One or two minor points come to mind in the course of reading the resolution, and the first is that while this resolution carries the implication that it refers to formal hearings, I believe that fact should be stated clearly in order that the necessary preparatory staff assistance can be carried out.

As you know, the Appropriations Committee spends more time in hearings than any other committee; in fact, as much time as all the rest of the committees combined. As you also know, as chairman of the Appropriations Committee I obtain each session blanket permission from the Senate to hold hearings while the Senate is in session so that we can expeditiously accomplish the work of the committee.

Therefore a second thought relates to section 9 on page 2 of the resolution which reads: "No committee hearing shall be held unless specifically authorized by the committee." This restriction might gravely hamper the progress of the work of the Appropriations Committee unless it could be waived by the committee so as to permit the delegation of such authority to the chairman and subcommittee chairmen in order that the work of an extremely busy committee, such as Appropriations, could go forward and not hold up the whole Congress. The obligation on the one hand of the Congress to gather facts in order to legislate and to protect the public welfare, and the duty on the other of the Congress to preserve individual liberties have at times seemed to many persons to conflict. The main problem is one that cannot be solved easily since it is in an area in which committee obligations and personal privileges must meet and not conflict. It is my hope, and I believe it to be the hope of most Americans, that your committee will recommend to the Senate an acceptable solution to this current problem.

STATEMENT OF HON. H. ALEXANDER SMITH, a United StatES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to express my views on the subject of rules of procedure in connection with investigations by Senate committees.

At the beginning let me emphasize my personal views on the general subject. My first conviction is that there should be uniform Senate rules to govern any investigation conducted by any committee, or subcommitee of the Senate. Since these committees and subcommittees are agents of the Senate as a whole, it seems entirely appropriate that the principal should prescribe their rules of conduct. Adoption by the Senate of a code of rules for investigations would insure the uniformity and adequacy of rules and permit appropriate action by the Senate to hold any of its agents accountable for the proper observance of these rules.

I believe that such a Senate code should extend to all individuals appearing before any investigating committee, or concerning whom charges have been made before any committee, and should include those protections afforded by the Bill of Rights to any individual involved in ordinary criminal proceedings. I recognize, of course, that certain of these protections must be so circumscribed as to prevent frustration of the legitimate processes of a legislative body and appropriately to protect the security of the United States.

Thus I believe that a procedure akin to the grand jury procedure should be developed, assuring that before public charges against an individual be made by an agent of the Senate, a prima facie case be developed in executive session. The courts have already assured to witnesses before congressional committees the right not to be witnesses against themselves. Another protection which I believe should be afforded the individual is the right to have a speedy and public hearing and be informed of the nature of the cause of the accusation. The other protections given an individual by the sixth amendment would seem also to be peculiarly applicable here. These are: the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel. As stated above, I recognize that considerations of the national security, or of the legislative processes may from time to time require a modification or limitation of these rights, but I feel that at least an absolute majority of the committee or subcommittee conducting the investigation should approve of the modification or suspension of these privileges which are considered basic rights in a criminal prosecution.

As one of the standing legislative committees of the Senate with broad jurisdiction, the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, of which I am chairman, has from time to time had occasion to conduct investigations as dis

tinct from normal legislative hearings. However, these rarely, and in recent years never, have involved what might be termed unfriendly or reluctant witnesses. As a result there was little need for any detailed committee rules to cover such a situation. However, with the increase in recent years of congressional investigations many Senators, including myself, have felt that uniform rules should be adopted to cover these investigations. Pending action by the Senate on this problem, on March 24, 1954, the Labor Committee adopted as rule 14 of its committee rules, the rules governing investigations which had been suggested by the majority policy committee. At the meeting at which the committee adopted these rules, it was suggested that they were not sufficiently comprehensive. We, therefore, appointed a special subcommittee consisting of Senator Ives, chairman, and Senators Cooper, Upton, Douglas, and Lehman to study the subject further and report desirable changes and additions to the full committee.

