"First, the plan must include all kinds of weapons. Outlawing any particular kind of weapon is not enough. The conflict in Korea bears tragic witness to the fact that aggression, whatever the weapons used, brings frightful destruction. "Second, the plan must be based on unanimous agreement. A majority of nations is not enough. No plan of disarmament can work unless it includes every nation having substantial armed forces. Onesided disarmament is a sure invitation to aggression. "Third, the plan must be fool-proof. Paper promises are not enough. Disarmament must be based on safeguards which will insure the compliance of all nations. The safeguards must be adequate to give immediate warning of any threatened violation. Disarmament must be policed continuously and thoroughly. It must be founded upon free and open interchange of information across national borders." The President observed that the principles were simple and practi cal and that if they were accepted and carried out genuine disarmament would be possible. Despite the absence of agreement, the President pointed out that "the will of the world for peace is too strong to allow us to give up in this effort. We cannot permit the history of our times to record that we failed by default. We must explore every avenue which offers any chance of bringing success to the activities of the United Nations in this vital area. "Much valuable work has already been done by the two disarmament commissions on the different technical problems confronting them. I believe it would be useful to explore ways in which the work of these commissions could now be more closely brought together. One possibility to be considered is whether their work might be revitalized if carried forward in the future through a new and consolidated disarmament commission." On December 12, 1950, the General Assembly met to consider the question of international control of atomic energy and had before it two resolutions. One was a resolution introduced by the Governments of Australia, Canada, Ecuador, France, the Netherlands, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In this resolution the General Assembly was asked to establish a committee composed of the members of the Security Council and Canada "to consider and report to the next regular session of the General Assembly on ways and means whereby the work of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments may be coordinated and on the advisability of their functions being merged and placed under a new and consolidated disarmament commission." Speaking in support of the resolution, the representative of the United States pointed out that once agreement was reached in atomic-energy and conventional-armaments control, the systems must be coordinated in their implementation under an over-all system of collective security. He stated further that, in the opinion of the United States, the work of the two armaments commissions should be carried forward by a single disarmament commission and that, in due course, the United States would advance its views on the status, terms of reference, membership, and program of work of a new and consolidated disarmament commission. The second resolution before the General Assembly was one introduced by the Soviet Union which called on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to prepare by June 1, 1951, "a draft convention for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and a draft convention for the international control of atomic energy, bearing in mind that both these conventions should be concluded and brought into effect simultaneously." In the debate the Soviet Union made it clear that only their own proposals for control-proposals repeatedly found to be woefully inadequate would form the basis for the draft convention on control. This stand offered no basis for hope that agreement could be reached. The General Assembly rejected the Soviet resolution, which received only 5 votes. On December 13, 1950, the General Assembly overwhelmingly adopted the jointly sponsored resolution with only the Soviet Union and four associated states voting against it. Accordingly, during 1951, questions relating to the control of national armaments can be considered by the six permanent members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. The General Assembly committee established at the fifth regular session will study and report on the coordination of their work and the advisability of their merger. E. ORGANIZATIONAL QUES- 1. Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of Member States Even before the beginning of the year the Chinese Communist regime in Peiping claimed the right to represent China in the United Nations. This claim gave rise to frequent discussions in practically all U.N. bodies concerning the principles and procedures that should be applied. In view of the difficulty of the problem and the sharp conflict of views concerning it, the Government of Cuba proposed, as a General Assembly item for the fifth regular session, the question of "Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of Member States." The Ad Hoc Political Committee discussed the question at length and appointed a subcommittee headed by the Cuban representative, Dr. Garcia Amador, to harmonize the various draft proposals which had been submitted. The United States believed that it would be helpful for the General Assembly to indicate some of the specific criteria which might be taken into consideration in the solution of questions of representation in the United Nations. Such criteria would include: 1. The extent to which a new authority exercises effective control of the territory of a member state concerned and is generally accepted by the population; 2. The willingness of that authority to accept responsibility for the carrying out by the member state of its obligations under the Charter; 3. The extent to which that authority has been established through internal processes in the