ously cripple our country in its conduct of foreign affairs at a time. when history has thrust upon us the leadership of the free world and when such leadership is indispensable to our survival.

Not only is the design and effect of the bar association proposal calamitous, but its detail is fallacious and deficient.

The first sentence of the association's proposal commits the unpardonable sin in constitution drafting of ambiguity. That sentence reads as follows:

A provision of a treaty which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect.

Who knows or can say with certainty how broadly or how narrowly the word "conflicts" in that sentence will be construed by future decision makers?

Senator HENDRICKSON. Do you feel that a treaty should conflict with the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. TILLETT. It depends on what the word "conflict" means. For example, before the treaty with Canada regarding migratory fowl was made, it was not within the power of Congress to control migratory fowl. Now, then, query: Since the Constitution did not give to the Congress the power to deal with migratory fowl, was a treaty about migratory fowl in conflict with the Constitution? I am now challenging the accuracy of that word "conflicts." I think it is ambiguous. For example, I think that the first section of Senator Bricker's proposal is clear as crystal. If you do want to adopt something to that end, then obviously you should knowingly not adopt this ambiguous sentence, but should adopt Senator Bricker's section 1. Senator HENDRICKSON. I am sorry, I did not know you were coming to that. Very shortly now, while we are discussing this matter informally, I will have to leave again. You will understand if I suspend for a while.

Mr. TILLETT. Yes, sir.

Senator HENDRICKSON. When I said to go away, I meant the Senate. Mr. TILLETT. There are many areas within which treaties will have to be made in the future in building up the body of international law which are not covered by express delegation of authority in the Constitution. Will future decision makers hold that treaties within such areas are in conflict with the Constitution? Who knows? In other words, the inclusion of this ambiguous sentence in our Constitution. will leave in doubt the validity of many treaties until, by the slow process of litigation, their validity or nonvalidity has been determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. Furthermore, the President and the Senate, in connection with the negotiation and ratification of future treaties, will be sincerely uncertain as to whether or not they are authorized to commit the country to treaties which might not be deemed to be within their expressly delegated power.

If the only objective of this sentence is to protect against treaties which might impinge upon the Bill of Rights, the sentence is totally unnecessary because it is clear that the treaty power is just as much subject to the limitations of the Constitution as any other power granted. The statement made by Justice Field cannot be successfully challenged where he said:

It would not be contended that it [the treaty-making power] extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids.

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It is fantastic to assume that a Supreme Court that would be restrained by the safeguards already in the Constitution would pay any attention to this ambiguous language proposed by the bar association. The question has been asked that if you think the proposals as Senator Bricker's proposals are unnecessary, because the Constitution already protects the rights of the citizen, what objection can you have in buttoning the thing up? There are many answers to this question, but one answer I should like to put forward is this: In order for this unnecessary clause to be written into the Constitution, it will have to be submitted to the legislatures of all of the States in order for them to vote in favor of the amendment. It will be necessary to convince them that their constitutional liberties are in danger of being bartered away by international action. The result will, I think, be unnecessary to arouse and frighten the people away from internationalism and further and further to isolationism. I think that this will be fatal to the cause of intelligent, thoughtful, and wholesome world cooperation. Thus, the movement to write this unnecessary clause to the Constitution will produce end results that its own proponents will concede undersirable.

The second sentence in the American Bar Association proposal, if included in our Constitution, would create a situation which can, in all kindness, be characterized only as a monstrous absurdity. This sentence reads as follows:

A treaty shall become effective and internal law in the United States only through legislation by Congress which it could enact under its delegated power in the absence of such treaty.

The meaning and effect of the inclusion of that sentence in our Constitution would be that a substantial number of treaties could not become effective until and unless referred to, and ratified by, the legislatures of several States. The inability, not to say incompetence, of the legislatures of the several States to deal with international matters is too well known to require argument here today. In my State, within a few days, we will hold a primary election for the selection of candidates for the legislature. No one knows what the attitudes of the various candidates for the legislature are with respect to foreign affairs. And yet, if it becomes a fact that a part of the treaty-making power shall be vested in our legislatures, it will become important and necessary, in voting on legislative candidates, to know what their attitudes are with respect to international matters. Mr. SMITHEY. I notice that the sentence which you quoted from the bar recommendation related to internal law in the United States and that your sentence which follows later mentions international matter: the legislatures of the several States to deal with international mattersWould you explain that, please?