Senator Ives as chairman of the subcommittee circulated to its members a more elaborate set of rules to govern investigations and invited comments thereon. The subcommittee has not yet made its recommendations to the full committee, but with the consent and concurrence of Senator Ives, I am submitting herewith for the benefit of your committee the tentative proposals of the Ives subcommittee.

I should like to make one comment on these rules. There is no provision among them covering the televising or broadcasting of open hearings. I feel strongly that the Senate should provide that on the objection of any witness there will be no televising or broadcasting of his testimony, or, indeed, any recording of it by any device other than the traditional transcription by an expert reporter.

I also submit for the benefit of your committee the rules suggested by the Republican policy committee as adopted by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. I understand that these rules have been further amended and that the latest "edition" will be submitted to your committee. I believe that the main points I wish to emphasize are covered by the Ives proposals, but I also recommend for the consideration of your committee the rules contained in Senate Resolution 253, introduced by Senator Bush of Connecticut.

SECTION 14 OF RULES AND PROCEDURES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, AS AMENDED MARCH 24, 1954

[RULES COVERING INVESTIGATIONS SUGGESTED BY SENATE REPUBLICAN POLICY

COMMITTEE]

Rule 14. Investigation procedures

(a) An investigating committee (subcommittee) may be authorized only by the action of a majority of the committee.

(b) No investigating committee (subcommittee) is authorized to hold a hearing to hear subpenaed witnesses or take sworn testimony unless a majority of the members of the committee or subcommittee are present, provided, however, that the committee may authorize the presence of a majority and a minority member to constitute a quorum.

(c) An investigating committee (subcommittee) may not delegate its authority to issue subpenas except by a vote of the committee (subcommittee).

(d) No hearing shall be initiated unless the investigating committee (subcommittee) has specifically authorized such hearing.

(e) No hearing of an investigating committee (subcommittee) shall be scheduled outside of the District of Columbia except by the majority vote of the committee (subcommittee).

(f) No confidential testimony taken or confidential material presented in an executive hearing of an investigating committee (subcommittee) or any report of the proceedings of such an executive hearing shall be made public, either in whole or in part or by way of summary, unless authorized by a majority of the members of the committee (subcommittee).

(g) Any witness summoned to a public or executive hearing may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing who shall be permitted while the witness is testifying to advise him of his legal rights.

TENTATIVE RULES PROPOSED BY AD HOC IVES SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE

(13) Any investigation by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare or a subcommittee thereof shall be authorized by a majority of the full committee.

(14) The full committee or subcommittee hearings shall be called only upon a minimum of 16 hours' written notice to the office of each committee or subcommittee member.

(15) The full committee or subcommittee hearings (whether public or in executive session) shall be held only when authorized by a majority of the committee or subcommittee and such hearings shall be held in meetings at which a majority of the full committee or subcommittee are present unless a majority of the full committee or the subcommittee have determined that the presence of not less than a majority and a minority member constitutes a quorum.

(16) A resolution or motion scheduling hearings shall state clearly and concisely the subject thereof which may be amended in the same manner prescribed in section (15) for the scheduling of hearings.

(17) Any witness before the full committee or a subcommittee at a public hearing and, unless the full committee or the subcommittee by a majority vote determines otherwise, any witness before the full committee or the subcommittee in executive session shall have the right to be accompanied by counsel, who shall be permitted to advise the witness while on the witness stand of his rights.

(18) Every witness shall have an opportunity, at the conclusion of the examination by the full committee or subcommittee to supplement the testimony which he has given by making a brief written or oral statement which shall be made part of the record; but such testimony shall be confined to matters with respect to which he has previously been examined.

(19) An accurate stenographic record shall be kept of the testimony of each witness before the full committee or a subcommittee whether in public or in executive session. In either case, the record of his testimony shall be made available for inspection by the witness or his counsel; and if given in public session he shall be furnished with a copy thereof at his expense if he so requests, and if given in executive session he shall be furnished with a copy thereof at his expense in case his testimony is subsequently used or referred to in a public session.

