Europe has been close to the center of U.S. political and military concerns since World War II. Both because of its own great importance and because a major war in Europe would involve a real danger of escalation to the use of strategic nuclear weapons, arms control must try to contribute to the political and military stability of Europe. This requires examination of how nuclear and conventional weapons are integrated into a NATO deterrent; arms control proposals must focus on improving the stability of that deterrent.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons

During the three decades of the nuclear era, a great diversity of nuclear arms has been developed and deployed. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the most important negotiation on the control of nuclear arms, can of necessity deal with only a fraction of these systems. A large number and a variety of nuclear delivery vehicles of less than intercontinental range possess a massive destructive potential. They extend from nuclear artillery shells and nuclear-armed anti-submarine weapons to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and medium bombers.

The boundary between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is not precise. Strategic weapons can be used against tactical targets; tactical weapons can in some cases serve "strategic" roles. For countries that are geographically close to their adversary, shorter range nuclear delivery systems constitute a "strategic" threat or conversely, a "strategic" deterrent. For example, the strategic deterrent forces of the United Kingdom and France are of less than intercontinental range, and these nations must regard Soviet medium range bombers and Soviet medium-range missiles as a "strategic" threat.

In Europe, the deployment of tactical and regional nuclear forces is most significant. This is also the area with the greatest confrontation of conventional forces. Prospects for control of tactical nuclear weapons and conventional arms must therefore be assessed primarily in the context of the balance of forces in Europe.

Besides the intercontinental nuclear delivery sys

tems, which include ballistic missiles and aircraft, both the United States and the Soviet Union have shorter range systems. Table I shows the quantitative balance of selected categories of U.S. and Soviet tactical nuclear delivery systems. The Soviet Union, in addition to its intercontinental missiles, has more than 600 medium-range and intermediaterange ballistic missiles, and it is in the process of modernizing this force with a new missile equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVS). Nuclear-capable theater aircraft include both medium bombers and attack- and fighterbomber types. Many Soviet and U.S. high performance combat aircraft can be configured to deliver nuclear weapons (bombs or air-to-surface missiles), though they have other roles as well. The Soviet worldwide inventory of tactical combat aircraft is quantitatively larger than that of the United States, a difference which results primarily from a roughly seven-to-one Soviet advantage in continental air

defense interceptors and the large Soviet medium bomber force of nearly a thousand Badger and Blinder aircraft. The United States is developing cruise missiles that could also be given a dual capability-nuclear or conventional; the Soviet Union already has large numbers of cruise missiles, though of an earlier technological generation, on airplanes, ships, and submarines. In addition, as noted above, American and Soviet "strategic" systems, whether ICBMs, SLBMs, or strategic bombers, can be used against regional targets.

Short-range nuclear delivery systems also include limited-range surface-to-surface missiles and artillery rounds. In addition, some surface-to-air defensive launchers can fire nuclear missiles. And there are special purpose munitions (such as the U. S. atomic demolition weapons) that are not "delivered" at all but are implanted like conventional landmines.

The shorter-range missiles (Soviet Scud and Frog; U.S. Pershing and Lance) are primarily suited for nuclear delivery, though in some cases conventional warheads can be used. Artillery is a basically conventional weapon that can be given a nuclear role by using compatible nuclear shells.

The European Military Balance and Deterrence

NATO's strategic and tactical nuclear forces help to deter Warsaw Pact use of nuclear weapons in Europe. Moreover, nuclear forces enhance deterrence of a Warsaw Pact conventional attack by posing a threat to its success and making clear that such an attack risks escalation to nuclear conflict. If the Warsaw Pact powers recognize NATO's willingness to use its nuclear weapons if necessary, these weapons will help to deter conflict.

NATO's conventional forces are both an essential element of deterrence and the primary means of initial defense against conventional attack. NATO's goal is a conventional capability sufficient to hold well forward against such an attack without recourse to nuclear weapons. The closer NATO can come to this goal, the higher the nuclear threshold is raised. If one simply adds up the total conventional resources of each NATO member, including France, the alliance would appear to be in a satisfactory position. To aggregate NATO's separate national resources, however, may give a misleading impression in several ways. French forces, for instance, cannot be included for all contingencies, and some forces of NATO members are reserved for nonNATO contingencies.

NATO's resources are not always used as effi

ciently as those of the Warsaw Pact powers. The Warsaw Pact nations have largely standardized their equipment and organization on Soviet lines, resulting in major saving in procurement and development costs as well as important operational benefits. On the other hand, Warsaw Pact technology is not as advanced, and its military production is not as efficient as that of the West.

