the TTBT are being derived from explosion of the devices. This could be a useful precedent in U.S.Soviet cooperation in implementing future agreements concerned with arms control.

On the occasion of the signing of the treaty, President Ford observed,

The Treaty we are signing today is an historic milestone in the history of arms control agreements: For the first time it provides for extensive cooperative arrangements for on-site observation in monitoring underground nuclear explosions. ... This accomplishment in agreeing to on-site observation demonstrates that our two countries can soberly negotiate responsible and beneficial agreements despite the difficulty of the challenge.

A joint Consultative Commission will be established to discuss any questions of compliance and to develop further specific details of the onsite inspection process as needed.

"Preventive" Arms Control Measures

Of the agreements signed during the past three decades, several are based on the premise that it is easier to exclude armaments before they are deployed than to eliminate or control them once they have been introduced. These agreements represent the foresight of nations in attempting to prevent conflicts and confrontations in specific geographic areas or environments before they are made feasible by advances in technology.

The first such agreement was the Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959 and brought into force in 1961. It prohibits military activity of any kind on the continent of Antarctica and permits any of the 18 parties to inspect facilities there. The United States has conducted four such inspections, in 1964, 1967, 1971, and 1975.

U.S. observers, as well as inspection teams from other countries, have all reported favorably. All facilities are open to the inspectors. No military activities, armaments, or prohibited nuclear activities have been observed and all scientific programs have been in accord with the Antarctic Treaty.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 and the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971 are examples of the "preventive" type of agreements. The former forbids

the testing or deployment of weapons of mass destruction or the establishment of military bases in outer space, and provides for inspection of any installation on the moon or other celestial bodies. The latter bans the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on or beneath the ocean floor, and provides for observation and, where necessary, inspection of activities undertaken there by any of the parties. Both treaties allow inspections to be carried out at the discretion of any of the parties.

The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, unlike the two agreements described above, is the first preventive measure to deal with a populated area. The 22 Latin American signatory nations have committed themselves to prevent in their respective territories "the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons..." There are two protocols to the treaty dealing with matters that concern non-Latin American countries. Protocol I calls on nations outside the treaty zone with territories in the zone to place them under the same restrictions as the treaty parties. Four powers have such territories: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, and the United States. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have signed and ratified Protocol I. The United States has not signed Protocol I because of special security arrangements relating to the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. France also has not signed. In Protocol II, nuclear-weapons countries undertake to respect the denuclearized status of the zone. The United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the People's Republic of China have adhered to Protocol II; the Soviet Union has not.

Other agreements are intended to eliminate the use of specialized weapons that are widely viewed as peculiarly repugnant or destructive to man and his environment. The Biological Weapons Convention (1972) prohibits development, production, and stockpiling of such weapons. In January 1975 the United States ratified this convention as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol which prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. The United States is pursuing the negotiation of an agreement effectively to prohibit chemical weapons.

In his message to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in Geneva in May 1975, President Ford restated the United States policy of promoting international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while insuring that it should not be misused as a means of mass destruction. On the possibilities of misuse, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who led the U.S. Delegation to the NPT Review Conference, warned: "The dangers resulting from nuclear proliferation are shared by all, nuclear powers and nonnuclear weapon states alike."

The problem of nuclear proliferation is inherent in the process of uranium fission which gives us access to nuclear energy. Once this process had been discovered and used for military purposes, it was likely that other nations would follow suit. The United States has sought to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the Baruch plan for international controls proposed in the United Nations in 1946.

But since the advent of the nuclear era, efforts have also proceeded to develop nuclear energy for nonmilitary ends, especially for generating electric power. Nuclear weapons and the nuclear fuel cycle depend principally on the same technology. Both also use much the same materials and types of production facilities. The essentials of weapon design are no

longer secret, and the manufacturing techniques are within the abilities of many nations.

