PREFACE.

THE high waves of controversy stirred up by the events of the late war in the whole domain of military science, and particularly in the department of tactics, have only begun to subside within the last year. The publication of personal experiences immediately after the war often brought to light the most conflicting opinions upon the mode of handling troops in action; for the line between cause and effect had not as yet been clearly drawn, and it is only very recently that our views have begun to clear up, and that the experience gained on the battle-field has been consolidated into fixed and firm conviction.

In the battles of the future infantry will be more than ever the decisive arm, the part assigned to it will be the most grateful, though at the same time the most sanguinary, and therefore if we wish to preserve the advantages gained with difficulty and at a great cost, it becomes our sacred duty not to persevere in the habits which are easy because they are old fashioned; and not to put blind confidence in our former good fortune, trusting implicitly to the dauntless devotion of our regimental officers and their gallant men. It is impossible to resist the conviction that if we continue to make use of the tactical formations now almost everywhere prescribed, we can neither attack with a fair prospect of success, nor hold a position against superior numbers, supposing the enemy in each case to be armed with the breechloader. It cannot fairly be said that our drill regulations positively prevent us from practising formations suitable to war, for though certainly not up to the times, a merit which their most ardent admirer will hardly claim for them, yet they furnish a certain excuse for such

practice to the zealous spirit skilled in reading between the lines.

The formations prescribed by regulation are simple and easily learnt; we appear then, if we take into consideration the excellent company training now given, to be committing a sin against that sacred thing, military spirit, when we spend the comparatively long time at our disposal in the monotonous repetition, so wearisome to mind and body, of what has already been thoroughly learnt, or in so-called tactical exercises, without any tactical connection between the movements, and, above all, without any tactical idea. Many, with a stubbornness worthy of a better cause, seek to prevent the intermixture of troops and apparent disorder consequent thereupon, which the present method of infantry fighting renders inevitable, their efforts culminating in the practice for hours together upon the drill ground of bayonet attacks with thin lines of skirmishers in the intervals, or even of bayonet charges of the battalion deployed into line three deep without a skirmisher in front.

The real danger lies in the fact that such tactical monstrosities are not only sanctioned in the Field Exercise Book at present in force, but their practice is also enjoined as a matter of regulation.

Let it not be said that, with this system of tactics, we have gained unexampled successes in three great wars; let us rather enquire how so much has been accomplished in spite of this system, which derives its fundamental ideas from the War of Independence, and we shall find that either different and more practical formations were taught us on the field of battle, the bullets of the enemy making us pay dearly for our lesson; or else that the discipline of the soldier, and, above all, the devotion of the regimental officer, had to correct the faults which our peace instruction, ill-adapted as it was to the requirements of war, had engendered.

Stimulated by the earnest desire which makes itself manifest in all military circles for the adoption of a system of tactics suitable to the present action of infantry in battle (a desire which lately found its most vivid expression in the able writings of the Prussian Lieutenant-Colonel V. Scherff), encouraged by many friends, the author offers the following 'Tactical Examples,' as a small contribution towards the good cause for which all are

striving, namely, our emancipation from old forms long ago condemned by experience, yet fondly adhered to.

This book does not pretend to be a collection of 'Tactical Receipts; in no art would the endeavour to lay down fixed rules be more dangerous than in that of handling troops in action, an art so difficult, and depending upon so many factors.

Should the author, as perhaps will be the case at first, be susspected of such a design, the following thirty examples will themselves be his defence.

Though the general principles of action which he has briefly cited remain the same when the suppositions are similar, the mode of execution varies according to the composition of your own force and of that of your adversary.

A battalion acting alone and independently will necessarily be handled in different fashion from one which is supported by the other arms, or from one which forms part of a considerable body of troops. Again, the mode of action will vary according to the relative strength of the enemy and according to the presence of either cavalry or artillery, or both, in support of his infantry.

The foregoing is of itself sufficient to show that the author never for a moment thought of giving Tactical Receipts.'

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Now with regard to reducing the 'examples' to practice, it is as well to remark that although intended for the drill field, the nature of which can offer but little variety of ground, they can be carried out with slight modifications on the terrain.

In order that they may afford real practical instruction they should be conducted as far as possible as on actual service. Thus commanders of companies, and at times even battalion commanders, should dismount and remain under cover, as far as this may be compatible with a good view of what is going on. Orders and instructions should in most cases be carried by orderlies trained to perform their duties skilfully; further, every movement in contemplation and its tactical intention should be communicated in a general manner to all officers assembled beforehand for the purpose, and lastly the enemy should be marked,' however slightly this may be done.

Officers should often be made to fall out as if hors de combat,' so that both they and the men may be accustomed to a change of command; the intermixture of units which is inevitable with the

present system of fighting must be divested of all character of disorder by preparing men to expect it as a matter of course, and by accustoming them when in this state of apparent confusion to resume close order at a moment's notice in handy tactical formations.

When we consider the numerous individual and external influences which affect the conduct of troops in battle, we must recognise the impossibility of producing 'Tactical Examples' presenting in all their phases and all their incidents the character of reality. This cannot and should not be attempted. To stand still is to retrograde! With this motto the author presents these Tactical Examples' to the public as an attempt to point out the direction of the path which ought to be followed. And should this work perchance stimulate some gifted pen actually to trace out that true path, the main object of the Tactical Examples' will have been attained.

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THE AUTHOR.

BERLIN: October 1874.

EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR THE PLATES.

The distances are given in paces.

1. The numbers of the companies are shown in Arabic numerals; those of the half-battalions in Roman numerals.

2. The divisions (Züge) are thus indicated, 2Zg/3; the number on the right being that of the company, the number on the left that of the division.

3. A skirmishing division is marked by a bugle with the number of the company to which the division belongs.