devise measures for the earliest application of articles 43, 45, 46, and 47 of the Charter regarding the placing of armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council by the member states and the effective functioning of the Military Staff Committee.

The United States and other Western delegations had no objection to the substance of the Soviet proposal. All countries were agreed that under the Charter the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining the peace and that United Nations efforts to maintain the peace would be far more successful if the Security Coun cil could function effectively. It was Soviet intransigence and abuse of the veto which prevented the Security Council from taking action and made necessary the Uniting for Peace resolution. The Soviet resolution was amended so as to make it clear that it in no way derogated from the Uniting for Peace program. As amended, it was adopted by a vote of 52 to 0, with 6 abstentions.

The second Soviet resolution related to article 106 of the Charter. That article provides that, pending the coming into force of the agreements referred to in article 43, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France should consult with one another and, as occasion requires, with other members with a view to such joint action on behalf of the organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The Soviet resolution provided that the Big Five should take steps to insure the necessary implementation of article 106 and should consult together in accordance with the provisions of that article for the purpose of taking such joint action on behalf of the United Nations as may prove necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 106 is entitled "Transitional Security Arrangements" and was intended to provide a method for taking effective enforcement action on behalf of the United Nations during the period before the Security Council acquired its own forces on the basis of article 45 agreements with member states. This article has never been invoked: nor is it likely that this article could lead to any action in the future. The article contemplates unanimous action by the Big Five. If unanimity of the Big Five could be achieved, the Security Council would be able to operate effectively and would have already established a United Nations force on the basis of article 43 agreements.

The fundamental lack of unanimity among the Big Five has, therefore, cast doubt upon the effectiveness of article 106. In the circumstances it was felt that no useful result could be achieved by calling on the Big Five to take action under this article. On the contrary, a resolution by the General Assembly to this effect would be highly

unrealistic and would reflect adversely on the need for a U. N. system of collective security under the Uniting for Peace resolution. The overwhelming majority of the members who had supported the Uniting for Peace program, therefore, voted against this Soviet resolution, and it was defeated by a vote of 5 to 39, with 11 abstentions.

SYRIA-IRAQ RESOLUTION CALLING

FOR BIG FIVE MEETINGS

In discussions on the Uniting for Peace item it was emphasized again and again that the peoples of the world desire peace and fear a new war among the nations. While the overwhelming majority of states were prepared to establish a system of collective security against aggression which might deter aggressors or, if necessary, help put down aggression, many of them felt that additional efforts must be made for peaceful settlement.

This sentiment was most clearly reflected in the response elicited by a proposal by Syria and Iraq calling on the permanent members of the Security Council to get together in order to seek a settlement of fundamental differences. Indeed, in its early form the draft resolution called for immediate meetings and a report to the General Assembly. In the discussions, however, other members pointed out that merely holding talks is not a cure for the world's ills. The United States Delegation indicated that it is always prepared to enter into discussions which are carried on in good faith and are likely to bring results. The peoples must not, however, be deluded into believing that current differences are superficial and that Big Power talks at this time could accomplish real results for world peace. Although Soviet propaganda periodically claimed that the Soviet Union was prepared to discuss questions with a view to their settlement, this meant only that the Soviet Union was always prepared to accept settlement on its own terms. Nevertheless, the United States Delegation supported the essential principle of the resolution and voted for it in its revised form. As adopted-by 57 favorable votes-the revised resolution recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that

"(a) They meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and if necessary, with other states concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter; (b) They advise the General Assembly and, when it is not in session, the Members of the United Nations, as soon as appropriate, of the results of their consultations."

2. Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities

Yugoslavia requested that the General Assembly consider at its fifth session an item entitled "Duties of States in the Event of the Outbreak of Hostilities" and submitted a proposal intended to provide additional means for deterring or terminating aggression. The Yugoslav Delegation proposed that every state which becomes involved in hostilities declare publicly within 24 hours its readiness to issue a cease-fire order and to withdraw its armed forces behind its own frontiers. A state would be required to make this ceasefire effective by midnight of the day of the declaration and to complete the withdrawal of its forces within 48 hours from the moment of the cease-fire. Any state involved in hostilities which failed to make the declaration or which, having made it, failed to comply would be considered an aggressor and held responsible for the breach of the peace.