Proliferation Potential of Nuclear Reactors

As a result, the possession of a civilian nuclear power plant can start a country down the path toward the ability to make nuclear weapons-whether or not that country wants weapons on the day it signs the contract for a power reactor. Large civilian nuclear reactors use or generate substantial quantities of fissionable material. This material-if diverted from civil uses and further processed-can be used to make nuclear weapons.

The table below indicates the number of nuclear weapons that can be manufactured annually from the fuel of various reactor types. Precise numbers of potential weapons will depend on the specific characteristics of reactors and weapons design; but in general a 1,000 megawatt reactor has the potential to provide material for a score of nuclear weapons each year.

To obtain nuclear weapons, a nation would have to: (1) design a weapon and obtain the nonnuclear components; (2) separate plutonium from spent reactor fuel in a reprocessing facility; (3) violate agreements not to divert materials from civilian purposes; and (4) if a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty,

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withdraw from it or violate it. United States policy, of course, seeks to avert such developments,

By 1985, nearly 40 countries are expected to have enough plutonium in the spent fuel from their power reactors for each to make a few bombs. This estimate does not take into account the possibility that a nation unable to produce weapons might obtain them from others. Some of these countries may choose to separate plutonium from the spent fuel. Even though the plutonium may be intended for use in reactors, the ready availability of such fissile material is the most critical factor in being able to develop a weapon.

Incentives To Go Nuclear

In the past concern usually centered on proliferation among the advanced industrial states because of their technical capability to make weapons.

Perhaps a greater proliferation risk today exists among states outside alliance or other security systems or among states that are uncertain of their alliance relationships and feel threatened. At the same time, it is becoming easier for such nations to get their own nuclear weapons.

One of the most troublesome aspects of proliferation is its built-in tendency to accelerate: a "little" can quickly lead to a great deal more. Countries that acquire nuclear weapons create an incentive for their regional or status rivals to follow suit-and these in turn may stimulate still others to pursue an option. It appears that there are a few critical countries which, if they decide to obtain nuclear weapons, would eventually lead several more nations to imitate them. Countries that do not now desire to have nuclear weapons may acquire the motive as their neighbors begin to build nuclear explosives.

We must also be concerned about the possibilities of a "gray market" for nuclear weapons or their critical components. If nuclear nations should sell such items to nonnuclear nations, it could become virtually impossible to limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Consequences of Proliferation

What are the likely consequences of much more proliferation? The United States has designed its defense posture to meet the threat of nuclear attack from one or two clearly identifiable and presumably rational adversaries, rather than from any of a large number of different sources. Our allies, who form a

vital part of our security structure, and to whose defense we have committed military forces, would find their defense planning similarly upset.

The notion has sometimes been expressed that the spread of nuclear weapons would not really harm the United States, and might even be beneficial because nuclear deterrence would extend to more nations. But our national security could be gravely affected.

Nations that newly acquire nuclear weapons might behave prudently, but we should not depend on it. In view of the intense rivalries that exist among many of the smaller nations which appear interested in nuclear weapons, the likelihood of direct nuclear threats and of actual use of weapons would increase. Internal events in such countries-military mutinies, coups, or civil wars-could suddenly assume great international significance if nuclear weapons were involved. The physical control of nuclear weapons costs substantial sums in the advanced nations. In less advanced, or internally unstable nations, such weapons could pass out of government control, perhaps ending up in the hands of terrorists and ultimately threatening distant nations. Moreover, the nuclear forces of small countries would tend to be highly vulnerable to surprise attack, thus placing a premium on the first strike, and threatening to turn every crisis into a local nuclear war.

While proliferation would immediately threaten the traditional enemies of new nuclear weapon states, it might also complicate attempts to reduce tensions between the major powers. In many of the situations where traditional rivals could become armed with nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union might find themselves lined up on opposite sides of the confrontation.

In summary, a world of many nuclear weapons states could become extremely unstable and dangerous.

