilege, and I think he should. That would keep the flow of testimony much more strictly canalized.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Berkovitch, may I ask a question which would really be an amplification of your question?

Mr. Angell, in connection with that, let us use the example of the hearings the Internal Security Subcommittee had about Owen Lattimore. Now, his name was adversely mentioned in testimony, and the Internal Security Subcommittee gave him the opportunity to appear and to testify. In the course of his testimony, he came in with a 55-page statement, which adversely mentioned many other people.

Now, after they were in turn adversely mentioned, they insisted on coming in and answering the testimony that Owen Lattimore was giving.

One of the persons so adversely mentioned began in turn to mention other people adversely.

The Internal Security Subcommittee saw before it extending out into a broad vista a limitless series of accusations and counteraccusations, all of them varying and all of them departing a great deal from the line of inquiry being pursued.

Now, don't you think there has to be some kind of a reservation by the committee of a right to limit that, and that you can't just give an unconditional right to anybody who is adversely mentioned in testimony to come in and do the things that the bill recommends?

Mr. ANGELL. Yes; certainly. There has to be a limitation to relevancy, to reasonable time and length.

Mr. MORRIS. Otherwise, isn't it true that, instead of an investigation proceeding, it would be continually going back, on some bypath that wouldn't be relevant to the inquiry?

Mr. ANGELL. Very obviously, Judge Morris; certainly.

Senator CARLSON. Mr. Angell, we certainly appreciate very much your appearance here this morning, and the testimony you have given is going to be very helpful to this committee.

Mr. MORRIS. Mr. Angell, I wonder if I might ask you several questions about the right of a witness to counsel.

Mr. ANGELL. Certainly.

Mr. MORRIS. I think most committees, at least for the last decade, have allowed counsel to appear both in executive session and in open session. Now, to what extent should that counsel be allowed to participate in the proceedings?

In several cases the Internal Security Subcommittee noticed that the counsel were not only advising witnesses as to their legal rights, but they were supplying answers to the witnesses. Do you think that a counsel should be restrained from doing such a thing, and what kind of a code do you think can enforce such an attitude?

Have you any comment on that, Mr. Angell?

Mr. ANGELL. Certainly counsel should not be permitted to tell the witness what answer to give, and that may, in practice, be a very difficult problem to resolve by any formal code or rule.

Certainly I think, where the counsel is permitted to accompany the witness to the stand, to sit at his elbow, counsel should be very specifically advised by the chairman that "you are not permitted to supply the answer to the witness; you may consult with the witness only if the witness asks or says he wishes to consult with you, and your advice must be limited to legal questions, matters of legal import."

I don't think you can prevent counsel possibly from overstepping. Mr. MORRIS. Actually the congressional committees seem to grant even more extensive rights to witnesses than do courts.

Mr. ANGELL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. If you have a witness on the stand in the courtroom, he cannot consult with counsel.

Mr. ANGELL. That is right.

Mr. MORRIS. In the first place, he is not entitled to counsel, is he? Mr. ANGELL. Not entitled to counsel; no.

Mr. MORRIS. And, in addition, he can't consult with counsel before answering a question?

Mr. ANGELL. Quite so.

Mr. MORRIS. So, really, the congressional committees go further than the courts in allowing rights to witnesses?

Mr. ANGELL. I wonder if that has grown out of a recognition perhaps only in conscience that, as I said in my statement a little while ago, a witness has no redress in court from procedural abuses by a committee, with the exception of the two limited areas of the scope of inquiry, relevant to the scope of inquiry, and the fifth amendment, whereas in court a witness who is the subject of improper procedure, even on the part of the judge himself, could conceivably, has a right of redress.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. Mr. Angell.

Mr. ANGELL. Yes.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. Unless the witness is a party to the proceeding, the judicial proceeding, he has no such right unless he is one of the parties to the action.

Mr. ANGELL. Oh, no.

Mr. BERKOVITCH. The fact that he is a witness, and has been abused or mistreated in any way, gives him no right of appeal to a higher court?

Mr. ANGELL. No; not unless he is one of the parties. I agree, Mr. Berkovitch.

Mr. MORRIS. May I ask a question, Mr. Angell, about the attitude of the Civil Liberties Union with respect to the legal evidence and the probative value of monitored phone conversations? A monitored phone conversation is different, as you understand, from a wiretap recording. I would also like to ask you your opinion of the probative value of a wiretap conversation.

Mr. ANGELL. A wiretap conversation, which means the spying upon the conversation, unknown to one or both of the participants? Mr. MORRIS. Generally unknown to both.

Mr. ANGELL. Generally unknown to both.

Mr. MORRIS. The wiretap is, for example, the security enforcement agency putting a tap on a phone conversation between two people

whom it believes to be conspirators, having previously received from a court of law the right to put a tap on that conversation.

Mr. ANGELL. Right. Now, are you asking me about the probative value of it?

Mr. MORRIS. The probative value of that, and also the probative value of a monitored phone conversation, a monitored phone conversation being different from a wiretap in that only one party recognizes that the conversation is being recorded.

Mr. ANGELL. The probative value is greater, obviously, if you have a device which records the conversation.

I am assuming there is a recording device on the wiretrap, not just the person listening, but a device which takes down the conversation.

There you have the complete record, assuming the device mechanically works properly. Its probative value is greater than anybody's recollection, and the same would be true

Mr. MORRIS. Wouldn't it be true, Mr. Angell, if you have a monitored conversation, where one party recognizes the conversation is being recorded, whereas the other party does not recognize that the conversation is being recorded, that it is not a genuine conversation, in that one person is being very careful to make a record of what he is saying, whereas the other one is just talking freely or being possibly drawn into something.

Mr. ANGELL. It is being slanted by one person.

