where she had been employed, was sold. Since that time she has on numerous occasions entered the United States as a commuter by presentation of her Form I-151, Resident Alien Identification Card, and a false letter of employment which showed that she was still employed in her sister's restaurant. The last commuter stamp on the false employment letter contained an expiration date of March 13, 1966 when she again sought admission as a commuter on April 25, 1966. In addition, the applicant has on a number of occasions subsequent to May 1964 obtained admission to the United States as a visitor upon presentation of her Canadian birth certificate. The applicant has admitted that she has rubber stamped the restaurant letterhead and has forged and presented other such letterheads for the purpose of keeping her commuter status current. She explained she desired to conceal the fact that she had abandoned her commuter status for the reason that she expects to move to the United States in a couple of years and had heard that if she surrendered her visa she could not get it back. A commuter who has been out of employment in the United States for six months or more is deemed to have abandoned status as a permanent resident of the United States and is not admissible without again qualifying for admission as a permanent resident.1 Thus, the commuter, even though in possession of an I-151, Resident Alien Border Crossing Identification Card, is not entitled to the commuter status under such circumstances. The applicant's attempt to qualify as a commuter upon the presentation of a fraudulent employment letter was material to her admission to the United States and was used in order to facilitate her admission in the capacity in which she sought to enter as a commuter. The fraudulent letter of employment constituted "other document" which was procured by fraud or wilful misrepresentation of a material fact. She is, therefore, inadmissible on the ground stated by the special inquiry officer. The applicant's alleged illness occurred, if at all, after she had lost status as a commuter and was not a factor in the case. The order of the special inquiry officer will be affirmed. ORDER: It is ordered that the order of the special inquiry officer dated May 24, 1966 be affirmed. 1 Matter of M-D-S-, et al, 8 I. & N. Dec. 209, 213. "Matter of D—C—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 519. 'Cf. Matter of 0—, 7 I. & N. Dec. 486, 487. 4 Matter of S— and B—C—, 9 I. & N. Dec. 436. MATTER OF MORCOS In Deportation Proceedings A-13923701 Decided by Board July 26, 1966 (1) Notwithstanding that respondent's voluntary removal from the United States in 1938 pursuant to section 23 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended, terminated, as a matter of law, his status as a lawful permanent resident, his abandonment of permanent residence is established, as a matter of fact, since following removal he married, was employed, and lived abroad with his wife and child; he made no effort to return to the U.S. until 1944; and his removal request made in 1938 because he had fallen in need of public aid and thought he would be better off to go home belies his presently advanced self-serving claim that he did not intend to abandon his residence in 1938; therefore, he was ineligible for the nonquota immigrant visa as a returning resident which he acquired deliberately withholding from the consul information concerning his removal and with which he gainel entry in 1965, and he is deportable under section 241(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because he was excludable at entry under section 211(a)(3) of the Act. (2) Permission to reapply is not warranted as a matter of discretion where respondent has been absent from the United States for 27 years after removal at government expense pursuant to his request; when seeking the visa with which he last gained entry, he deliberately withheld essential information from the consular officer; his wife and child reside abroad, and there appears no reason why he cannot return to the same employment abroad he had prior to entry (he has same employer here). CHARGES: Order: Act of 1952-Section 241(a)(1) [8 U.S.C. 1251]—Excludable by law existing at time of entry [section 212(a)(17); 8 U.S.C. 1182]-Removed from the United States-No consent to reapply for admission. Act of 1952-Section 241 (a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251]-Excludable by law existing at time of entry [section 212 (a) (19); 8 U.S.C. 1182]—Visa procured by fraud or willful misrepresentation Act of 1952-Section 241 (a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251]-Excludable by law existing at time of entry [section 211(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. 1181]-Not nonquota immigrant as specified in visa. On January 10, 1966, the special inquiry officer denied the respondent's application for permission to reapply for admission to the United States, nunc pro tunc, as of the date of his last entry on January 4, 1965; granted his alternative request for voluntary departure; and provided for his deportation from the United States to Australia, alternatively to the United Arab Republic (Egypt), on the first and third charges stated in the order to show cause, in the event of his failure to so depart. The appeal from that decision, which brings the case before this Board for consideration, will be dismissed. The record relates to a 56-year-old married alien male, a native and citizen of the United Arab Republic, who was originally admitted to the United States for permanent residence on July 23, 1929. On March 28, 1938, he applied for removal from the United States to Egypt as an alien in distress or in need of public aid from causes arising subsequent to entry, pursuant to section 23 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917 (former 8 U.S.C. 102), as amended by the Act of May 14, 1937 (50 Stat. 164). In said application, respondent stated that he had received public aid from the State Relief Administration, and a representative of that agency certified that the respondent had received food, lodging and clothing from February 1, 1935 until November 28, 1938 in the amount of $168.91. In a sworn interrogation in connection with the removal application, taken on March 28, 1938, the respondent stated that he was requesting removal to his native country