(20) No statements shall be released and no documents shall be published by the full committee or a subcommittee without the approval of a majority of such committee.

(21) When testimony given the full committee or a subcommittee is released, the full text of the testimony shall be released except when considerations of national security otherwise require.

(22) Any person who is specifically identified by name in public hearings before the full committee or a subcommittee or in private hearings when the testimony has been made public, and who believes that testimony or other evidence given in such hearing or comment made by any member of the full committee or a subcommittee or its counsel tends to defame him or otherwise adversely affect his reputation, shall be afforded the following privileges:

(1) To file with the full committee or a subcommittee a sworn statement of reasonable length, concerning such testimony, evidence, or comment, which shall be made a part of the record of such hearings.

(2) To appear personally before the full committee or a subcommittee and testify in his own behalf.

(3) Unless the full committee or a subcommittee by a majority vote shall determine otherwise, to have the full committee or a subcommittee secure the appearance of witnesses whose testimony adversely affected him, and to cross-examine such witnesses, either personally or by counsel; but such cross-examination shall be limited to 1 hour as to any one witness unless the full committee or a subcommittee votes to lengthen the period.

(4) In the discretion of the full committee or a subcommittee, by a majority vote, to have the full committee or a subcommittee call a reasonable number of witnesses in his behalf. The extent to which this privilege may be availed of shall be left to the discretion of the full committee or a subcommittee.

(23) In the discretion of the chairman of the full committee or a subcommittee, a witness may question another witness who comments adversely upon his testimony. Where such questioning is allowed, it shall be conducted by means of written questions handed to the chairman and stated by him.

(24) Any witness who gives testimony before the full committee or a subcommittee in an open hearing which reflects adversely on the character or reputation of another person shall be required to disclose his sources of information, unless to do so would endanger the national security.

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE HUGH BUTLER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEBRASKA

Mr. Chairman, in response to your invitation, I am very pleased to give you my views as to the proper procedure for the handling of investigations by Senate committees, based on my own experience and observation during my period of service in the Senate.

In my judgment, it is of the utmost importance that the authority and power of Senate committees be fully preserved to conduct such investigations as they find necessary in order to fulfill their responsibilities to the Senate.

By the terms of the United States Constitution, the Congress is the policymaking branch of the Government. In the discharge of this duty, it is necessary that we in the Congress have available to us information from every possible

source.

The investigative power is of particular importance when it comes to checking on the manner in which the various departments are performing their duties. In such cases it may frequently be necessary to investigate particular incidents or the activities of particular individuals. Without full power to make such investigations, we may find it extremely difficult to decide as to the policies which should be enacted into law.

In short, in my view, the investigative power is a necessary power in the performance of the general function of determining policy. I believe the Senate should resist firmly any effort from any outside source to curtail the authority of its committees in that regard.

However, from the above, I do not mean to imply that our rules of procedure could not be improved.

For example, it is my opinion that the "live" televising or broadcasting of committee sessions should be held to a minimum, or perhaps barred entirely by the Senate. When a committee session is on the radio or television, there may be a strong tendency on the part of witnesses, committee members, and other participants to think primarily in terms of how their statements will sound to the casual nationwide audience, rather than in terms of getting the essential facts on the record. In my opinion, committee sessions should not be used for personal advantage, nor should they be used for campaign purposes.

I believe the discontinuing of the televising or broadcasting of committee sessions would be very helpful in eliminating some of the undesirable features that have cropped up in some recent committee hearings.

As to the detailed rules for the conduct of an investigative hearing, I seriously question whether any major changes are necessary. Most of the suggestions which have been made along that line have, it seems to me, been based on a misunderstanding of the general methods and objectives of such investigative hearings.