Mr. TILLETT. May I read these two next paragraphs? Then I come to an illustration in a minute and I will be able to explain it a little more clearly.

Mr. SMITHEY. Certainly.

Mr. TILLETT. Furthermore, legislatures meet usually for only 60 or 90 days, their calendars are overwhelmingly crowded with matters of State and local concern and there would never be the time or inclination on the part of the members of State legislatures to sub

ordinate matters of pressing State and local concern to the consideration of some treaty.

In addition to this, legislatures meet at irregular intervals, those in North Carolina being spaced 2 years apart. The delay in submitting to, and obtaining action by, the legislatures of the various States upon treaties which under the bar association proposal would have to be submitted to them would be unendurable from an international standpoint.

Now my illustration

Senator HENDRICKSON. Before you give your illustration, let me say something in defense of State legislatures. I want the record to be clear on this. I had the high privilege of serving my own State in the Senate for a great number of years. You say the calendars are crowded. That may be so in some States. But if we conducted our business in New Jersey, in the State legislature of New Jersey, as the Congress of the United States conducts its business here, there would be very few of us ever returned to office by the people of the State. I can say that to you.

Mr. TILLETT. I am not in any sense of the word throwing off on legislatures.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I say that by and large they are more efficient than the Congress of the United States.

Mr. TILLETT. To deal with the problems that they are competent to deal with, and that is matters of State and local concern. But I do not think that they are elected for the purpose of

Senator HENDRICKSON. I understand your point. I simply wanted to clear the statement about the legislatures of our several States in any statement of incompetency. I did not want it to appear that way. Mr. TILLETT. I don't mean, myself, to be throwing off on them as being incompetent to deal with matters of their own concern.

An illustration of a treaty which, under the bar association proposal, would have to be submitted to the legislatures of the several States is a treaty relating to the ownership of land. My neighboring State of South Carolina has a statutory provision to the effect that, ordinarily speaking, no alien and no corporation controlled by aliens can own more than 500 acres of land.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I am going to have to suspend. Will you pardon me?

Mr. TILLETT. Yes, sir.

Senator HENDRICKSON. As to other witnesses, I am perfectly willing to carry on through the afternoon because I know you are all here giving of your time in an important cause. I want to be as helpful and cooperative as possible. If you want to stay here until after the next vote is over, I will be glad to take on the other witnesses. How many witnesses are there?

Mr. SMITHEY. We have one more scheduled, Mr. Maslow, of the American Jewish Congress.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I am sorry that these interruptions have to

occur.

(Brief recess.)

Senator HENDRICKSON. The hearing will be in order. You may proceed, Mr. Tillett.

Mr. TILLETT. An illustration of a treaty which, under the bar association proposal, would have to be submitted to the legislatures of the several States, is a treaty relating to the ownership of land.

Suppose there is a country-let us call it Ruritania-where commercial opportunities are opening to Americans, provided they can own land there and establish commercial facilities. A treaty negotiated with Ruritania, by which that country gives the Americans and American-controlled corporations the unlimited right to own land in exchange for the privilege in America, on the part of Ruritanians, of having a similar right for themselves and their corporations to own land. Such a treaty, under the American Bar Association proposal, could not become effective until and unless the South Carolina Legislature approved it. And the same thing would be true if there are any other States in the Union which contain similar restrictions upon the right of aliens to own land.

