On August 28, 1959, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. had announced that the Soviet Union would not resume testing except "in case of resumption [by the Western Powers] of nuclear weapons tests." There was no time limit contained in this pledge. France had begun testing, however, and there were frequent Soviet warnings that the consequences of French testing would be the responsibility of "the Western Powers." On May 15, 1961, following a French test 2 weeks earlier, Soviet Ambassador Tsarapkin told the Geneva disarmament talks:

The continuance of nuclear weapon tests by France places the Soviet Union in a situation which may compel it to resume atomic and hydrogen bomb tests...

The commitment of both sides to the testing moratorium was thus hedged and tentative. Tension was heightened enormously when the Soviet Union resumed testing on August 30, 1961 with an extensively prepared and highly publicized test series. There had not been any further French testing to provide even an excuse for this action, which was clearly intended to demonstrate Soviet power and influence the crisis over Berlin. The political impact probably was worse than if there had been no moratorium. American public opinion was shocked and embittered. When the Soviet Union completed its test series and proposed a new moratorium, President Kennedy, in an address on March 2, 1962 declared:

We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the advantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an uninspected moratorium. Some may urge us to try it again, keeping our preparations to test in a constant state of readiness. But in actual practice, particularly in a society of free choice, we cannot keep topflight scientists concentrating on the preparation of an

experiment which may or may not take place on an uncertain date in the future.

Ironically, the negotiating deadlock on a test ban treaty was finally broken by another U.S. unilateral initiative. Speaking at American University on June 10, 1963, President Kennedy pledged that the United States would refrain from conducting nuclear tests in the atmosphere as long as other states also refrained. He indicated that a ban limited to atmospheric testing could be adequately verified by means acceptable to the Soviet Union. There was an almost immediate Soviet expression of interest and the Limited Test Ban Treaty was initialed 6 weeks later in Moscow.

If the 1963 proposal is an example of a successful unilateral initiative followed by negotiations, the earlier efforts demonstrate the inadequacy of unilateral actions alone as a substitute for negotiated agreements lasting a longer period. When nations disagree, unilateral initiatives cannot bridge the gap. There is danger that each side will merely put forward its own terms on an "all-or-nothing" basis.

Arms control must be a continuing and expanding process. Measures which limit or restrain competition in one area must not exacerbate it elsewhere. For example, despite the obvious importance of efforts to limit strategic arms, these weapons are only a small part of the armaments of the superpowers, consuming only a fraction of their military budgets. They by no means even include all nuclear weapons. As the strategic balance stabilizes, the tactical or regional balances, both nuclear and conventional, increase in importance. Also, limitations on nuclear weapons must be supplemented by limitations on conventional weapons and on arms transfers. Nor can arms control be limited to the superpowers alone. The interests of all the nations of the world are intimately involved in arms control.

Within the past decade and a half, the United States has signed more than a dozen international treaties and other agreements limiting or prohibiting armaments. Some of the agreements have been signed by almost all nations; others are bilateral agreements between the two major nuclear powers.

These agreements have worked well, not only in achieving their specific objectives but also in providing confidence and security on which further agreements can build.

Nonproliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) binds nations possessing nuclear weapons not to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives to any other country and commits nonnuclear nations not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It also requires nonnuclear nations to subject all of their peaceful nuclear activities to international safeguards, and requires all parties to insist that any country which imports nuclear materials or equipment from them shall accept international safeguards. It contains assurances with respect to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and pledges continued good faith efforts toward nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The treaty was negotiated in the Geneva-based Disarmament Conference and entered into force in May 1970. The negotiators provided that a conference of the parties should be held 5 years after its entry into force "to review the operation of this Treaty with a view of assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." The NPT Review Conference was held in Geneva in May 1975. Fifty-eight nations (including virtually every party that had any nuclear activities) and seven signatories as well as observers from seven nonsignatory nations attended.