member state. The majority of the Ad Hoc Political Committee, however, did not feel that the General Assembly was at this time in a position to recommend these criteria. A number of states suggested that these legal and procedural problems be studied further by either the Secretary-General, the International Law Commission, or the International Court of Justice. However, all proposals to this effect were withdrawn in the belief that the studies would not be productive at this time in view of existing world tension. A substantial majority of members agreed upon the following general principles, which were incorporated into a resolution: 1. That whenever more than one authority tries to represent a member state in the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of controversy in the United Nations, it should be considered in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circumstances of each case; 2. That when any such question arises it should be considered by the General Assembly or by the Interim Committee if the General Assembly is not in session; 3. That the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should be taken into account in other organs of the United Nations and in the specialized agencies; 4. That the attitude adopted by the General Assembly or its Interim Committee concerning any such question should not of itself affect the direct relations of individual member states with the state concerned. On December 14 the General Assembly adopted the resolution by 36 votes to 6, with 9 abstentions. The resolution is a constructive step, since it should contribute to uniformity of treatment of representation problems by U.N. bodies. 2. Admission of New Members One new member, the Republic of Indonesia, was admitted to the United Nations in 1950. Indonesia applied on September 25; the Security Council on September 26 unanimously recommended its admission; and the General Assembly on September 28 admitted it by acclamation as the sixtieth member. In 1950, 14 applications for admission to the United Nations, presented in previous years, were still pending. Of these, 9 had been vetoed by the U.S.S.R.: Austria, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Republic of Korea, Nepal, and Portugal. Five Sovietsupported candidates-Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Mongolian People's Republic, and Rumania-had never received as many as 7 affirmative votes in the Security Council or majority support in the General Assembly. The General Assembly at its preceding session had adopted nine separate resolutions on the first nine candidates mentioned above, declaring in each case that the candidate was qualified for admission and requesting the Security Council to refrain from the use of the veto in voting on membership applications, and requested the Security Council to keep all 14 applications under consideration in the light of article 4, paragraph 1, of the Charter. However, in 1950 no changes in the positions of the members of the Security Council appeared, and the Security Council did not discuss or vote on the applications. The Government of El Salvador requested the inclusion in the agenda of the fifth regular session of the General Assembly of an item on the admission of new members. The Assembly on December 4, 1950, adopted by 46 votes to 5, with 2 abstentions, a resolution submitted by Brazil, Canada, the Philippines, Sweden, and Syria again requesting the Security Council to keep all pending applications under consideration in accordance with the terms of the resolutions adopted during the fourth regular session. The United States supported this resolution. A Soviet resolution recommending that the Security Council review all of the above applications except that of the Republic of Korea was rejected by 18 votes to 22, with 13 abstentions. El Salvador submitted a draft resolution which, as amended, recommended that the Security Council reconsider the applications of the nine non-Soviet-sponsored applicants; permitted these nine applicants to send observers to sessions of the General Assembly and its committees, including the Interim Committee, in order to express their views and furnish information whenever consulted by member states; and provided that any documents submitted by these applicants to the United Nations should be circulated to all member states. This resolution was rejected by 13 votes to 19, with 19 abstentions. The General Assembly at its fourth regular session requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on the question whether under the Charter the General Assembly can admit a state to membership "when the Security Council has made no recommendation for admission by reason of the candidate's failing to obtain the requisite majority or of the negative vote of a permanent member upon a resolution so to recommend." The Court on March 3, 1950, by 12 votes to 2, gave a negative answer to this question. 3. Continuation of Secretary-General Trygve Lie in Office Acting upon a recommendation from the Security Council, the General Assembly on February 1, 1946, appointed Trygve Lie as first Secretary-General of the United Nations for a term of 5 years. With the expiration of his term of office in February 1951, it was necessary during the fifth regular session of the Assembly to take action respecting his reelection or the appointment of a successor. Following private, informal consultations among members of the Security Council, private meetings of the Council were held on October 9, 12, 18, 20, 21, 25, and 30 to deal with the matter. These meetings made it clear that the Council would not be able to agree upon a candidate, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members. On October 12 Ambassador Austin, as president of the Security Council for October, informed the president of the General Assembly that the Council had met in private session and had thus far been unable to agree on a recommendation to the General Assembly regard |