Mr. MORRIS. I know one of the congressional committees had a great deal of difficulty in determining whether or not the monitored phone conversations should be made a part of the record.

Now, what is the attitude of the Civil Liberties Union with respect to the admissibility of the monitored phone conversations?

Mr. ANGELL. I don't think we have ever taken any official position about it, so far as I can remember, Judge Morris.

Mr. MORRIS. Now, what would be the attitude of the Civil Liberties Union with respect to wiretap conversations?

Mr. ANGELL. Well, we dislike the union dislikes-wiretap, basically. We think it is a very unfortunate development of modern mechanical science.

Speaking for myself, I think the bill-I have forgotten whose it is now, under which name-which would permit the wiretap only on the order of the Federal judge is preferable to the so-called administration bill, giving the Attorney General's department the power to do itand that, of course, is not personal in any sense to the present incumbent of that office. I just don't believe giving the executive, any executive agency, any such power as that to invade the privacy of the individual is the proper thing to do.

Government grows and it intrudes into our lives increasingly all the time. It is necessary in this complex civilization of ours, but that my conversations and yours should be listened in to by the secret police, without the approval of at least a judge, just seems intolerable to me. That is a very strong personal opinion of mine. I feel deeply about it. Senator CARLSON. Mr. Angell, again we thank you for your appearance before the committee. You have been very helpful.

Mr. ANGELL. Thank you, Senator, for hearing me.

Senator CARLSON. The next witness will be Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen, Jr.

The Chair wishes to state that we will hear Mr. Ferman shortly because we have some Members of Congress here and we would like very much to accommodate them.

Representative Frelinghuysen, it has been the policy of this committee to swear witnesses. Do you have any objection to being sworn? Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. No; I have no objection.

Senator CARLSON. Do you promise and swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?. Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I do.

Senator CARLSON. You may proceed with your statement in any way you care to, sir. We appreciate very much your coming over.

TESTIMONY OF HON. PETER FRELINGHUYSEN, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, I have no desire to take too much of your time, but, if I could, I would like to read most of this statement, if that is all right.

First of all, I wish to thank you for affording me this opportunity to testify before your committee.

Many Members of the House, as well as the Senate, as you know, are vitally interested in the question which you have been considering. What I have to say will be of a broad and general nature, but I hope that it may be of some value as you consider the overall question of committee rules.

If I should attempt to be specific and make a definitive statement, I should become involved in many complex and difficult questions, which I know you have already considered in some detail.

As a freshman Representative, I have been impressed by the important role played by congressional committees. When they function well, as most of them do, they contribute greatly to the passage of important legislation. I have also been surprised at the relatively small degree of partisanship displayed in most of these bodies. As a member of the Veterans' Affairs Committee, I have seen little evidence that either Republicans or Democrats were thinking of veterans' problems in an exclusively political way.

Even more surprising to me was the small degree of political partisanship on the House Education and Labor Committee, of which I am also a member. Although individual members have sharply differing opinions, all witnesses are given a full and fair hearing.

Each of us has realized that the basic question-the adequacy of present labor-management relations legislation-needs to be considered objectively. So far, at least, partisanship has been minimized. Unfortunately, the general objectivity and balance that characterize most of our committees do not apply where there is competition between committees.

Competition for publicity among investigating committees is a serious fault. Another fault is the failure on the part of some committees to afford adequate protection to witnesses. As a result, some persons oppose all congressional investigating committees. They feel these committees do more harm than good, and that Congress should restrict its investigations to the gathering of information needed in the preparation of legislation.

I do not hold this view. When properly employed, the investigatory function is an extremely valuable one. Such investigating committees can serve two valuable functions:

1. They can help Congress to carry out its role of "overseeing" the work of the executive departments. This function is an essential part of our system of "checks and balances." It has become increasingly important with the growth of bureaucracy and the insulation of many governmental decisions from public opinion.

2. They can help Congress to perform what Woodrow Wilson called the informing function; that is, they can help educate the people and aid them in securing the facts they need to perform as intelligent and responsible citizens.

Investigating committees in the field of subversive activities need not be excepted from the above generalizations. In the field of internal security, as in others, Congress can do a useful and constructive job in overseeing the work of the executive branch.

The primary responsibility for investigating subversion and for reassuring the public rests with the Justice Department and the FBI. The role of the legislative branch should be of a general supervisory character, with congressional investigating committees serving as watchdogs to check on the performance of the executive branch. Certainly their primary function should not be to develop ammunition to be used for political purposes.

How then should Congress deal with the problems presented by the various competing committees investigating subversive activities? The problem can best be handled, it seems to me, by the establishment of a single Joint Committee on Internal Security, which would have exclusive jurisdiction in this field.

On the opening day of this session of Congress, I introduced House Joint Resolution 328, providing for such a joint committee.

A similar resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 157, was introduced by Senator Robert C. Hendrickson on May 11 of this year. Previously, on March 8 of this year, Senator Douglas, with Senator Humphrey as a cosponsor, introduced Senate Joint Resolution 137, which is virtually identical to House Joint Resolution 328.

The resolution I have introduced contains a number of fair-play provisions. These would afford witnesses protections similar to those they would receive in a court of law. The problem of developing such a code of procedures, I realize, is not necessarily tied up with the proposal for a joint committee.

A large number of resolutions dealing exclusively with the question of investigating committee procedures has been introduced, some of which are being considered by your committee.

This problem of the rights of witnesses, nonetheless, is one that arises most frequently in connection with investigations of alleged subversion.

While considering the question of establishing a single committee in this field, therefore, I felt that Congress should have the opportunity to pass upon the question of the rights of witnesses. In that way Congress can establish basic committee procedures.

The question of adequate protection for witnesses is so fundamental that it should not simply be left to the individual committee itself. House Joint Resolution 328 would provide witnesses with four