Moreover, in a short war NATO's strength at the point of attack would be limited to the forces in the region and the reinforcements that could be quickly gathered. NATO must prepare to meet an attack launched with little warning, further limiting the forces available. A posture that relied on long term mobilization, looking toward the eventual recapture of overrun territories, would not be a credible deterrent or acceptable to our allies. NATO must be able to mount a strong immediate defense against any conventional attack.

The assessment below covers only the critically important region of Central Europe. In a full examination of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance, however, each of NATO's regions would have to be separately considered.

Warsaw Pact forces in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Poland, and Czechoslovakia total about 925,000 ground force personnel, including 58 combat divisions and about 16,000 main battle tanks, plus about 3,000 tactical aircraft. Of these, about 460,000 ground force personnel, including 27 combat divisions, over 9,000 main battle tanks and about 1,200 aircraft are Soviet. Of the Soviet divisions, 20 are in the GDR along with the GDR's own 6 divisions.

As against this, the forces in the NATO countries facing them (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) comprise about 777,000 ground force personnel and about 6,000 operational main battle tanks, plus about 1,300 tactical aircraft. These figures include the U.S. (193,000 troops), Canadian, French, and British forces stationed in the area. NATO's forces, though organized in different ways, are equivalent to about 27 active divisions; these would, however, be larger than Warsaw Pact divisions.

While such numerical comparisons are always incomplete, there are significant disparities favoring the Warsaw Pact in all these measures: personnel, aircraft and especially main battle tanks. Both sides have, of course, made improvements in their forces in recent years. The Warsaw Pact nations have increased the conventional capability of their forces, by augmenting armored strength, artillery, air de

fense, and to some extent logistic support. They have increased their theater nuclear capabilities as well.

The disparity in ground personnel is particularly troubling. Moreover, this disparity would be compounded if, in a crisis, the Warsaw Pact began mobilizing reserves and reinforcing with units from the Soviet Union before NATO could begin its own mobilization. The headstart would give the Warsaw Pact a short term advantage. Forces from the Western U.S.S.R. are, of course, much closer to the Central European front than the potential reinforcements in the United States.

The great disparity in tanks aggravates this concern. It is an oversimplification to call tanks "offensive" and antitank-armed infantry "defensive"; both can be used for either offense or defense. Yet it is correct to say that a force tailored for offensive breakthrough will have proportionately more tanks than a force postured for defense, since an offensive force needs armor-heavy units for breaking through a defense line and for exploiting such a break.

The Warsaw Pact armies in Central Europe thus confront NATO with a numerically superior force, apparently designed and equipped to break through NATO's defenses. Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in ground personnel combined with an even greater superiority in tanks suggests the nature of the principal military threat in Central Europe: a Warsaw Pact armored offensive perhaps begun with little warning and designed to break through NATO defenses in a relatively short but intensely fought

war.

Nuclear Issues in Europe

NATO relies for deterrence on the full spectrum of military capabilities including tactical and strategic nuclear forces. Deterrence depends on a credible threat of retaliation at any level of aggression. For this reason, the United States and its NATO allies have continued to reject proposals for a pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. However, NATO has long sought to avoid undue reliance on nuclear weapons and to raise the nuclear threshold. For this reason, the alliance continues to improve its conventional defense capabilities.

U.S. nuclear forces in Europe provide a concrete manifestation of the U.S. commitment to its allies and an integral part of NATO's deterrent. We are continuing to improve them just as we have sought to improve our strategic forces by making them less vulnerable and avoiding weaknesses. NATO has

long sought survivable, controllable, and flexible nuclear forces. In addition, it is clearly desirable to have systems that minimize unintended damage to civilian populations.

The vulnerability of the forces to preemptive attack should be minimized. Just as in the strategic balance, relatively vulnerable forces in a crisis or in time of war may tempt opponents to attack and force decisionmakers to use them quickly-before they are destroyed.