Other delegations, including that of the United States, gave sympathetic consideration to this proposal. In its original form, however, the resolution appeared to have serious weaknesses. Generally speaking, it made no distinction between the attacker and the victim of the attack. It made no exception for hostilities undertaken under a collective self-defense treaty or on behalf of the United Nations pursuant to a U. N. recommendation. Taken by itself. moreover, the automatic cease-fire arrangement might have lent itself to use by an aggressor for its own purposes. In order to lull the victim into a false sense of security, an aggressor might make the declaration but thereafter move its troops in such way as to improve its tactical position or again attack on the pretext that the other state had failed to comply with the cease-fire provisions. Finally, taken by itself, the lapse of time necessary to carry out any arrangement for an automatic cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops might hamper instead of help the Security Council or General Assembly in dealing with a threat to the peace.

Taking into account the views expressed by other delegations, the Yugoslav Delegation revised its proposal, which was subsequently adopted by the Assembly. It provides that a state engaged in armed conflict shall take all steps practicable in the circumstances and compatible with the right of self-defense to bring the armed conflict to an end at the earliest possible moment. It requires that the state shall, within 24 hours, make a public statement proclaiming its readiness, provided that its opponents will do the same, to discontinue

military operations and withdraw its military forces on terms agreed to by the parties or under conditions indicated by the appropriate organs of the United Nations. A state engaged in armed conflict should also immediately notify the Secretary-General, for communication to the Security Council and the members of the United Nations, of the public declaration which it has made and invite the appropriate organs of the United Nations to dispatch the Peace Observation Commission to the area if it is not already functioning there. Finally, the resolution provides that the conduct of the states concerned in relation to the recommendations of this resolution shall be taken into account by U. N. organs in determining the responsibility for a breach of the peace. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 49 to 5, with 1 abstention.

While the Soviet Union opposed the Yugoslav proposal, it took the opportunity afforded by the Yugoslav item to offer a proposal of its own. The Soviet Delegation introduced a resolution in which the General Assembly would adopt a definition of aggression. The definition offered by the Soviet Union was the "Litvinov definition" which it had introduced at the Disarmament Conference held in 1933 under the auspices of the League of Nations and which, with modifications, was later incorporated in a series of international conventions to which the Soviet Union was a party. Significantly, the definition proposed by the Soviet Union was not the modified text as it appears in these conventions, which includes as aggression support or protection to armed bands which have formed within its territory and which have invaded the territory of another state.

At the San Francisco Conference on International Organization (1945) there was a movement to insert a definition of aggression in the United Nations Charter. The United States opposed this proposal. It took the position that a definition of aggression cannot be so comprehensive as to include all cases of aggression and cannot take into account the various circumstances which might enter into the determination of aggression in a particular case. Any definition of aggression is a trap for the innocent and an invitation to the guilty. The United States position prevailed at San Francisco, and the Charter adopted a system whereby the appropriate U. N. organ, in the first instance the Security Council, would determine on the basis of the facts of a particular case whether aggression has taken place.

The United States took the same position in the First Committee of the General Assembly when the Soviet proposal came up for discussion. It emphasized that a definition of aggression serves little purpose and is not consistent with the method adopted at San Fran

cisco for determining aggression. The United States also noted, in passing, that the proposed Soviet definition was markedly deficient in that it did not include as a form of aggression subversion or fomenting civil strife in the interest of a foreign power, which another resolution of the Assembly had declared to be aggression.

The states which had in the past favored a definition of aggression were not prepared to dismiss it out of hand as the United States thought should be done. It was finally decided that it should be sent to the International Law Commission which should consider the matter and formulate its conclusions as soon as possible.

3. Establishment of a Permanent Commission of Good Offices

The Yugoslav Delegation introduced another proposal which would establish a permanent Commission of Good Offices to carry out conciliation functions in respect of disputes on the agenda of the Genera! Assembly or the Security Council, or even in respect of matters which had not come before other United Nations organs.

The conciliation function of the United Nations has been the subject of study by the Interim Committee. On the basis of its proposals the General Assembly in 1949 adopted a resolution recommending that the Security Council examine the desirability of adopting the practice of appointing a special rapporteur or conciliator in connection with the consideration of any dispute. The Assembly also established in 1949 a Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation, consisting of names of prominent individuals, which could be drawn upon wher ever there was need for the services of conciliators. In actual cases also, the United Nations had in the past used prominent individuals to seek conciliation of pending disputes.

In its studies of conciliation, the Interim Committee is considering whether or not any new formal machinery for conciliation is necessary. There is still pending before it, moreover, a proposal by Lebanon which in many respects resembles the present Yugoslav proposal. The Assembly decided, therefore, to send the Yugoslav proposal and the discussions of the Assembly on the matter to the Interim Committee for study in connection with the question of establishing a permanent organ of conciliation. A resolution to that effect was adopted by a vote of 45 to 5, with 3 abstentions.