In substantially all of the committee hearings in which I personally have participated, an effort has been made to preserve an air of informality, without strict rules of evidence or any effort to adhere narrowly to the rules of evidence that are characteristic of court proceedings. Committee members should feel free in their questioning to bring in all sorts of material that may be helpful, even though some of such material might appear irrelevant at first glance. On the other hand, witnesses should be permitted to speak freely, to explain their answers fully if they care to, etc.

Much has been said during recent months about the danger that the rights of a witness will be infringed upon by committee proceedings. Personally, I can see no objection to allowing all witnesses the right of legal counsel, if they so desire. That has been my own policy in any committee hearings that I have personally conducted.

However, I cannot help feeling that there has been much exaggeration in the talk about the danger to the witness' rights. It is commonly overlooked that the powers of a committee of Congress to discipline its witnesses are far less than the powers of almost any court of justice. In most cases a witness may, if he chooses, resort to evasive or unresponsive answers with comparative im

punity. Such conduct in any court would lead to immediate punishment for contempt, but in Congress it is extremely difficult to secure punishment for contempt against any witness, regardless of how contumacious he may be. In fact, during recent years, there have been many cases of obstinate or uncooperative witnesses who have suffered no punishment at all for such conduct.

Furthermore, as a normal thing, all committees and subcommittees contain representation by members of both political parties. Thus, the rights of a witness can be protected by minority members of the committee, if those minority members choose to attend the committee hearing. If such minority members fail to attend to their committee assignments, they are in no position to complain about the conduct of the hearing in question.

In other words, the average committee hearing creates no danger to the rights of a witness, and in fact, many witnesses have used such committee hearings as a forum for the airing of their views.

I hope the above summary of my views as to the conduct of investigative hearings will be useful to the members of the Committee on Rules and Administration.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. BRICKER, A UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to express my views on the rules under which all Senate investigating committees and subcommittees should operate..

First, I want to record my unalterable opposition to any code of rules that limits, directly or indirectly, the scope of congressional investigations. The subjects of congressional inquiry are virtually unlimited. That fact has been established by history. It has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. This hearing, as I understand it, is concerned with the procedure, and not the substantive scope, of Senate investigations.

As I see it, there is one paramount danger in this job of writing for all Senate committees a uniform code of investigating procedure. That danger springs from the false notion that it is possible for the Senate to impose on all its committees an ideal set of rules. Standards that would be ideal for one Senate committee would hamstring others. We must be content with devising minimum standards, permitting each committee to adopt such other rules as it deems appropriate for its particular work.

There are roughly three types of congressional investigations-legislative, supervisory, and informing. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, of which I am chairman, conducts investigations that are almost without exception purely legislative in character. In other words, most of our investigations are directly related to bills and nominations pending before the committee. It would be the height of folly to saddle our committee with some form of judicial procedure.

Other Senate committees investigate primarily in a watchdog or supervisory capacity. Still other committees investigate primarily for the purpose of informing the public, any legislative byproduct being remote or purely incidental. It is the Congressional investigation to inform that has attracted most of the criticism in recent years. It is in response to that criticism that this hearing is being held. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to recall the words of Woodrow Wilson in his book, Congressional Government:

"Quite as important as legislation is vigilant oversight of administration; and even more important than legislation is the instruction and guidance in political affairs which the people might receive from a body which kept all national concerns suffused in a broad daylight of discussion. *** The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function."

In my judgment, much of the criticism of congressional investigations held primarily to inform the public has been unwarranted. The abuses have been grossly exaggerated. Nevertheless, I recognize that witnesses appearing before investigating committees are entitled to more protection than they are sometimes accorded. Moreover, I believe that such protection should exist as a matter of right and not merely by virtue of committee grace. The problem we face is simply this: How can a decent measure of procedural due process be provided without handcuffing the committees that expose crime, communism, and corruption both in and out of Government?

Those who demand courtroom procedure in committee hearing rooms overlook one vitally important fact. No congressional committee can fine or