That, sir, is what I mean by the legislature not being on international matters. Obviously, a commercial treaty which would call for Americans being allowed to own land in foreign countries and that country being allowed to own land in America, would require a conception of international relations and international commerce, and things of that sort. It could be very easily possible that the legislature would not realize the international implications of that, and would therefore turn it down. I can visualize, for example, without throwing off on my neighbor State of South Carolina, something like this coming up, that the motion would be made that such a treaty be ratified. They would say "We have too many Ruritanians in America in South Carolina already, and we don't want any more. We don't want Ruritanians owning lands here. As far as Americans investing money in Ruritania, there is a lot of good land in South Carolina. Why don't they come down here and put their money in South Carolina?" Senator HENDRICKSON. That would be sort of far-fetched, would it not?

Mr. TILLETT. I don't know.

Senator HENDRICKSON. I mean, that would be an extreme case.

Mr. TILLETT. That would be an extreme case, but that is just like a cartoon, it illustrates the point. That is the kind of thing. In other words, where I say that where you have a treaty which would override a State law, then, in order for the legislature, intelligently, to decide that it would allow the State law to be overridden, it would require a knowledge on the part of the legislatures of international relations, which they do not have.

Senator HENDRICKSON. Are you saying that this situation would apply to every treaty that would come up even if the Bricker amendment was adopted or the bar association amendment?

Mr. TILLETT. No, not the Bricker amendment. The Bricker amendment very carefully takes care of that. Under the Bricker amendment you would not have——

Senator HENDRICKSON. But you do envisage that, a possibility of that sort, under the bar association recommendation?

Mr. TILLETT. That is right, the bar association. That second sentence of the bar association amendment would require the submission of a great many treaties to the legislatures.

Mr. SMITHEY. Would you feel the same way, if the subject matter was the practice of law.

Mr. TILLETT. You mean by that, say a treaty, let us say, that would give to Ruritanians the right to practice law in North Carolina in exchange for North Carolinians having the right?

Mr. SMITHEY. Irrespective of the citizenship.

Mr. TILLETT. Yes; I would say that if that were a matter of international concern, I would say that the people who were supposed to pass on it would be people who were concerned and had knowledge of international matters. I would like to say this: That you cannot, by any sort of amendment to the Constitution, or any sort of legislative or constitutional gadget, protect the country against bad treaties. The only protection against bad treaties is to elect into the treatymaking body competent people. The trouble about Americans is that they are gadget-minded. They feel, "Well, we can write some. sort of constitutional gadget into the Constitution and then go home and play golf and pay no attention to who represents us, and pay no attention to international affairs, and that gadget will protect us against bad treaties." The only answer you can have, and protection against a bad treaty, is to have competent people pass on your treaty. Mr. SMITHEY. Sir, in connection with the practice of law, do you feel that the fact that a lawyer is an officer of the court has anything to do with whether the State should retain jurisdiction or not? Would you be willing to distinguish between lawyers and the ownership of land by aliens?

Mr. TILLETT. I would not, to the extent of saying that I would, on account of the lawyer illustration, be willing to endorse the American Bar Association proposal.

Mr. SMITHEY. That is not the question I put to you. You have illustrated this here. I wanted to know whether you would feel as strongly if the subject matter involved was the practice of law within a given State.

Mr. TILLETT. If I understand your question, my answer is "Yes," because again I feel like where there are matters of international concern, they should be passed on by people with knowledge of international relations, and I do not think the legislatures are equipped to pass upon international matters. I say it would be a terrible price to pay. Nobody can conceive of such a proposal actually ever having reality. It would be inconceivable that a treaty would ever be negotiated about the practice of law. I say that it would be a terrible price to pay, in order to protect ourselves against some such fantastic proposal as that—to bring it about so that matters of real international concern would be submitted to our legislatures instead of to our internationally-minded treaty-making bodies.

Mr. SMITHEY. Sir, are you familiar with the fact that the President of the United States has transmitted a copy of what is known as the treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation with Israel, which contains in section 2 of article VIII the following language:

Nationals of either party shall not be barred from practicing the professions within the territories of the other party merely by reason of their alienage; but they shall be permitted to engage in professional activities therein upon compliance with the requirements regarding qualifications, residence, and competence that are applicable to nationals of such other party.

There is no limitation in there with respect to the practice of the profession of law.