Even before the review conference began, it served the beneficial purpose of stimulating adherences to the Treaty. There had been virtually no movement toward adherence for several years, and none since India's first nuclear explosion in May 1974, but with the expectation of the review conference this picture changed dramatically. In the weeks

preceding the conference, the treaty was ratified by the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Republic of Korea, and it was submitted to the Japanese Diet for ratification. Three ratifications including that of Libya occurred during the conference. Three more parties have since been added, including Japan. As of July 1976, there were 99 parties to the Treaty and 12 other signatory states, in several of which the ratification process had begun.

However, the treaty does not yet enjoy the participation of all nations which have the potential for acquiring nuclear weapons. Among those nations which have not signed the treaty are Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Spain. As noted, India has exploded a nuclear device, although the Indian government has stated that the test was a part of a peaceful nuclear explosion program. France and China, both nuclear-weapons countries, have not signed. Neither nation has transferred nuclear weapons to any other nation, however, and the French Government has publicly stated it "... will behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty."1

On the last day, the review conference adopted by consensus a final declaration, reflecting the month-long deliberations of the two main working committees. Several delegations, while not objecting to the consensus, submitted interpretative statements or made oral statements explaining their positions. The U.S. Representative made an oral interpretative statement, to be a part of the permanent record, which set forth primarily the U.S. position on efforts to stop the nuclear arms race.

In adopting the final declaration, the conferees confirmed that the obligations undertaken by the parties not to transfer or acquire nuclear weapons had been faithfully observed and reaffirmed the vital role of the NPT in international affairs.

The conference laid to rest any lingering apprehension that the international inspection regime administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would be rejected by any of the parties. The conferees strongly endorsed the neces

1 Address by the French representative to the United Nations General Assembly June 12, 1968.

sity for IAEA safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons purposes. They recommended that safeguards contain appropriate provisions for continuance upon reexport and that they preclude the diversion of safeguarded material to any nuclear explosive device.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

The agreements resulting from the first phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are subject to a continuing review by reason of the establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) under the terms of the agreements.

The Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, were signed in Moscow in May 1972. They placed limits and restraints on some of the most important armaments of both the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the obligations assumed go to the heart of their respective concerns for national security.

During the negotiations, it was decided that there should be a continuing process for consultation to promote the objectives and implementation of these agreements, including discussing and resolving the problems which would inevitably arise. The SCC was formally established by a Memorandum of Understanding on December 21, 1972.

Each government is represented on the SCC by a Commissioner and a Deputy Commissioner, who are assisted by such staff and advisors as they deem necessary. The U.S. Commissioner is Sidney N. Graybeal, an official of ACDA. The Soviet Commissioner is Brigadier General G. I. Ustinov. The Commission holds periodic sessions in Geneva, at least twice annually. Between sessions, the Commissioners may communicate with one another through diplomatic channels concerning any matter within the competence of the Commission.

By the end of the third working session, the SCC had drafted two protocols governing the replacement, dismantling or destruction, and notification procedures for those armaments in excess of the agreed limits in the ABM Treaty and the Interim. Agreement. These protocols were signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. Specifically, their provisions govern: (1) the replacement of certain older ICBM launchers and launchers on older submarines by ballistic missile launchers on modern submarines as permitted under the Interim Agreement, and (2) the dismantling or destruction of weapons systems and compo

nents in excess of those permitted by the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The SCC is currently working out ABM replacement procedures required to implement the provisions of the Treaty and of the Protocol to the Treaty which was signed in Moscow in July 1974, and which entered into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification on May 24, 1976. This Protocol limits each side to one ABM deployment area, but permits one relocation of areas by each side if desired.

An important SCC agenda item has been the discussion of questions concerning compliance with the SALT agreements in force. The strategic weapons system covered by these agreements are of great technical complexity, and are also subject to constant military activity involving training, operational proficiency, and modernization. The task of monitoring activities related to these systems to verify adherence to the provisions of the agreements is, therefore, a complicated one, requiring sophisticated technology and a process of refining intelligence information to interpret properly the relevant facts. The SCC provides a face-to-face forum for discussing, clarifying, and resolving questions of compliance and ambiguous situations.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have brought such questions to the SCC. They have been discussed in a pragmatic, thorough manner, and in many instances the questions have been resolved. Others are under discussion.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed in the SCC that the proceedings of the Commission would be private. This has facilitated the frank exchanges necessary for effectively discharging SCC tasks and responsibilities.