because: "I am broke, can't get a job, have been on relief and I think that I can go home to Egypt and be much better off than I am here." On April 18, 1938, the application for removal was granted and the respondent was removed from the United States on July 23, 1938. Nevertheless, he was admitted to the United States on January 14, 1965, his last entry, upon the presentation of a nonquota immigrant visa issued to him by the United States Consul in Cairo, Egypt, on January 4, 1965, as a returning resident. The pertinent portion of section 23 of the Immigration Act of February 5, 1917, as amended by the Act of May 14, 1937, which was in effect at the time of the respondent's removal from the United States, provided as follows: That the Commissioner of Immigration and Nationality * shall have authority to enter into contract for the support and relief of such aliens as may fall into distress or need public aid, and to remove to their native country, or to the country from whence they came, or to the country of which they are citizens or subjects, at any time after entry, at the expense of the appropriations for the enforcement of this Act, such as fall into distress or need public aid from causes arising subsequent to their entry and are desirous of being so removed, but any person thus removed shall forever be ineligible for readmission except upon the approval of the Secretary of State and the Attorney General. (Emphasis supplied.) Although the requirement of the approval of the Secretary of State has been eliminated by section 250 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1260), the provision rendering the removed alien ineligible for a visa and for admission to the United States, except with the prior approval of the Attorney General, has been retained. Moreover, section 212 (a) (17) of the Immigration and Nationality Act specifically renders inadmissible an alien who has been removed pursuant to this or any prior Act unless he has received the required consent from the Attorney General to reapply for admission to the United States. The respondent initially stated that he did not know whether he had obtained permission to return to the United States following his removal, supra. Subsequently, however, he acknowledged that he had never applied for permission to return because he did not know it was necessary. He thereafter stated that he had never received permission from the Attorney General to return to the United States after his removal. The foregoing facts of record bring the respondent's case squarely within the scope of the statutory provisions hereinbefore discussed, which are controlling in this case. Accordingly, we concur in the special inquiry officer's conclusion that the respondent is deportable on the first charge stated in the order to show cause. We find unavailing the respondent's claim that if, under the same set of facts, he were to apply for removal from the United States today his application would not be granted. It is established and uncontested that he did make such an application, it was granted and he was removed. These facts speak for themselves; they bring the respondent's case clearly within statutory provisions rendering him inadmissible to and deportable from the United States, and there our inquiry ends. There has been no substantial change in the law from the time of the respondent's application for removal to date. The special inquiry officer has held that the second charge of deportability placed against the respondent is not sustained. We concur in said official's conclusion in this respect, for the reasons stated in his opinion. Further discussion of this aspect of the case is unnecessary, except to make it clear that this factor has no bearing whatsoever on the decision in this case. The special inquiry officer has held that the respondent's voluntary removal from the United States in 1938, in and of itself, effected extinguishment of his status as a lawful permanent resident alien, as a matter of law. We agree with that holding, for the simple reason that the clear and unambiguous wording of the controlling statutory provisions, as discussed in connection with the first charge of deportability, leave no room for any other conclusion, legal or logical. Accordingly, respondent was ineligible for a visa as a returning resident when he came back to this country in 1965. Consequently, he was not entitled to status as a nonquota Immigrant and was subject to exclusion under section 211(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act at that time. He is, therefore, subject to deportation on the third charge contained in the order to show cause. Also, contrary to the contentions of counsel, the respondent's abandonment of his status as a lawful permanent resident is established by the record, as a matter of fact. He was removed from the United States at the expense of the government of this country on his own request on July 23, 1938, because: "I am broke, can't get a job, have been on relief and I think that I can go home to Egypt and be much better off than I am here." We think this statement, made at the time his application for removal was made, completely belies his present self-serving claim, advanced for the first time 27 years afterwards and when he is obviously seeking to overcome the effect of his much earlier action. In addition, after his voluntary removal to Egypt in 1938, the respondent married in that country, lived there with his wife and daughter, and was employed there. He made no move to return to the United States until 1944-a period of six years-when he filed a preliminary visa application. These facts alone are sufficient to rebut the present claim that he did not intend to abandon his domicile in 1938. Coupled with the statement he made at that time, supra, the conclusion is irrefutable that he then abandoned his status as a lawful permanent resident, factually as well as legally. Respondent's reliance upon the cases of Tejeda v. Immigration and Naturalization Service (346 F.2d 389) and McLeod v. Peterson (283 F.2d 180) is misplaced. In the former, there was a possibility that the alien's rights were prejudiced by incorrect advice on the part of a United States Consul in the Philippines who was aware of all the pertinent facts. In the latter, the alien's rights were adversely affected by his departure to Canada on the advice of an |