Nevertheless, the situation is not hopeless. As the proliferation threat has developed, so have efforts to control it. Today, in contrast to only a year ago, all of the world's major nuclear supplier states have adopted policies to slow down proliferation.

There is, of course, no guarantee that efforts to control proliferation will succeed, but proliferation can at least be delayed and perhaps prevented indefinitely. Many countries that could make nuclear weapons have not done so, which suggests that the spread of weapons-were it to occur-need not be inexorable or rapid.

Potential nuclear weapons nations differ greatly in

their resources, relations with neighbors, alliance ties to great powers, political stability, and incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. This diversity requires a variety of means to discourage such nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.

One means is to reduce the incentives nonnuclear weapons countries have to become nuclear weapons states. A second means is to try to slow the growth in capacity of countries to develop nuclear weapons among those now lacking this capacity. A third means is to keep the critical timethe time required to move from a civilian safeguarded status to the manufacture of a nuclear weapon as long as possible. This critical time may create the opportunity to change political purposes, resolve disputes, and take countervailing actions. U.S. policy is moving along all of these paths.

Reducing Incentives

In general, the most effective way to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons is by reducing incentives to "go nuclear." Today, about 20 countries have the technical competence and separable fissile material to design and build nuclear explosives. Only six have done so. Why not the others? Because the majority did not have motivation. Some have not felt threatened; others, although threatened, have felt adequately protected by an alliance; and still others have felt that acquiring nuclear weapons would cause adversaries and allies to react and perhaps leave them worse off.

Among the motives for acquiring nuclear weapons are the desire for greater international status, the desire to gain a superior position in a region, more effective defense against an adversary, and insurance against an uncertain future. But a review of the countries that seem most interested in obtaining nuclear weapons in the next decade suggests that an extremely important factor is alliance. Those countries that are protected by firm alliance seem not to be strongly motivated toward developing their own nuclear weapons. Those outside an alliance or with a weakening relationship are more strongly motivated. The message is clear: the erosion of alliances strongly increases the pressure for independent nuclear capabilities.

This means the United States must pay close attention to the needs for security felt by nonnuclear nations. These states are less likely to want nuclear weapons if they are protected from threat and attack by dependable security alliances.

One proposal to discourage nuclear proliferation

would have nuclear weapon states pledge never to use nuclear weapons against nonweapon states, which, it is argued, would reduce the incentive to build opposing nuclear forces. This pledge, however, could undermine the nuclear deterrence of existing collective security agreements, and so could ultimately drive more nations to seek their own independent nuclear weapons.

Nuclear-free zones may be another barrier to proliferation. Here, parties in a region agree to deny themselves nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapon states pledge not to introduce weapons into the region. The Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty is an example. In this context the nonuse pledge by nuclear weapons powers may have genuine merit.

Safeguards

Safeguards are measures intended to detectand thereby deter-diversion of material in the civil nuclear fuel cycle to military use. They include accounting procedures to keep track of nuclear materials; on-site inspection to verify their location and condition; and equipment such as seals, cameras, and sensing devices to detect whether materials are stolen or secretly diverted.

More specifically, safeguards consist of the set of measures adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Under the NPT nonnuclear nations agree to accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear programs, and all parties agree to require them on exports to nonnuclear weapon states.

The IAEA system of safeguards, if adequately implemented, can provide an international system for tracking nuclear materials. It applies to nearly all operating civil nuclear facilities in nonnuclear weapon states, and in the future will apply to facilities exported by major suppliers whether or not they are parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty.

There is, however, room for improvement both in the technical thoroughness and the timeliness of safeguards. Improvement in the technical quality of safeguards is the objective of a substantial part of ACDA's research program. Recently this program has included the following activities:

-external research to improve TV surveillance, spent fuel assays, and the remote monitoring of seals on sensitive equipment;

-technical support to the IAEA for verification of plutonium quantities and for minimization of measurement errors;