The reduction in yield to avoid unintended damage, however, should not go so far that the clear distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons is blurred. Obscuring this distinction could both lower the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons and make escalation to nuclear warfare more likely. Suggestions have been made that the United States should develop and deploy nuclear weapons of very low yield that could be employed without many of the inhibitions that accompany "normal" nuclear weapons. Despite these arguments, the United States has committed itself publicly on this question. Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. the U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, said in 1974:

In response to speculation that further development of lowyield tactical nuclear weapons would blur the present distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons, I wish to state categorically that the United States Government has no intention whatever to treat such tactical systems as interchangeable with conventional arms. We fully appreciate that the distinction, or firebreak, between nuclear and nonnuclear arms is a major factor in preventing nuclear warfare, and we will not act to erode this distinction. The very special command-and-control and safety arrangements that apply to nuclear weapons in general have of course always applied to small-yield nuclear weapons as well . . .

In summary, NATO relies on a spectrum of nonnuclear and nuclear forces to deter aggression. Certainly the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used in a war in Europe stands as a powerful deterrent against attack. This does not, however, relieve planners of the need to face a number of difficult questions:

-If NATO relies on nuclear weapons to prevent its conventional forces from being destroyed, could NATO planners assume the enemy would restrain his own nuclear forces? Or would the enemy reply with equal (or even higher) levels of nuclear violence?

-Once tactical nuclear weapons are used, which side stands to gain militarily-the defensive or the offensive?

-When planners assess the military value of

destroying targets with tactical nuclear weapons, should not their calculations also take into account the extent to which their own assets might be destroyed by the enemy's nuclear weapons?

-How dangerous is the vulnerability of our tactical weapons? If a nonnuclear war should break out, to what extent might the existence of vulnerable tactical nuclear forces tend to encourage preemptive nuclear attack against them?

-Avoiding damage to nonmilitary targets may be a goal of NATO in case it were forced to use nuclear weapons; but would an enemy follow the same policy? Or might the enemy deliberately threaten or cause vast civilian damage in an effort to coerce the Alliance?

-To what extent do forward deployed NATO nuclear alert forces detract from NATO's conventional capability by diverting manpower and delivery systems?

Arms Control Initiatives

Analysis of the evident source of instability in the military balance in Central Europe the East's advantages in conventional forces-also suggests areas in which unilateral measures could improve the stability of NATO's deterrent position and thereby contribute to arms control objectives.

Unilateral measures to reduce NATO's vulnerability to an armored breakthrough could include increasing combat readiness, reallocating manpower to enhance combat capability, emphasizing antiarmor capability, implementing a serious program of standardizing equipment, and substantially increasing all-weather capability in tactical aircraft. Other measures which require early and rapid political action-such as improved mobilization and reinforcement capabilities-could place additional strain on NATO's political and military decisionmaking structure and could have a mixed effect on stability. In a crisis, there is often uncertainty as to whether quick action is needed to counter an opponent's decision or whether it will only exacerbate the situation. Other unilateral actions, for example reducing nuclear instabilities through improved command and communications, can alleviate this problem of crisis decision but cannot solve it. Both sides, therefore, should have an interest in avoiding the necessity for such a critical decision.

Some agreed measures that reduce uncertainty both in peacetime or in a crisis would be useful and might be negotiable. Indeed there are other improvements that only negotiations could achieve

such as agreed measures to reduce the possibility of a massive surprise attack being successful, which would lessen pressures to preempt in a crisis. This could be accomplished through negotiated reduction of force levels, and particularly of those elements, such as armor, which would make possible surprise attack, or through agreed measures to provide earlier and more reliable warning. Arrangements for assured communication in a crisis (a regional "hotline") might be another stabilizing possibility. Agreements providing for advance notification on military maneuvers comprise still another promising subject for negotiation.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced an example of such agreements. The nations participating in the conference accepted nonbinding provisions for the announcement and observation of large military maneuvers. Under these provisions, the participants agreed to give notification at least 21 days in advance of any military maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops which took place in Europe or within 250 kilometers of the Soviet Union's land and sea frontiers with Europe. In addition, they agreed to invite observers to one another's military maneuvers, promote exchanges among military personnel, and voluntarily give notification of major military movements within Europe.

Of all negotiated measures, however, the most important would be changes in the level and composition of forces in order to achieve a more stable balance, if possible at lower levels of forces and expenditure. This is the objective of the continuing talks with the Warsaw Pact.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations have been in progress in Vienna since November 1973. Both NATO and Eastern (Warsaw Pact) participants are agreed that the central objectives of the talks are to reduce the possibility of armed conflict and to strengthen peace in Europe without diminishing the security of any party.

The NATO nations directly participating in the talks are Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Warsaw Pact direct participants are Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and the Soviet Union. Direct participants are those states which have forces in the geographic area to be covered the so-called "reductions area."