Risk of War Measures

In the course of the SALT talks, two additional agreements were negotiated which are designed to reduce the risk of a nuclear disaster caused by technical malfunction, human failure, a misinterpreted incident, or any unauthorized action. The first of these is the Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Soviet Union signed in 1971. It is a pledge by both sides to take measures to improve organizational and technical safeguards and to notify the other immediately of any incident involving the possible detonation of a nuclear weapon. The SCC has discussed measures to implement this agreement.

The second agreement covers improvements in

the direct communications link-the "Hot Line"between Washington and Moscow. The original arrangement, agreed to in 1963, has been modified to take advantage of new technology, particularly the establishment of two satellite communications circuits with a system of multiple terminals in each country.

The "Hot Line" was used in an emergency situation during the 1967 war in the Middle East. Test messages are relayed daily to insure the operational effectiveness of the system.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty

In 1963, after more than eight years of negotiations seeking a comprehensive prohibition on the testing of nuclear weapons, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, to which 114 states are now parties. The failure to achieve the comprehensive ban was due to the intractable problem of distinguishing underground tests from earthquakes. Verification in the other environments where nuclear explosions were banned by the treaty was feasible by national means of detection.

Since the treaty entered into force, none of the parties has carried out a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, under water, or in outer space. The treaty included a further restriction, however, that gave rise to some problems. The parties agreed not

to carry out any nuclear-weapon-test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, in any environment (including underground) that caused radioactive debris to be present beyond the borders of the country where the explosion took place. This raised two types of problems: explosions designed to be fully contained underground but which accidentally released radioactive debris into the atmosphere that might be carried beyond national borders; and nuclear excavation explosions designed for earth moving which necessarily release some radioactive debris into the atmosphere, part of which might pass beyond national borders. The first actual occurrence of either type was a Soviet excavation explosion in January 1965. Additional Soviet nuclear explosions leading to detectable radioactive debris outside Soviet borders have occurred since then. The United States has not carried out any nuclear excavation explosions since 1968, but an accidental venting of an underground test occurred in December 1970. Following this incident, the United States substantially improved its precautions against accidental venting.

The United States has continued to work toward a comprehensive test ban treaty, but the problem of adequate verification arrangements stands in the way. It has not been possible, despite advances in seismic technology, confidently to distinguish by national technical means between underground nuclear weapons tests and earthquakes. The United States has spent over $300 million in research on

this problem, but there is still no way to have full assurance from distant instruments alone.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and PNE
Treaty

Twin agreements have been reached with the Soviet Union that are important steps in curbing underground explosions. The first, the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, was signed during the Summit meeting in Moscow in July 1974. It is inextricably bound together with the second, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, which was negotiated in Moscow from October 1974 to April of this year. It was signed May 28, 1976.

The treaty limiting weapons testing establishes a nuclear "threshold," banning tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (equivalent of 150,000 tons of TNT). The parallel treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) places exactly the same limit of

150 kilotons on the yield of any individual nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes, such as an engineering project, and an aggregate limit of 1,500 KT on group explosions.

A protocol to the treaty on weapons tests limits testing to specific test sites and describes technical data to be exchanged to facilitate verification, including such geological information as density of rock formation, water saturation, and depth of the water table. Data on a certain number of "calibration tests" will be exchanged so that the two sides can establish the correlation between given yields of explosions at the designated sites and the seismic signals produced.

The treaty governing PNE explosions provides that each party may have observers to monitor all nuclear explosions carried out on the territory of the other, when the aggregate yield of all the devices making up a group is above 150 kilotons. Such access is designed to provide assurance that no weapons-related benefits otherwise precluded by